

PLOTINUS

VI



Translated by
A. H. ARMSTRONG

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PLOTINUS

VI

PLOTINUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

VI

ENNEADS

VI. 1-5



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PREFACE

TO LOEB PLOTINUS VI-VII

The text of these volumes corresponds to that of the third volume of the revised *editio minor* of Henry and Schwyzer (*Plotini Opera* III, Oxford Classical Texts, 1982), with correction of printers' errors and a few changes in punctuation, except in the following places, where the changes are indicated in the critical notes:

vol. VI	vol. VII
VI. 1. 12. 38	VI. 7. 1. 48-9
VI. 2. 5. 5	VI. 7. 7. 25
VI. 2. 9. 21	VI. 7. 7. 26-8
VI. 3. 4. 36	VI. 8. 1. 7
VI. 4. 3. 15	VI. 8. 14. 19
VI. 5. 8. 29-31	VI. 8. 18. 29
VI. 5. 10. 44	VI. 8. 21. 23
VI. 5. 12. 6	

Indices have not been provided. The availability of the recently published *Lexicon Plotinianum* (by J. H. Sleeman and Gilbert Pollet: Leiden and Leuven 1980) makes the provision of a selective word-index unnecessary and likely to be misleading; and the *Index Fontium* in *Plotini Opera* III (see above), while not complete, is very extensive and must be referred to by anyone seriously interested in the sources of Plotinus; work on its revision and expansion is continuing.

PREFACE

The preparation of Volumes VI and VII for publication has been assisted by grants from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust, which are gratefully acknowledged.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

SIGLA

- A = Laurentianus 87, 3.
A¹ = Codicis A primus corrector.
E = Parisinus Gr. 1976.
E = exemplum alterum tractatus VI. 5 in codice E a posteriore scriba scriptum.
B = Laurentianus 85, 15.
R = Vaticanus Reginensis Gr. 97.
J = Parisinus Gr. 2082.
U = Vaticanus Urbinas Gr. 62.
C = Monacensis Gr. 449.
Q = Marcianus Gr. 242.
L = Ambrosianus Gr. 667.
- w = AE
x = RJ
z = QL
- mg = in margine
ac = ante correctionem
pc = post correctionem
- H-S¹ = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio maior
H-S² = Henry-Schwyzzer, editio minor (= OCT)

ORDO ENNEADV M COMPARATVR
CVM ORDINE CHRONOLOGICO

Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.
I 1	53	II 1	40	III 1	3
I 2	19	II 2	14	III 2	47
I 3	20	II 3	52	III 3	48
I 4	46	II 4	12	III 4	15
I 5	36	II 5	25	III 5	50
I 6	1	II 6	17	III 6	26
I 7	54	II 7	37	III 7	45
I 8	51	II 8	35	III 8	30
I 9	16	II 9	33	III 9	13
Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.
IV 1	21	V 1	10	VI 1	42
IV 2	4	V 2	11	VI 2	43
IV 3	27	V 3	49	VI 3	44
IV 4	28	V 4	7	VI 4	22
IV 5	29	V 5	32	VI 5	23
IV 6	41	V 6	24	VI 6	34
IV 7	2	V 7	18	VI 7	38
IV 8	6	V 8	31	VI 8	39
IV 9	8	V 9	5	VI 9	9

ORDO CHRONOLOGICVS COMPARATIVR
CVM ORDINE ENNEADVM

chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.	chron.	Enn.
1	I 6	19	I 2	37	II 7
2	IV 7	20	I 3	38	VI 7
3	III 1	21	IV 1	39	VI 8
4	IV 2	22	VI 4	40	II 1
5	V 9	23	VI 5	41	IV 6
6	IV 8	24	V 6	42	VI 1
7	V 4	25	II 5	43	VI 2
8	IV 9	26	III 6	44	VI 3
9	VI 9	27	IV 3	45	III 7
10	V 1	28	IV 4	46	I 4
11	V 2	29	IV 5	47	III 2
12	II 4	30	III 8	48	III 3
13	III 9	31	V 8	49	V 3
14	II 2	32	V 5	50	III 5
15	III 4	33	II 9	51	I 8
16	I 9	34	VI 6	52	II 3
17	II 6	35	II 8	53	I 1
18	V 7	36	I 5	54	I 7

PLOTINUS

ENNEAD .VI. 1-5

SVMMARIVM

Τάδε ἔνεστι Πλωτίνου φιλοσόφου ἐννεάδος ἕκτης·

- VI. 1 μς' Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος α'.
- VI. 2 μζ' Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος β'.
- VI. 3 μη' Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος γ'.
- VI. 4 μθ' Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὄν ἅμα
πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον α'.
- VI. 5 ν' Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸ ὄν ἅμα
πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον β'.
- VI. 6 να' Περὶ ἀριθμῶν.
- VI. 7 νβ' Περὶ τοῦ πῶς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ιδεῶν
ὑπέστη καὶ περὶ τὰγαθοῦ.
- VI. 8 νγ' Περὶ τοῦ ἐκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ
ένός.
- VI. 9 νδ' Περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ ενός.

ENNEAD VI. 1-3

VI. 1-3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Introductory Note

THE work on the *Categories* (Nos. 42-44 in the chronological order) was composed late in Plotinus' writing life, towards the end of the six years during which Porphyry was with him (*Life* ch. 5). It is difficult not to feel as one reads it that he did not find the subject very congenial. In the first of the three treatises into which Porphyry has divided the work (Porphyry's editorial divisions correspond exactly here to the real divisions of the subject-matter, as they do not always do elsewhere) Plotinus seems to be doing his duty as a Platonic philosopher by making his contribution to the traditional polemic which some Platonists had been engaged in since, probably, the first century B.C. against the category-doctrine of Aristotle and the Peripatetics and to the joint attack by Peripatetics and Platonists on Stoic category-doctrine which had been going on since about the same period. (There were other Platonists, notably Alcinous (or Albinus) in the second century A.D. who took a more positive attitude which finally prevailed in the Platonic school, with Porphyry and Iamblichus.)

In the first twenty-four chapters of VI. 1 Plotinus seems to be very much dependent on the polemic against the Aristotelian categories of the Platonist of the second century A.D. Nicostratus (who took over the work of an otherwise unknown Lucius), about which we know something from the *Commentary on the Categories* of Simplicius: the passages of this which are relevant to the text of Plotinus are printed in the *editio maior* of Henry and

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Schwyzler.¹ In the last six chapters of the treatise it is likely that he is making use of the anti-Stoic polemic of the Peripatetic Andronicus, the editor of Aristotle in the first century B.C. and his pupil Boethus. Ancient philosophers are not at their best in polemic, and Plotinus and his Platonic and Peripatetic sources are no exceptions. Very much of the criticism is carping, superficial and tendentious, and there is very little attempt to understand the positions of Aristotle and the Stoics or to discover what they are really trying to do. The philosophical point of view is throughout that of Platonism as Plotinus understood it. Aristotle is treated as if he were a bad and metaphysically unintelligent Platonist, and the Stoics as gross and crude materialists. (Plotinus can sometimes understand Aristotle at a very much deeper level, and, even when he is criticising him, develop genuinely Aristotelian thoughts: and his own thought in some areas is much influenced by Stoicism, in ethics and in his understanding of the organic unity of the universe.)

VI. 2 is on a considerably higher level and must rank as one of the major works of Plotinus on the One-Being, the Divine Intellect, *Noûs*. Here he turns from polemic against opponents to expound the true Platonic doctrine of the Categories of the Intelligible World. These are the "greatest genera" of Plato *Sophist* 254D–257A, Being, Rest, Motion, Same and Other. Plotinus uses them in a remarkable and original way, of which this treatise gives the fullest account to be found in the *Enneads*. It has not perhaps very much to do with logic in any ordinary Aristotelian or modern sense: the "categories" are not really used as logical categories or classes. Bréhier, in his *Notice* to VI. 1–3 in his edition (p.37), puts it very well when he speaks of it as a "reflective analysis which brings to light different aspects of the same whole." The ultimate

¹ On Nicostratus see further K. Praechter "Nikostratos der Platoniker" in *Hermes* 57 (1922), 481–517 and J. Dillon *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977), 233–6.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

appeal, as always when Plotinus is speaking of the intelligible world and its source, is to a direct awareness or vision, for which discursive reasoning can only prepare us. This is very apparent in Chapter 8 and in the last three chapters of the treatise, especially Chapter 21.

In VI. 3 Plotinus returns from the intelligible to the sensible world, and does his best to provide it with a suitable Platonic set of categories. His attitude to Aristotle at this point becomes a good deal more positive, and this part of the work is more a critical adaptation than a refutation of Peripatetic doctrine. But he finds it difficult to arrive at any certain conclusions, and is more imprecise and undogmatic than usual. This is particularly apparent in the last eight lines of Chapter 3, where he suggests, though he does not pursue the suggestion, that we might be able to manage here below with only two categories, quasi-substance and relation, and in the rather impatiently agnostic last words of Chapter 27. We can see clearly in this treatise how a Platonist, who, following the *Timaeus*, does not believe that any certain and unchanging knowledge of the sense-world is possible, can be much more open and uncommitted to any particular account of the nature and structure of material things than an Aristotelian, who, while still believing that certain and unchanging knowledge is possible, must find its objects predominantly in the world of sense.

(Only Substance, Quantity, Quality, Motion and, incidentally, Relation are discussed in VI. 3. It is possible, but not certain, that Plotinus meant to continue with a fuller discussion of other categories than the summary remarks in the last chapter.)

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

Synopsis

VI. 1

Earlier opinions on the number of beings and kinds of being summarily considered. Do the ten Aristotelian categories apply to both sensible and intelligible worlds (ch. 1)? Substance: criticisms of Aristotelian doctrine: there cannot be one category of substance for both sensible and intelligible worlds (chs. 2-3). Quantity: difficulties about numbers and magnitudes, discontinuous and continuous quantity (ch. 4). Speech and time should not be classed as quantitative (ch. 5). Relation: difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine. Relations are not only in our thinking (chs. 6-9). Quality: difficulties about the Aristotelian account and the classification of qualities (chs. 10-12). When. Why make it a separate category: are not "whens" parts of time (ch. 13)? Where. Again, as with the "when", perversity of making a separate category, and putting place and what is in place in different categories (ch. 14). Action (or doing and making): critical discussion of the Aristotelian account (chs. 15-19). Affection (or passivity). Difficulties about making it a separate category, sharply distinguished from Action (chs. 20-21). Action-Affection as Relation (ch. 22). Having: is this category really necessary (ch. 23)? The same applies to Position (ch. 24).

The Stoic Categories: absurdity of the Stoic highest genus, "something": confusion in their materialistic account of substance-subject (ch. 25). Attack on Stoic materialism (chs. 26 and 27). The great Stoic mistake is reliance on sense-perception (ch. 28). Criticism of the materialistic Stoic account of Quality (ch. 29). Summary dismissal of the Stoic categories of State and Relation (ch. 30).

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

VI. 2

The Platonic genera. Genera and Principles. Being and Becoming (again, absurdity of the Stoic "something") (ch. 1). Being is one and many: its co-equal genera are also principles (ch. 2). The transcendent One cause of the genera: the genera in the unity of the One-Being: inadequacy of discursive reason to apprehend this (ch. 3). Bodily and intelligible being: Soul as a handy example of the intelligible (ch. 4). The unity and multiplicity of Soul, and of the One-Being (chs. 5 and 6). Movement as life in Soul and Intellect. Necessity also of the genus Rest (ch. 7). The discernment by direct vision of Being, Motion and Rest in Intellect: this brings with it the discernment of Same and Other (ch. 8). Are there more genera? Why the transcendent One is not a genus (ch. 9). Why the One in the One-Being is not a genus: how this One is in Being (chs. 9–11). All things, including mathematical entities, which appear to be soulless, strive towards the One and Good (chs. 11–12). Quantity and number are posterior to and derived from the five Platonic genera (ch. 13). So is quality: in the intelligible world it is the activity of substance (ch. 14). Being and the other four Platonic genera (ch. 15). There is no place for the other Aristotelian categories in the intelligible (ch. 16). The Good is not a genus: the activity, life or movement of the One-Being towards the transcendent Good is its good (ch. 17). The Beautiful belongs to Substance, Knowledge is Movement. Intellect is not a genus, but all that truly exists: and the virtues are its activities (ch. 18). The genera and their species: universal and particular in Intellect (chs. 19–20). The great vision of Intellect, in which, deriving from and along with the primary genera, Quality, Quantity, number and figure are discerned. The all-inclusiveness of Intellect (ch. 21). Exegesis of *Timaeus* 39E (the Complete Living Creature) in terms of this doctrine, with confirmatory texts from the *Parmenides* and *Philebus* (ch. 22).

ON THE KINDS OF BEING

VI. 3

Are the categories of the sense-world the same, analogously, as those of the intelligible, or different? Problems of classification in the sense-world (ch. 1). Sensible substance: matter, form and composite: the Platonic intelligible categories cannot be applied, even analogously, to sensible substance (ch. 2). Discussion of matter, form and composite continued: relation of other categories to them. Seven, five, or possibly only two categories of the sensible world (ch. 3)? What have matter, form and composite in common to make us put them in the category of "substance" (ch. 4)? Substance and substrate (chs. 4-5). What does "is" mean in the sense-world (ch. 6)? It is not matter from which things here below derive their being (ch. 7). Sensible substance as a combination of qualities and matter (ch. 8). How should the genus "sensible substance" be divided into species (chs. 9-10)? Quantity in the sense-world (chs. 11-15). Quality in the sense-world (chs. 16-20). Movement in the sense-world (chs. 21-26). Stillness in the sense-world is to be distinguished from the Platonic category Rest in the intelligible (ch. 27). Summary conclusion, with a few remarks on Relation (ch. 28).

VI. 1. (42) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ τῶν ὄντων πόσα καὶ τίνα ἐζήτησαν μὲν καὶ οἱ πάνυ παλαιοί, ἔν, οἱ δὲ ὠρισμένα, οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστοι οἱ μὲν ἄλλο οἱ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ ἔν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πεπερασμένα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἄπειρα εἰπόντες· καὶ
5 τοῖς μετ' αὐτοὺς ἐξετασθεῖσαι αὐταὶ αἱ δόξαι ἱκανῶς ἀφετάι ἡμῖν. ὅσα δ' ἐξετάσαντες τὰ ἐκείνων ἔθεντο ἐν γένεσιν ὠρισμένοις αὐτοί, περὶ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον, οἷ οὔτε ἐν θέμενοι, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐώρων, οὔτε ἄπειρα, ὅτι μήτε οἶόν τε μήτ' ἐπιστήμη ἂν γένοιτο,
10 τὰ τε πεπερασμένα εἰς ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ¹ ὑποκείμενα οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶον στοιχεῖα, γένη δὴ² τινα οὗτοι εἰρήκασιν, οἱ μὲν δέκα, οἱ δὲ ἐλάττω· εἶεν δ' ἂν τινες οἱ πλείω τούτων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι

¹ αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὰ] αὐτῶν. ὅτι <δὲ> τὰ H-S¹.

² Theiler: δὲ Enn.: del. Volkmann, H-S¹.

¹ The "extremely ancient philosophers" are the Pre-Socratics. As usual, Plotinus takes his information about them from Aristotle and dismisses them very summarily. "One being": Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus; "a definite number": Empedocles; "an infinite number": Anaxagoras, Democritus.

² Aristotle and the Stoics.

³ The reference may be to Peripatetic discussions of the Categories by Andronicus, Boethus, and their followers

VI. 1. ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

1. The extremely ancient philosophers investigated beings, how many there were and what they were: some said there was one being, some a definite number, and some an infinite number; and in each of these groups, some said the one being was one thing and some another, and the same applies to those who said the number of beings was limited and those who said that it was infinite.¹ And since these views have been sufficiently examined by those who came after them, we can let them go. But since these later philosophers,² after examining the views of the earlier ones, themselves placed beings in a number of definite kinds, we must consider them and see how many the kinds are; these philosophers did not posit one being, because they saw many even in the intelligible realm, nor an infinite number, because this was impossible and knowledge could not occur, and some of them posited ten of their numerically limited kinds and some fewer (they have said that the foundations of being are not rightly thought of as a sort of elements, but as genera of some kind); but there might have been some who posited more than these ten.³ But there are differences in their genera (first century B.C.): cp. Dexippus *In Categ.* I 37, p. 32,10-34.2. But the wording is vague, and Plotinus clearly did not know much about these people and was not very interested in them.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

διαφορά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ γένη ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα
τῷ γένει τοσαῦτα.

- 15 Πρῶτον τοίνυν τὴν διαιρουμένην εἰς δέκα τὰ ὄντα
ληπτέον ἀνασκοποῦντας, πότερα δέκα γένη δεῖ νομίζειν
αὐτοὺς λέγειν κοινοῦ ὀνόματος τυχόντα τοῦ ὄντος ἢ
κατηγορίας δέκα. ὅτι γὰρ οὐ συνώνυμον τὸ ὄν ἐν ᾧ ἅπασι,
λέγουσι καὶ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐκείνο πρῶτον
20 ἐρωτητέον, πότερα ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐν τε τοῖς
αἰσθητοῖς τὰ δέκα, ἢ ἐν μὲν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἅπαντα, ἐν
δὲ τοῖς νοητοῖς τὰ μὲν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
ἀνάπαλιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ἐξεταστέον, τίνα κακεῖ τῶν δέκα, καὶ εἰ
τὰ ἐκεῖ ὄντα ὑφ' ἐν γένος ὑπακτέον τοῖς ἐνταῦθα, ἢ
25 ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ἐκεῖ οὐσία ἢ τε ἐνταῦθα· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο,
πλείω τὰ γένη. εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἄτοπον τὸ αὐτὸ
σημαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν ἐπὶ τε τῶν πρώτως ὄντων καὶ τῶν
ὑστέρων οὐκ ὄντος γένους κοινοῦ, ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον
καὶ ὕστερον. ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν
οὐ λέγουσιν· οὐ πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὄντα διαιρεῖσθαι
30 ἐβουλήθησαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα παραλελοίπασιν.

2. Πάλιν οὖν ἄρα γένη νομιστέον εἶναι; καὶ πῶς ἐν
γένος ἢ οὐσία; ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης πάντως ἀρκτέον. ὅτι μὲν
ἐν ἐπὶ τε τῆς νοητῆς ἐπὶ τε τῆς αἰσθητῆς κοινὸν εἶναι

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

as well: for some of them make the genera principles of being, others the beings themselves, generically the same in number.

First, then, we must take the opinion which divides beings into ten, and see whether we think the philosophers are saying that there are ten genera which fall under the common name of "being", or ten categories. For they say, and say rightly, that being does not mean the same thing in all ten; but we should rather ask them this first, whether the ten are there in the same way in the intelligible beings and the beings perceived by sense, or whether they are all in the beings of the sense-world, but in the intelligibles some are there and some not: for it certainly cannot be the other way round. At this point we must examine which of the ten are also there in the intelligible, and if the things there can be brought under one genus with those here below, or whether the term "substance" is used ambiguously of that there and this here. But if this is so, then there are more than ten genera. But if "substance" is used in the same sense there as here, it will be absurd for it to mean the same thing when applied to primary beings and those which come after them, since there is no common genus of things among which there is priority and posterity. But in their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible beings: so they did not want to classify all beings, but left out those which are most authentically beings.

2. Again, then, are they really to be considered as genera? And how is substance one genus? For we must in any case begin with this. That there cannot be one common substantiality applying to both

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἀδύνατον τὸ τῆς οὐσίας, εἴρηται. καὶ προσέτι ἄλλο τι
 5 ἔσται πρό τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρὸ τῆς αἰσθητῆς, ἄλλο τι
 ὃν κατηγορούμενον κατ' ἀμφοῖν, ὃ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε
 ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη· ἔσται γὰρ ἢ τὸ σῶμα ἀσώματον, ἢ τὸ
 ἀσώματον σῶμα. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν τῇδε
 οὐσιῶν ζητητέον, τί κοινὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἶδους
 10 καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα οὐσίας λέγουσιν
 εἶναι, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἴσον εἰς οὐσίαν ἔχειν, ὅταν μᾶλλον
 λέγεται τὸ εἶδος οὐσία ἢ ἡ ὕλη· καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἱ δ' ἂν
 εἴποιεν τὴν ὕλην μᾶλλον. αἱ δὲ πρῶται λεγόμεναι οὐσῖαι
 πρὸς τὰς δευτέρας τί ἂν ἔχοιεν κοινόν, ὅποτε παρὰ τῶν
 15 προτέρων ἔχουσιν αἱ δευτέραι τὸ οὐσῖαι λέγεσθαι; ὅλως
 δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ τὸ
 ἴδιόν τις ἀποδοίη, ἥδη ἔχει τὸ τί ἐστι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲ
 τὸ “ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν ἀριθμῶ δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων” ἐπὶ
 πάντων ἀρμόσει.

3. Ἄλλ' ἄρα μίαν τινὰ κατηγορίαν λεκτέον ὁμοῦ
 συλλαβοῦσι τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐξ
 ἀμφοῖν; οἷον εἴ τις τὸ τῶν Ἑρακλειδῶν γένος ἐν τι
 λέγοι, οὐχ ὥς κοινὸν κατὰ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀφ' ἐνός·
 5 πρῶτως γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐκείνη, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ ἥττον τὰ
 ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει μίαν κατηγορίαν τὰ πάντα εἶναι;
 καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὰ λεγόμενα

¹ This seems to be a polemical reference to the widest Stoic category *τι* (“sort of something”), which included both corporeals (the only realities) and incorporeals (which existed only in thought): cp. *SVF* II 117, 329, 331–3; cp. ch. 25, 1–10.

² A critical reference to Aristotle *Categories* 5. 4a10–11.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

intelligible and sensible substance has been said already. And besides, there will [if this is so] be something else before both intelligible and sensible substance, which is something else and is predicated of both, and this could not be either body or bodiless: for [if it is] body will be bodiless, or the bodiless body.¹ Of course we must also investigate this point about the substance here below themselves, what there is common to matter and form and the composite of both. For they say that all these are substances, but that they are not equal in respect of substance, when it is said that form is more substance than matter—quite correctly; but there are those who would say that matter is more substance. But what could the substances which they call primary have in common with the secondary ones, when the secondary ones derive their name of substances from those prior to them? But in general it is impossible to say what substance is: for even if one gives it its "proper characteristic", it does not yet have its "what it is", and perhaps not even the definition "that which is one and the same in number which is receptive of the opposites" will fit all cases.²

3. But ought we really to call substance one category, collecting together intelligible substance, matter, form and the composite of both? This would be like saying that the genus [or clan] or the Heraclids was a unity, not in the sense of a unity common to all its members, but because they all come from one ancestor: for the intelligible substance would be so primarily, and the others secondarily and less. But what prevents all things from being one category? For everything else which is said to exist

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

εἶναι. ἡ ἐκεῖνα μὲν πάθη, αἱ δ' οὐσίαι ἐφεξῆς ἄλλως.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ οὕτως οὕτω ἔχομεν ἐπερείσασθαι τῇ
10 οὐσίᾳ, οὐδὲ τὸ κυριώτατον λαβεῖν, ἢν' ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ
τὰς ἄλλας. συγγενεῖς μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔστωσαν πᾶσαι αἱ
λεγόμεναι οὐσίαι ἔχουσαί τι παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα γένη. τί ἄρα
γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ "τί" καὶ τὸ "τόδε" καὶ τὸ
"ὑποκείμενον" καὶ μὴ ἐπικείμενον μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ὡς ἐν
15 ὑποκειμένῳ μηδὲ ὃ ἐστὶν ἄλλου ὄν, οἷον λευκὸν ποιότης
σώματος καὶ ποσὸν οὐσίας, καὶ χρόνος κινήσεώς τι καὶ
κίνησις τοῦ κινουμένου; ἀλλ' ἡ δευτέρα οὐσία κατ'
ἄλλου. ἡ ἄλλον τρόπον τὸ "κατ' ἄλλου" ἐνταῦθα, ὡς
γένος ἐνυπάρχον καὶ ἐνυπάρχον ὡς μέρος καὶ τὸ "τί"
ἐκείνου· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν κατ' ἄλλου, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλὰ
20 ταῦτα μὲν ἴδια ἂν τις λέγοι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
εἰς ἐν οὕτω συνάγοι καὶ οὐσίας λέγοι, ἐν δέ τι γένος οὐκ
ἂν λέγοι, οὐδὲ δηλοῖ πῶς τὴν ἐννοίαν τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὴν
φύσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω· ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν τοῦ
ποσοῦ ἴωμεν φύσιν.

4. Ἀριθμὸν δὴ πρῶτον ποσὸν λέγουσι καὶ τὸ
συνεχὲς ἅπαν μέγεθος καὶ τόπον καὶ χρόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

derives from substance. Now those other existents are affections [of substances] and substances are in successive order in a different way. But besides that, in this way we are not yet able to put any weight on substance or grasp the most essential thing about it, in order that the others may come from it. Let all the so-called substances, certainly, be akin in this way and have something over and above the other genera. But what *is* this very "something" and "this here", and the "substrate" and the not resting upon or being in something else as in a substrate, nor being what it is as belonging to another, as white is a quality of body and quantity belongs to substance, and time is something belonging to motion, and motion belongs to the moved? But second substance is predicated of something else. Now here it is predicated of something else in a different way, in the sense of an immanent genus, immanent as a part, and the "what it is" of that first substance; but the [quality] white is predicated of something else because it is in something else. But one might say that these are peculiar properties of substances as compared with other things, and for this reason one might collect them into one and call them substances, but one would not be speaking of one genus, nor would one yet be making clear the concept and nature of substance. Let this discussion rest here, and let us go on to the nature of the quantum.¹

4. They say that the first quantum is number, also all continuous magnitude and place and time, and they refer all the other things they call quanta back

¹ Plotinus returns to the discussion of sensible "substance" at length in VI. 3.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

εἰς ταῦτα ἀναφέρουσιν, ὅσα ποσὰ λέγουσι, καὶ τὴν
 κίνησιν ποσὸν τῷ τὸν χρόνον, καίτοι ἴσως ἀνάπαλιν τοῦ
 5 χρόνου τὸ συνεχές παρὰ τῆς κινήσεως λαβόντος. εἰ μὲν
 δὴ τὸ συνεχές ἢ συνεχές ποσὸν φήσουσιν εἶναι, τὸ
 διωρισμένον οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποσόν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 τὸ συνεχές, τί κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἔσται τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι;
 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ποσοῖς εἶναι ὑπαρχέτω· καίτοι
 10 τοῦτο τὸ λέγεσθαι ποσοῖς ὑπάρχει, οὐπω δέ, τίς ἢ φύσις
 καθὸ λέγεται, δηλοῦται· ἀλλὰ γραμμὴ γε καὶ ἐπίπεδον
 καὶ σῶμα οὐδὲ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ μεγέθη μὲν λέγεται, ποσὰ
 δὲ οὐ λέγεται, εἴπερ τότε προσλαμβάνει τὸ ποσὸν
 λέγεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἀχθῇ δίπηχυ ἢ τρίπηχυ· ἐπεὶ
 15 καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ φυσικὸν μετρηθὲν γίγνεται ποσόν τι,
 καὶ ὁ τόπος κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ἢ τόπος. δεῖ δὲ μὴ
 τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ποσὸν λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθ’
 αὐτό, οἷον ποσότητα· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς τρεῖς βούς ποσόν,
 ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀριθμόν· βόες γὰρ τρεῖς δύο
 κατηγορίαι ἤδη. οὕτως οὖν καὶ γραμμὴ τοσήδε δύο
 20 κατηγορίαι, καὶ ἐπιφάνεια τοσήδε δύο, καὶ ἡ ποσότης
 μὲν αὐτῆς ποσόν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια διὰ τί ποσόν;
 περατωθεῖσα γοῦν οἷον τρισὶ γραμμαῖς ἢ τέτρασι λέγεται
 εἶναι ποσόν. τί οὖν; μόνον τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς φήσομεν
 ποσόν; ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν τοὺς καθ’ αὐτοὺς ἀριθμούς, οὐσίαι
 25 λέγονται οὗτοι καὶ μάλιστα τῷ καθ’ αὐτοὺς εἶναι. εἰ δὲ

¹ These are the Platonic Ideal Numbers, which Plotinus discusses in VI. 6.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

to these, and they say that movement is quantified by the quantum of time, though perhaps, conversely, time takes its continuity from movement. But now, if they are going to say that the continuous is a quantum in so far as it is continuous, the discontinuous would not be a quantum; but if the continuous is a quantum incidentally, what is this being quantitative which is common to both? Now let us agree that numbers have the property of being quanta; yet this only gives them the property of being called quanta, and it is not yet made clear what their nature is in virtue of which they are called quanta; but a line and a surface and a body are not even called quanta, but are called magnitudes but not quanta, granted that they receive the additional appellation of quanta when they are brought to a number, two cubits or three cubits: since the natural body also becomes a quantum when it is measured, and place is so incidentally, not in so far as it is place. But one must not take what is incidentally a quantum, but the quantitative in itself, like quantity: since even the three oxen are not a quantum, but their number is: for three oxen are already two categories. In this way, therefore, a line of a certain length is two categories, and a surface of a certain area is two categories, and its quantity is a quantum, but why is the surface itself a quantum? It is, at any rate, only when it is limited, by three or four lines for instance, that it is said to be a quantum. Well then, shall we assert that only the numbers are quantitative? But if we mean the numbers in and by themselves,¹ these are called substances, and are called so particularly because they are in and by themselves. But if we mean the num-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν, καθ' οὓς ἀριθμοῦμεν, οὐ
 μονάδας, ἀλλὰ ἵππους δέκα καὶ βούς δέκα, πρῶτον μὲν
 ἄτοπον δόξει εἶναι, εἰ ἐκεῖνοι οὐσίαι, μὴ καὶ τούτους,
 ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ μετροῦντες τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν
 30 αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕξω ὄντες ὥσπερ οἱ κανόνες καὶ τὰ
 μέτρα μετροῦσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντες λαμβάνονται
 εἰς τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὔτε ἐκεῖνα
 ποσὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ μετέχοντα ποσότητος, αὐτοὶ τε
 διὰ τί ποσόν; μέτρα γάρ· τὰ δὲ μέτρα διὰ τί ποσὰ ἢ
 35 ποσότης; ἢ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντες, εἰ μηδεμιᾷ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀρμόττουσι, τοῦτο, ὃ λέγονται, ἔσονται καὶ ἐν τῇ
 λεγομένη ποσότητι κείσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς αὐτῶν
 ὀρίζει ἐν, εἴτ' ἔπεισι καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσα
 μηνύει, καὶ μετρῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἢ ψυχὴ προσχρωμένη.
 40 μετροῦσα οὖν οὐ τὸ τί ἐστὶ μετρῇ· ἐν γὰρ λέγει καὶ δύο,
 καὶ ὅποια οὖν καὶ ἐναντία ἢ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἥντινα διάθεσιν
 ἔχει, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ καλόν, ἀλλ' ὅσα. τοῦ ποσοῦ ἄρα, εἴτε
 καθ' αὐτόν, εἴτ' ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσι θεωροῖτο, αὐτός, οὐ
 τὰ μετέχοντα. οὐ τὸ τρίπηχυ τοίνυν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία. διὰ
 45 τί οὖν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη; ἄρα, ὅτι ἐγγὺς τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ οἷς
 ἂν ἐγγίγηται, ποσὰ αὐτὰ λέγομεν, οὐ τῷ κυρίως ποσῷ,

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

bers in the things which participate in them, the numbers by which we count, not just units, but ten horses or ten oxen, first of all it will seem absurd that, if the numbers in themselves are substances, these [counting] numbers should not be so as well, and then [it will also seem absurd] if when they measure their subjects they exist in them, and do not exist outside them and measure them like rulers and measuring-pots. But if it is as existing on their own and not in their subjects that they are taken for measuring, those subjects will not be quanta since they will not participate in quantity, and why are the numbers themselves quantitative? For they are measures: but why are measures quanta or quantity? Presumably because, since they are among the things that exist, if they do not fit into any of the other categories, they will be what they are called and will be placed in the category called quantity. For their unit marks off one thing, and then goes on to another, and number indicates how many there are, and soul measures the multiplicity using number to help it. Therefore when it measures it does not measure what a thing is: for it says "one" and "two", whatever they are and even if they are opposites; but it does not measure what state a thing is in either, warm or beautiful for instance, but how many things there are. Number itself then, whether it is regarded in itself or in the things which participate in it, is quantitative, but its participants are not. So not the "three cubits long" but the "three". Why, then, are magnitudes also quantitative? Is it because they are near the quantum, and we call the things in which they occur quanta, not because they are quanta in the proper sense, but we call something big as if on

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἀλλὰ μέγα λέγομεν, ὥσπερ πολλοῦ μετέχον ἀριθμοῦ,
καὶ μικρόν, ὅτι ὀλίγου; ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ
μικρόν οὐκ ἀξιοῦται ποσὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι· ἀλλὰ
ὁμῶς πρὸς τι λέγουσι, καθόσον ποσὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι.
50 σκεπτέον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον. ἔσται τοίνυν οὐχ ἓν τι γένος,
ἀλλ' ὁ ἀριθμὸς μόνος, τὰ δὲ δευτέρως. οὐ κυρίως τοίνυν
ἐν γένος, ἀλλὰ κατηγορία μία συνάγουσα καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς
πῶς τὰ πρῶτως καὶ δευτέρως. ἡμῖν δὲ ζητητέον, πῶς οἱ
καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀριθμοὶ οὐσίαι ἢ καὶ αὐτοὶ ποσόν τι·
55 ὁποτέρως δ' ἂν ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ἂν κοινόν τι ἔχοιεν πρὸς
τούτους ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλ' ἢ ὄνομα μόνον.

5. Ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις πῶς;
πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγου, εἰ βούλει [μετρεῖται μὲν
γάρ].¹ ἀλλὰ λόγος ὢν τοσόσδε ἐστίν[ν]—〈μετρεῖται μὲν
γάρ〉¹—ἢ δὲ λόγος, οὐ ποσόν· σημαντικὸν γάρ, ὥσπερ
5 τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα. ὕλη δ' αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀήρ, ὥσπερ καὶ
τούτων· καὶ γὰρ σύγκειται ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἡ δὲ πληγὴ
μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος, καὶ οὐχ ἡ πληγὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ἡ
τύπωσις ἡ γιγνομένη, ὥσπερ μορφοῦσα· μᾶλλον οὖν
ποίησις καὶ ποίησις σημαντική. τὴν δὲ κίνησιν ταύτην
κατὰ² τὴν πληγὴν ποίησιν μᾶλλον ἂν εὐλόγως τις
10 θεῖτο, τὴν δὲ ἀντικειμένως πάθος, ἢ ἐκάστην ἄλλου μὲν
ποίησιν, ἄλλου δὲ πάθος, ἢ ποίησιν εἰς τὸ ὑποκείμενον,
πάθημα δ' ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ. εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν πληγὴν

¹ transposuimus.

² coniecimus: καὶ Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

the ground that it participates in a great deal of number, and small, because it participates in a little? But the big itself and the small are not considered to be quanta, but relations; but, all the same, they call them relations in so far as they appear to be quanta. But we must consider this more precisely. There will, then, not be one genus, but only number, and the other things as quanta secondarily. There is not, then, one genus in the proper sense, but one category which gathers in also the things that are somehow near quanta in a primary and secondary sense. But we [Platonists] must investigate how the numbers in and by themselves are substances, or whether they too are a kind of quantum; but, whichever way they are, those numbers would have nothing in common with these numbers here below, except the name alone.

5. But how are [articulate] speech and time and movement quanta? First of all, if you like, about speech. But it is speech and is of a certain quantity—for it is certainly measured—yet in so far as it is speech it is not a quantum: for it is something significant, like noun and verb. Like theirs, its matter is the air: for in fact it is composed of them; but it is rather the impact which is speech, and not just simply the impact but the resulting impression which so to speak shapes the air: it is therefore an action, and a significant action. Certainly one would more reasonably class this movement according to the impact as an action and the corresponding movement as an affection, or say that each of them was an action of one thing and an affection of another, or an action upon the substrate and an affection in the substrate. But if the voice is not considered in terms

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἡ φωνή, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα, δύο ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ μία ἡ
 κατηγορία ἐκ τῆς σημαντικῆς, εἰ <τὸ σημαντικὸν
 ταύτης, τὸ δέ>¹ συσημαντικὸν ἐκείνης τῆς
 15 κατηγορίας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος, εἰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν
 λαμβάνοιτο, τί ποτε τὸ μετροῦν ληπτέον· ἢ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἢ
 τὸ νῦν. εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετρούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ τοσόνδε
 εἶναι, οἷον ἐνιαύσιος, ἔστω ποσόν, κατὰ μέντοι τὸ
 χρόνος εἶναι φύσις τις ἄλλη· τὸ γὰρ τοσόνδε ἄλλο ὄν
 20 τοσόνδε ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποσότης ὁ χρόνος· ἡ δὲ
 ποσότης οὐκ ἐφαπτομένη ἄλλου αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη τὸ
 κυρίως ποσόν. εἰ δὲ τὰ μετέχοντα πάντα τοῦ ποσοῦ
 ποσὰ θεῖτο, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ποσόν. τὸ δὲ
 ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον ἴδιον εἶναι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐπ’
 αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, οὐ τῶν μετεχόντων, ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ
 25 συμβεβηκός, οὐχ ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα, ὥσπερ ὁ τρίπηχυς
 ποσός, σννηρημένος καὶ οὗτος οὐκ εἰς γένος ἔν, ἀλλ’ ὑφ’
 ἓν καὶ μίαν κατηγορίαν.

6. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι οὕτως ἐπισκεπτέον, εἴ τις κοινότης
 γενικὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον εἰς ἓν, καὶ
 μάλιστα ἐπὶ τούτου, εἰ ὑπόστασις τις ἢ σχέσις ἐστίν

¹ Igal.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

of the impact but of the air, there would be two categories and not one to be extracted from the significant action, if the significant thing is to be placed in this category and the co-significant in that.¹ As for time, if it is understood in its measuring capacity, we must grasp what it is that measures: for it is either soul or the "now". But if it is understood as measured, let it be a quantum in respect of being of a certain length, a year's length for instance; but in respect of being time it is some different nature: for the so much is a something else which is so much. Quite certainly time is not quantity; but it is just exactly quantity which has no hold on anything else which is the quantum in the strict and proper sense. But if one classes all the things which participate in the quantitative as quanta, then substance will be the same thing as quantum. But that "equal and unequal are characteristic of the quantum"² must be understood of the quantum itself, not of the things which participate in it, except incidentally, not in so far as they are those things which they are, as the man three cubits tall is; he too is not brought together into one genus, but under one genus and one category.

6. As regards relation, we should enquire about it in this way: whether there is any generic community in it, or whether it comes together in another way into one. And it is particularly important when dealing with this category to ask whether this state of being related has any substantial existence, for

¹ We adopt here Igal's conjecture, which gives good sense and accords with Simplicius *In Categ.* 6, p. 131. 8–10.

² Aristotle *Categories* 6. 6a26–7

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

αὕτη, ὥσπερ ὁ δεξιὸς καὶ ἀριστερὸς καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον
 5 καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἣ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 ὕστερον λεχθέντος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πρότερον λεχθέντος
 οὐδεμία, ἣ οὐδαμοῦ τοῦτο. τί δὴ ἐπὶ διπλασίου καὶ
 ἡμίσεος καὶ ὅλως ὑπερέχοντος καὶ ὑπερεχομένου, καὶ
 αὐτὴ ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως, ἀνακλίσεως, καθίσεως,
 10 στάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ πατρὸς υἱέος, δεσπότης δούλου, καὶ
 πάλιν ὁμοίου ἀνομοίου, ἴσου ἀνίσου, ποιητικοῦ τε αὐτὴ
 καὶ παθητικοῦ, καὶ μέτρου καὶ μετρούμενου; καὶ
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἣ μὲν πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, ἣ δὲ
 πρὸς αἰσθητόν. ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἔχει ἂν πρὸς
 ἐπιστητόν μίαν τινὰ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑπόστασιν [πρὸς τὸ
 15 τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ εἶδος],¹ καὶ ἣ αἴσθησις πρὸς αἰσθητόν
 ὡσαύτως, τό τε ποιητικὸν πρὸς τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἔργον
 ἐν ἀπεργάσασθαι, καὶ τὸ μέτρον πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον
 τὴν μέτρησιν. ὅμοιον δὲ πρὸς ὅμοιον τί ἂν ἔχει
 ἀπογεννώμενον; ἢ οὐκ ἀπογεννώμενον, ἀλλὰ ὑπάρχον,
 τὴν ταυτότητα τὴν ἐν τῷ ποιῶ. ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸ ἐν
 20 ἐκατέρῳ ποιὸν οὐδέν. οὐδὲ τὰ ἴσα· τὸ γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ
 ποσῷ προϋπάρχει πρὸ τῆς σχέσεως. ἣ δὲ σχέσηις τί ἄλλο
 ἢ ἡμετέρα κρίσις παραβαλλόντων τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ὄντα ἃ
 ἐστὶ καὶ λεγόντων “τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος
 ἔχει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιότητα” καὶ “οὗτος πεποίηκε
 25 τοῦτον καὶ οὗτος κρατεῖ τούτου”; καθίσις τε καὶ στάσις
 παρὰ τὸ καθήμενον καὶ ἐστηκὸς τί ἂν εἴη; ἢ δ' ἕξις [καὶ
 διάθεσις]² ἣ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἔχον λεγομένη ἔχειν ἂν μᾶλλον

¹ del. Dörrie.

² del. Kirchhoff.

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instance the right and the left and the double and the half, or whether it is so in some cases, for instance the one last mentioned, but there is no substantiality in the first mentioned, or whether it is nowhere so. What, then, about double and half and in general exceeding and exceeded, and again about habitual state and [changeable] disposition, and lying, sitting, standing, and again about father, son, master, slave, and further about like, unlike, equal, unequal, and active also and passive, and measure and measured? And knowledge and sense-perception, of which one is related to the object known and the other to the object perceived. Knowledge would indeed have in relation to its object a single active substantial existence, and sense-perception in the same way in relation to its object, and so would the active to the passive, granted that they accomplish a single work, and the measure to the measured in respect of measuring it. But what product would like have in relation to like? It is not a question of a product, but of something which is there, of the sameness in the qualified. But there is nothing over and above the qualification in each of the like things. Nor is there in the case of equal things: for the sameness in the quantum is there before the state of being related. But what is this state of being related other than our judgement when we compare things which are what they are by themselves and say "this thing and this thing have the same size and the same quality", and "this man has produced this man, and this man controls this man"? And what would sitting and standing be over and above what sits and stands? But habitual state, when it refers to the possessor, would rather signify

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

σημαίνοι, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον ποιὸν ἂν εἴη· καὶ ἐπὶ
 διαθέσεως ὡσαύτως. τί ἂν οὖν εἴη παρὰ ταῦτα τὰ πρὸς
 30 ἄλληλα ἡ ἡμῶν τὴν παράθεσιν νοούντων; τὸ δ' ὑπερέχον
 τὸ μὲν τοσόνδε μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε· ἄλλο δὲ τόδε, τὸ
 δὲ ἄλλο· ἡ δὲ παραβολὴ παρ' ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς. ὁ δὲ
 δεξιὸς πρὸς ἀριστερὸν καὶ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπισθεν
 μᾶλλον ἂν ἴσως ἐν τῷ κείσθαι· ὁ μὲν ὠδί, ὁ δὲ ὠδί· ἡμεῖς
 δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν ἐνόησαμεν, ἐν δὲ αὐτοῖς
 35 οὐδέν. τό τε πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον χρόνοι δύο· τὸ δὲ
 πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἡμεῖς ὡσαύτως.

7. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὐδέν λέγομεν, ἀλλὰ λέγοντες
 ψευδόμεθα, οὐδὲν ἂν τούτων εἴη, ἀλλὰ κενὸν ἡ σχέσις·
 εἰ δ' ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες “πρότερος ὁδε τοῦδε, ὁ δ'
 ὕστερος”, χρόνους δύο παραβάλλοντες ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ
 5 ὑποκείμενα αὐτῶν λέγοντες τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἐπὶ δεξιοῦ
 καὶ ἐπὶ ἀριστεροῦ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν παρὰ τὸ
 ποσὸν αὐτῶν τὴν σχέσιν, καθὸ τὸ μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, τὸ δ'
 ὑπερβάλλεται, εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ λεγόντων ἡμῶν μηδὲ
 νοούντων ἔστιν οὕτως, ὥστε διπλάσιον εἶναι τόδε
 τοῦδε, καὶ ἔχει, τὸ δ' ἔχεται, καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἐπιστῆσαι,
 10 καὶ ἴσα πρὸ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιά εἶναι
 ἔστιν ἐν ταυτότητι τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ὧν

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

possession, but when it refers to the possessed, would be a quale; and the same would be true of [changeable] disposition. What then would there be over and above these things which are related to each other except ourselves thinking their juxtaposition? Exceeding is a matter of one thing of one definite size and another of another definite size; and this one and that one are two different things; the comparison comes from us, but is not in them. But right in relation to left, and before and behind perhaps rather belong in the category of position: one is here and the other there; but we thought the right and left; there is nothing of it in the things themselves. And the before and after are two times; but it is we who think the before and after in the same way.

7. If then we are not saying anything, but our statements are deceptive, none of these would exist and "the state of being related" would be an empty phrase; but if we speak the truth when we say "this time is before this one, and this one after", comparing two times and saying that the "before" is something other than the underlying subjects, and it is the same with right and left, and if in the case of sizes [it is true to say] that their relationship is something over and above their quantitateness, in that one exceeds and the other is exceeded; further, if, even when we do not speak or think, it is in fact so that this is the double of that, and one possesses and another is possessed, even before we notice it, and things are equal to one another prior to us, and, where being qualified is concerned, are in a relation of sameness to each other, and if in the case of all things which we say are related the state of being

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

λέγομεν πρὸς τι μετὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἔστι πρὸς ἄλληλα
 ἡ σχέσις, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐσαν θεωροῦμεν καὶ ἡ γνώσις πρὸς
 τὸ γινωσκόμενον—οὐ δὴ καὶ φανερώτερον τὸ τῆς
 15 ὑποστάσεως τὸ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως—παυστέον μὲν τὸ
 ζητεῖν, εἰ ἔστι σχέσις, ἐπισημηναμένους δὲ ὅτι τῶν
 τοιούτων ἐπὶ μὲν ὦν, ἕως μένει τὰ ὑποκείμενα ὅπως
 εἶχε, καὶ χωρὶς γένηται, ὑπάρχει ἡ σχέσις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν,
 ὅταν συνέλθῃ, γίγνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καὶ μενόντων
 20 παύεται ἡ σχέσις ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἄλλη γίγνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ
 δεξιῷ καὶ πλησίον, ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα ἡ ὑπόνοια
 τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· τοῦτ' οὖν ἐπι-
 σημηναμένους χρὴ ζητεῖν τί ταυτόν ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ εἰ ὡς
 γένος, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμβεβηκός· εἴτα εὐρεθὲν τὸ ταυτόν
 ποίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. λεκτέον δὴ τὸ πρὸς τι οὐκ εἴ τι
 25 ἀπλῶς ἐτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἕξις ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, οὐδ'
 ὅτι ψυχὴ τοῦδέ ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλ' οἷς ἡ ὑπόστασις
 οὐδαμόθεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως παραγίγνεται· ὑπόστασις
 δὲ οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς τι λέγεται. οἷον
 τὸ διπλάσιον πρὸς ἡμισυ τὴν ὑπόστασιν δίδωσιν οὔτε τῷ
 30 διπλήχει ἢ ὅλως δυσὶν, οὔτε τῷ πηχυαίῳ ἢ ὅλως ἐνί,
 ἀλλὰ τούτων ὄντων κατὰ τὴν σχέσιν αὐτῶν πρὸς τῷ
 δύο,¹ τὸ δὲ ἐν εἶναι, ἔσχε τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον λέγεσθαί τε

¹ πρὸς τῷ δύο Kirchhoff (πρὸς τῷ τὸ μὲν δύο F^{3mg}: *praeter id Ficinus*): πρὸς (παρὰ R^{2mg}) τὸ δύο Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

related to each other is subsequent to the subjects related, but we observe it as presently existent, and our knowledge is directed to the object being known—at this point the substantiality arising out of the state of relation is even more obvious—we should stop enquiring whether the state of relation exists; but we should also note that with some things in this state, as long as the subjects remain as they were, even if they become separated, the state of relation persists, but with others it comes into existence when they come together, and with others again, even when they remain as they are, the state of being related either comes to an end altogether or becomes different, as in the case of right and near, and it is from these particularly that our suspicion arises that in things of this kind relation is nothing. Having taken note of this, then, we must enquire what is the same in all, and if it is so as a genus, but not something incidental; then, when we have found what is the same, we must enquire what kind of existence it has. We must certainly speak of relation, not if something is simply said to belong to another, a state of soul or body for instance, nor because a soul belongs to this man or is in something different [from itself], but in things where the existence derives from nowhere else but the state of relation: existence here does not mean that of the [related] subjects, but that of the relation. For instance the relation double to half gives existence neither to the two-cubits-long nor in general to two things, nor to the one-cubit-long nor in general to one thing, but when these are in their state of being related, in addition to being two and one respectively, the first has the name and reality of double, and the one the

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

καὶ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖσι ἔσχεν αὐτό. συνεγέννησεν οὖν
ἄμφω ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄλλο εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ ἡμῖσι, ἃ πρὸς
35 ἄλληλα ἐγεννήθη, καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ ἀλλήλοις
εἶναι, τῷ μὲν διπλασίῳ παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχειν τὸ ἡμῖσι,
τῷ δὲ ἡμίσει παρὰ τοῦ ὑπερέχεσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
μὲν αὐτῶν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα
ὑφίσταται. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἅμα μένει; ἢ ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ
40 καὶ τῶν παραπλησίων πατρὸς ἀπελθόντος υἱός ἐστι, καὶ
ἀδελφοῦ ἀδελφός· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ “ὅμοιος οὗτος τῷ
τεθνηκότι” λέγομεν.

8. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν παρεξέβημεν· ἐκείθεν δὲ
ζητητέον τὸ διὰ τί ἐπὶ τούτων οὐχ ὁμοίως. ἀλλὰ τὸ
εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ παρ' ἀλλήλων τίνα ἔχει κοινήν τὴν
ὑπόστασιν εἰπάτωσαν. σῶμα μὲν οὖν τι τοῦτο τὸ κοινὸν
5 οὐκ ἂν εἴη. λείπεται δέ, εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἀσώματον, καὶ ἢ ἐν
αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξωθεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ σχέσις, συνώνυμος, εἰ
δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἄλλη ἄλλων, ὁμώνυμος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ, ὅτι σχέσις
λέγεται, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αὐτὴν ἂν ἔχοι. ἄρ' οὖν τὰς
σχέσεις ταύτῃ διαιρετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἔχει ἀργὸν τὴν σχέσιν,
10 οἷον κειμένην θεωρεῖν, καὶ ἅμα πάντα ἢ ὑπόστασις, τὰ δὲ
μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἔργου ἢ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὴν σχέσιν καὶ εἶχε

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name and reality of half. They both together, therefore, generated from themselves something else, the existence of double and half, which came into existence in relation to each other, and their being is nothing else than being for each other; for the double it comes from exceeding the half and for the half from being exceeded; so that one of them is not prior and the other posterior, but they come into existence together. But do they remain in existence together? Now in the case of father and son and similar relations, when the father is gone the son is [still] son, and a brother [is a brother] when his brother is gone: for we say "he is like the dead man".

8. But we digressed here; and starting from this point we must investigate the question why there is dissimilarity in these relations. But let these philosophers¹ tell us what common substantiality this being from each other has. Well now, this common reality cannot be a body. So it remains that, supposing it exists, it is incorporeal, and is either in the things related or comes from outside. And if the state of being related is [always] the same, it is univocal, but if not, but different in different cases, it is equivocal: for it is certainly not just because it is called a state of being related that it would have the same essential character. Are then the states of being related to be distinguished in this way, in that some things have a relationship observable as inactive, just lying there, so to speak, and it only exists when they are entirely simultaneous, but others, along with their power and operation, are either always disposed to relationship and had their

¹ The Peripatetics.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὴν ἐτοιμότητα, ἐν δὲ τῇ συνόδῳ καὶ
ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπέστη, ἣ καὶ ὅλως τὰ μὲν πεποίηκε, τὰ δ'
ὑπέστη, καὶ τὸ ὑποστὰν ὄνομα μόνον παρέσχε τῷ
15 ἑτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ὁ πατήρ
καὶ ὁ υἱός· καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν δὲ καὶ παθητικὸν ἔχει τινὰ
οἶον ζῶν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. ἀρ' οὖν ταύτῃ διαιρετέον τὴν
σχέσιν καὶ διαιρετέον οὐχ ὡς ταυτόν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἐν
διαφοραῖς, ἀλλ' ὅλως ὡς ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν σχέσιν ἐν
20 ἑκατέρῳ, καὶ λεκτέον ὁμώνυμον τὴν μὲν ποιούσαν
ποίησιν καὶ πάθησιν, ὡς μίαν ἄμφω, τὴν δὲ οὐ
ποιούσαν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν τὸ ποιοῦν ἄλλο; οἶον ἰσότητα
τὴν τὰ ἴσα· ἰσότητι γὰρ ἴσα καὶ ὅλως ταυτότητί τι
ταυτά· τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ μὲν μεγέθους
παρουσία, τὸ δὲ μικρότητος. ὅταν δὲ τὸ μὲν μείζον, τὸ
25 δὲ μικρότερον, οἱ μὲν μεταλαβόντες ὁ μὲν μείζων
ἐνεργείᾳ φανέντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μεγέθους, ὁ δὲ μικρὸς
τῆς μικρότητος.

9. Χρὴ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρόσθεν εἰρημένων, οἶον
ποιούντος, ἐπιστήμης, ἐνεργῇ τὴν σχέσιν κατὰ τὴν
ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ λόγον τίθεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ
τῶν ἄλλων εἶδους καὶ λόγου μετάληψιν εἶναι. καὶ γάρ,

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preparedness for it beforehand, and it comes into existence in their coming together and actualisation, or, in a quite general way, one set of them have produced and the others come to exist, and what has come to exist only gives a name to the other, but the producer gives the existence? For the father and the son are like this; and the active and the passive have a kind of life and actualisation. Are we then to divide the state of being related in this way, and divide it not as something identical and common in its differentiations, but on the general assumption that the state of relationship is a different nature in each of the two classes, and we are to speak of it equivocally when we say that one kind produces action and affection as a united pair, but the other does not produce, but what produces the relationship in both the related things is something other than them? For instance, equality is the state of relationship which produces equals: for they are equal by equality, and in general same things are the same by some kind of sameness; as for large and small, one is large by the presence of largeness and the other small by the presence of smallness. But when it is a question of larger and smaller, one of the participants is larger by the actualisation of the largeness apparent in him, and the other smaller by the actualisation of the smallness.

9. We must therefore in the cases mentioned earlier, of the producer and of knowledge for instance, posit that the state of being related is active by reason of the activity of the actual agent and the rational forming principle operative in the activity, and in the other cases that it is a participation in form and rational forming principle. For certainly, if

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

- 5 εἰ μὲν σώματα ἔδει τὰ ὄντα εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἔδει λέγειν εἶναι
ταύτας τὰς τοῦ πρὸς τι λεγομένας σχέσεις· εἰ δὲ καὶ
ἄσωμάτοις δίδομεν τὴν κυρίαν χώραν καὶ τοῖς λόγοις
λόγους λέγοντες τὰς σχέσεις καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις
αἰτίας—τοῦ γὰρ διπλάσιον εἶναι τὸ διπλάσιον αὐτὸ
10 αἴτιον, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἡμισυ. καὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶδει, τὰ δὲ
τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις εἶναι ἃ λέγεται· ἅμα οὖν τῷδε μὲν
προσῆλθε τὸ διπλάσιον, ἄλλω δὲ τὸ ἡμισυ, καὶ τῷδε μὲν
τὸ μέγεθος, τῷδε δὲ ἡ μικρότης. ἡ ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἐστὶν ἐν
ἐκάστω, καὶ ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης καὶ ὅλως ταῦτόν
15 καὶ θάτερον· διὸ καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
ταῦτόν καὶ θάτερον. τί οὖν, εἰ ὁ μὲν αἰσυχρός, ὁ δὲ
αἰσχίων εἶδους τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετουσίᾳ; ἢ, εἰ μὲν
παντάπασιν αἰσχροί, ἴσοι εἶδους ἀπουσίᾳ· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ
μὲν τὸ μᾶλλον, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἥττον, μεταλήψει εἶδους οὐ
κρατοῦντος ὁ ἥττον αἰσυχρός, ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι μᾶλλον οὐ
20 κρατοῦντος· ἢ τῇ στερήσει, εἴ τις βούλοιτο τὴν
παραβολὴν ἔχειν, οἶον εἶδους αὐτοῖς ὄντος. αἰσθησις δὲ
εἶδος τι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ γνῶσις ὡσαύτως ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τι
εἶδος· ἡ δὲ ἕξις πρὸς τὸ ἐχόμενον ἐνέργειά τις οἶον
συνέχουσα, ὥσπερ ποιήσις τις· ἡ δὲ μέτρησις τοῦ
38

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

realities had to be bodies, it would be necessary to say that the states which are said to belong to a relation were nothing; but if we give the principal place to incorporeal things and rational principles, saying that the states of relationship are rational principles and participations in forms their causes¹ for [it is necessary to say] that the double itself is cause of being double, and for the other [related] thing the half [is cause of its being half]. And some are what they are called by the same form, but others by opposed forms: for the double comes to one thing and the half to another simultaneously, and largeness comes to one thing at the same time as smallness to the other. Or both are in each thing, both likeness and unlikeness and, in a general sense, sameness and otherness. What then is going on if one man is ugly, but another uglier by participation in the same form? Now, if they are altogether ugly, they are equal by the absence of form; but if there is a greater degree of ugliness in one, and a lesser degree in the other, the less ugly is so by participation in a form which is not in control and the more ugly by participation in it when it is still more not in control; or, if one would like to get one's comparison [in this way, one could do it] by privation, which would be like a kind of form for them. But sense-perception is a kind of form coming from both [the related things] and knowledge in the same way a kind of form from both; but the habitual state in relation to what is possessed by it is a kind of activity which in a way holds it together, like a kind of making; and measuring is an activity of the

¹ The apodosis of this sentence is missing.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

25 μετρούντος ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ μετρούμενον λόγος τις. εἰ
 μὲν οὖν [ὡς εἶδος]¹ γενικῶς τὴν τοῦ πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὡς
 εἶδος τις θήσεται, γένος ἓν καὶ ὑπόστασις ὡς λόγος τις
 πανταχοῦ· εἰ δὲ οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἀντικείμενοι καὶ διαφορὰς
 ἔχοντες τὰς εἰρημένας, τάχα οὐκ ἂν ἓν γένος εἴη, ἀλλ'
 30 εἰς ὁμοιότητά τινα πάντα ἀνάγεται καὶ κατηγορίαν
 μίαν. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εἰς ἓν δύναιτο ἀνάγεσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα,
 ἀλλ' εἰς γένος ἓν ἀδύνατον τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κατηγορίαν
 αὐτοῖς τεθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν εἰς ἓν
 ἀνάγουσι, καὶ τὰ παρονομαζόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον καὶ
 35 τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ διπλάσιος. πῶς ἂν οὖν ὑφ' ἓν γένος
 αὐτό τι καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον,
 καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ οὐ πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζῶόν τις γένος
 θεῖς καὶ τὸ οὐ ζῶον ἐκεῖ τιθείη. καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ὁ
 διπλάσιος ὥσπερ ἡ λευκότης καὶ ὁ λευκός, οὐχ ὅπερ
 ταυτόν.

10. Τὴν δὲ ποιότητα, ἀφ' ἧς ὁ λεγόμενος ποιός, δεῖ
 λαμβάνειν πρῶτον τίς οὐσα τοὺς λεγομένους ποιούς
 παρέχεται, καὶ <εἰ>² μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν
 ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὰ εἶδη παρέχεται ἢ, εἰ πολλαχῶς αἰ

¹ del. Theiler.

² A³⁸ (*numquid* Ficinus), Perna.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

measurer which is a rational principle in relation to the measured. If then one is going to consider the state belonging to relation generically as a form, it will be one genus and substantial reality, as there is a rational forming principle in all cases; but if the rational principles are both opposed and have the differences which have been stated, perhaps there would not be one genus, but all relatives are brought back to a certain likeness and a single category. But even if it was possible to bring back all the relatives we have mentioned into one, it would be impossible to bring into a single genus all the things which are grouped under the same category with them. For they bring back into one the denials of the relative terms and the things which derive their name from them, for instance the double and the double-sized man.¹ How then could one bring under one genus a thing itself and the denial of it, double and not double, and relative and not relative? It is just as if one made a genus "living being" and put the non-living being into it. And the double and the double-sized man are like whiteness and the white man, not at all identical.

10. And as for quality, from which what is called the qualified [or *quale*] derives, one must first grasp what is its real nature which enables it to produce what are called qualified beings, and whether, being one and the same according to what is common [to all kinds of quality], it produces its species by distinctive differences, or, if qualities are to be under-

¹ On ἀποφάσεις see Dexippus *In Categ.* 33. 8-13 (= Aristotle fr. 116 Rose³, p. 106 Ross). παρονομαζόμενα are defined in Aristotle *Categories* 1. 1a12.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

- 5 ποιότητες, οὐχ ἓν ἂν εἴη γένος. τί οὖν τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ τε
 ἕξεως καὶ διαθέσεως καὶ παθητικῆς ποιότητος καὶ
 σχήματος καὶ μορφῆς; καὶ λεπτόν, παχύ, ἰσχυρόν; εἰ μὲν
 γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν δύναμιν ἐροῦμεν, ἡ ἐφαρμοττει καὶ ταῖς
 ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς διαθέσεσι καὶ ταῖς φυσικαῖς δυνάμεσιν,
 10 ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ἔχον δύναται ἃ δύναται, οὐκέτι αἱ ἀδυναμῖαι
 ἀρμόσουσιν. ἔπειτα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ἡ μορφή ἡ περὶ
 ἕκαστον πῶς δύναμις; εἴτα καὶ τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν δύναμιν
 οὐδεμίαν ἕξει, ἀλλ' ὅταν αὐτῷ προσέλθῃ τὸ ποιόν. αἱ δὲ
 ἐνέργειαι τῶν οὐσιῶν, ὅσαι μάλιστα εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὸ
 15 ποιοῦ καθ' αὐτὰς ἐνεργοῦσαι καὶ τῶν οἰκείων δυνάμεων
 ὅ εἰσιν. ἀλλ' ἄρα κατὰ τὰς ἐπ' αὐτὰς τὰς οὐσίας
 δυνάμεις; οἷον ἡ πυκτικὴ δύναμις οὐ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ
 ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε οὐ ποιότης τὸ οὕτω
 λογικόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὃ ἐξ ἀρετῆς κτήσαιο ἄν τις· ὥστε
 ὁμώνυμον τὸ λογικόν· ὥστε εἴη ἂν ἡ ποιότης δύναμις
 20 προστιθεῖσα ταῖς οὐσίαις μεθ' αὐτὰς τὸ ποιαῖς εἶναι. αἱ
 δὲ διαφοραὶ αἱ πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς οὐσίας διστᾶσαι
 ὁμωνύμως ποιότητες, ἐνέργειαι οὐσαι μᾶλλον καὶ λόγοι
 ἢ μέρη λόγων, τὸ τί οὐδὲν ἦττον δηλοῦσαι, κἂν δοκῶσι
 τὴν ποιὰν οὐσίαν λέγειν. αἱ δὲ ποιότητες αἱ κυρίως,
 25 καθ' ἃς ποιοί, ἃς δὴ λέγομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι, τὸ κοινὸν
 εἶεν ἂν λόγοι τινὲς καὶ οἷον μορφαί, περὶ τε ψυχὴν κάλλη

¹ The passage of Aristotle under discussion in this chapter is *Categories* 8. 8b25 ff.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

stood in many different senses, there would not be one genus of quality. What, then, is the common element in state and disposition and passive quality and figure and shape¹? And what about rarefied and solid and lean? For if we are going to say that the common quality is power, which fits states and dispositions and natural powers, from which that which has it has the powers which it has, the incapacities will not fit in any more. Then, how are individual figure and shape power? And further, being *qua* being will have no power except when the quale comes to it. And the activities of substances, which are activities in the strictest sense, activate what belongs to the quale by themselves, and what they are belongs to their own powers. But does this mean that qualities are according to the powers intrinsic to the essences themselves? For instance, the power of boxing does not belong to man *qua* man, but rationality does; so that rationality in this sense is not a quality, but rather the rationality which one might acquire from virtue; so "rationality" is equivocal; so that quality would be a power which adds to substances, posterior to their being themselves, the being qualified. But the specific differences which distinguish substances in relation to each other are qualities in an equivocal sense, being rather activities and rational forming principles, or parts of forming principles, making clear what the thing is none the less even if they seem to declare that the substance is of a specific quality. And the qualities in the strict and proper sense, according to which beings are qualified, which we say are powers, would in fact in their general character be a sort of forming principles and, in a sense, shapes, beauties

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

καὶ αἴσχη καὶ περὶ σῶμα ὡσαύτως. ἀλλὰ πῶς δυνάμεις
 πᾶσαι; κάλλος μὲν γὰρ ἔστω καὶ ὑγίεια ἐκατέρα, αἴσχος
 δὲ καὶ νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ ἀδυναμία ὅλως; ἢ ὅτι καὶ
 30 κατὰ ταύτας ποιοὶ λέγονται; ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει λεγομένους
 ποιоὺς ὁμωνύμως λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ καθ' ἓνα λόγον, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τετραχῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν
 τεττάρων τοῦλάχιστον διχῶς; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ κατὰ τὸ
 ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν ἢ ποιότης, ὥστε ἄλλως μὲν τὸ
 δυνάμενον ποιεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ πάσχον; ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
 35 ὑγίειαν κατὰ¹ τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ποιὸν καὶ τὴν
 νόσον ὡσαύτως καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. ἀλλ' εἰ
 τοῦτο, οὐκέτι κοινὸν ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τὸ
 κοινὸν ζητεῖν. οὐδ' αὖ λόγους πάσας· πῶς γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἡ
 ἐν ἕξει λόγος; ἀλλ' ἄρα τὰς μὲν ἐν εἴδει καὶ δυνάμει
 40 ποιότητος, ταύτας δὲ στερήσεις; ὥστε μὴ ἐν γένος,
 ἀλλὰ εἰς ἐν ὡς μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον ἐπιστήμην μὲν
 εἶδος καὶ δύναμιν, ἀνεπιστημοσύνην δὲ στέρησιν καὶ
 ἀδυναμίαν. ἢ μορφή τις καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία· καὶ ἡ νόσος, καὶ
 δύναται δὲ καὶ ποιεῖ πολλά, ἀλλὰ φαύλως, καὶ ἡ νόσος
 45 καὶ ἡ κακία. ἢ ἔκπτωσις τοῦ σκοποῦ οὕσα πῶς δύναμις;
 ἢ τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη πράττει οὐ πρὸς τὸ ὀρθὸν βλέπουσα·
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐποίησέ τι, ὃ μὴ δύναται. καὶ τὰ καλλῆς² δὲ
 δύνανται ἔχει τινός. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ἢ ὅλως οὐδὲ
 πρὸς δύνανται δεῖ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ μάλλον πρὸς ὃ

¹ Igal, H-S²: καὶ Enn.

² Igal, H-S²: τὸ κάλλος Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

and uglinesses in the soul and in the body in the same way. But how can they all be powers? Let us grant that beauty and health are, of both kinds, but how can ugliness and illness and feebleness and in general incapacity be powers? Is it because beings are said to be qualified according to them? But what prevents the term "qualified" from being used equivocally and not according to one definition, and not only in four different senses, but in at least two in the case of each of the four? Now, first of all, is not quality [divided] according to active and passive, so that what is able to act is quality in one sense, and what is passive in another? And further, health determined by disposition and state is a quale, and illness in the same way, and strength and feebleness. But if this is so, power is no longer common [to all quality], but we must look for something else as the common element. Nor, again, are all qualities rational forming principles: for how can illness, a permanent state of illness, be a forming principle? But, then, are those which consist in forms and powers qualities, but these other ones privations? So there is not one genus, but they are brought into one as one category, as for instance knowledge is a form and power, but ignorance is a privation and incapacity. Now incapacity is a sort of shape, and so is illness, and both illness and vice are capable of and do many things, but badly. But when a quality is a missing of the mark, how is it a power? It does its own business, not having the correct end in view: for it would not have done anything which it could not do. And the unbeautiful has some sort of capacity. Well, then, does the triangle? Now in general we ought not even to look in the direction of power, but

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

50 διάκειται· ὥστε κατὰ τὰς οἶον μορφὰς καὶ χαρακτῆρας,
καὶ κοινὸν ἢ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μετὰ
τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀλλὰ πάλιν πῶς αἱ δυνάμεις; ἢ καὶ ὁ φύσει
πυκτικὸς τῷ διακεῖσθαι πῶς ἔχει τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ ἀδύνατος
πρὸς τι. καὶ ὅλως χαρακτήρ τις ἢ ποιότης οὐκ
55 οὐσιώδης, ὃ δ' ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ δοκῇ καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν
συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ εἰς μὴ οὐσίαν, οἶον θερμότης καὶ
λευκότης καὶ ὅλως χροᾶ· τὸ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλο, οἶον
ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ δευτέρως καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ
ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰδωλον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅμοιον. ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ
60 τὴν μόρφωσιν καὶ χαρακτῆρα καὶ λόγον, πῶς τὰ κατὰ
ἀδυναμίαν καὶ αἴσχη; ἢ λόγους ἀτελεῖς λεκτέον, οἶον ἐν
τῷ αἰσchrῶ. καὶ ἐν τῇ νόσῳ πῶς ὁ λόγος; ἢ καὶ ἐνταῦθα
λόγον κινούμενον τὸν τῆς ὑγιείας. ἢ οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ πάντα,
ἀλλὰ ἀρκεῖ τὸ κοινὸν παρὰ τό πῶς διακεῖσθαι εἶναι

¹ Plotinus seems to be here concerned to exclude any recourse to the "negative Forms" which undoubtedly appear in Plato, but have generally been an embarrassment to Platonists: he explicitly denies their existence in V. 9,10. On negative Forms in Plato see W. D. Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 167–9. Plotinus' "theory of ideas" is of exactly the kind which Ross suggests on p. 169: "It *might* be possible for a theory of Ideas to dispense with an Idea of evil and with Ideas of its species, and to explain all evil in

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

rather to what [a quality] is disposed; so that quality is a matter of what one might call shapes and characteristics, and shape is the common element, and the form on the substance which is posterior to the substance. But again, how are there the powers? The natural boxer has this ability of his by being disposed in a certain way, and so does the man who is incapable of something. And in general quality is a kind of non-substantial characteristic; it is something which seems to be the same and to contribute both to substance and to non-substance, heat, for instance, and whiteness and in general colour: that which belongs to substance is one thing, a kind of activity of the substance, but that which does not has a secondary status and derives from that other and is one thing in another, an image of it and like it. But if quality corresponds to shaping and characteristic and rational forming principle, what about the cases of incapacity and ugliness? They must be said to be incomplete forming principles, as in the ugly. And how is the forming principle in illness? Here too we must speak about a disturbed forming principle, that of health.¹ Or perhaps all are not contained in rational forming principle, but the sufficient common element [of quality] is, besides being disposed in a particular way, being outside substance, and the

the sensible world as due to the fact that the relation of the phenomenal to the ideal is never one of perfect instantiation but always one of imitation which falls short of its pattern." Plotinus' close friend and colleague Amelius, however, took a different view, perhaps closer to Plato's own. He postulated Forms of Evils (Asclepius *In Nic. Arithm.* 44. 3-5 p. 32 Tarán; cp. Proclus *Platonic Theology* I. 21 p. 98 Saffrey-Westerink).

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἔξωθεν τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ ἐπιγιγνόμενον μετὰ τὴν
65 οὐσίαν ποιότητος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον
ποιότητος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, οὐχ ἀπλῶς τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν
τούτῳ καὶ καθόσον ἐμόρφωσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης
ἐμόρφωσεν; ἢ οὐσίωσεν.

11. Ἄλλ' εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως, διὰ τί πλείω εἶδη
ποιότητος, καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ
διαφορὰ ποιότητος τὸ μόνιμον καὶ τὸ μή, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ ἡ
διάθεσις ὅπως οὖν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὸ παρασχέσθαι ποιόν·
5 προσθήκη δ' ἔξωθεν τὸ μένειν· εἰ μή τις λέγοι τὰς μὲν
διαθέσεις μόνον ἀτελεῖς οἷον μορφάς, τὰς δὲ ἕξεις
τελείας. ἀλλ' εἰ ἀτελεῖς, οὐπω ποιότητες· εἰ δ' ἤδη
ποιότητες, προσθήκη τὸ μόνιμον. αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ
δυνάμεις πῶς ἕτερον εἶδος; εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὰς
δυνάμεις ποιότητες, οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει πάσαις τὸ τῆς
10 δυνάμεως, ὥς εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ τῷ διακεῖσθαι τὸν φύσει
πυκτικὸν ποιὸν λέγομεν, οὐδὲν ἡ δύναμις προστεθεῖσα
ποιεῖ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι δύνამεις. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ὁ
κατὰ δύναμιν τοῦ κατὰ ἐπιστήμην διοίσει; ἢ εἰ ποιοί,
οὐδὲ διαφοραὶ ποιότητος αὗται, εἰ ὁ μὲν μελετήσας
15 ἔχοι, ὁ δὲ φύσει, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν ἡ διαφορὰ· κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ
εἶδος τῆς πυκτικῆς πῶς; καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν ἐκ πάθους, αἱ δὲ
οὐ· οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ὁπόθεν ἡ ποιότης· λέγω δὲ

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

quality of the substrate is what comes upon it posterior to the substance. But the triangle is a quality of that in which it is, not simply and solely a triangle, but the triangle which is in this thing and in so far as it has shaped this thing. But did manhood also shape? Rather, it gave substance.

11. But if all this is so, why are there several species of quality, and why is there a difference between state and disposition? For there is no specific difference of quality involved in persistence and non-persistence, but any kind of disposition is sufficient to make something a quale; and persisting is an external addition; unless someone says that dispositions are only incomplete sort of shapes, but states are complete ones. But if they are incomplete, they are not yet qualities; but if they are already qualities, persistence is an addition. But how are natural powers another species [of quality]? For if they are qualities because of the powers, the power-characteristic does not fit all of them, as has been said; but if we say that the natural boxer is qualified by being so disposed, then the addition of "power" does nothing, since there is power in states also. Then why will [the boxer] by natural power differ from the [boxer] by knowledge? If they are both [pugilistically] qualified, these differences are not specific differences of quality, if one is a boxer by practice and one by nature, but the difference is external. But how [are they to be differentiated] in relation to the very form of boxing? And [the difference is external again] if some qualities derive from being affected, but others not: for the source of the quality does not make a specific difference; but what I am talking about is differentiation by vari-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ποιότητος παραλλαγαῖς καὶ διαφοραῖς. ἔχοι δ' ἂν
 ζήτησιν καί, εἰ ἐκ πάθους αἶδε, αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δὲ μὴ
 20 τῶν αὐτῶν, πῶς ἐν εἶδει τῷ αὐτῷ· καὶ εἰ αἱ μὲν τῷ
 γεγονέναι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, ὁμωνύμως ἂν εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ
 περὶ ἕκαστον μορφή; εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθὸ εἰδός ἐστιν
 ἕκαστον, οὐ ποιόν· εἰ δὲ καθὸ καλὸν μετὰ τὸ τοῦ
 ὑποκειμένου εἶδος ἢ αἰσχρόν, λόγον ἂν ἔχοι. τὸ δὲ τραχύ
 25 καὶ τὸ λείον καὶ τὸ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν
 λέγοιτο ποιά; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ταῖς διαστάσεσι ταῖς ἀπ'
 ἀλλήλων καὶ <τῷ>¹ ἐγγὺς τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ
 τραχύτης, καὶ οὐ πανταχοῦ ἐξ ἀνωμαλίας θέσεως καὶ
 ὁμαλότητος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ὧς
 ποιά εἶναι. τὸ δὲ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ γνωσθὲν δηλώσει,
 30 ὅπου δεῖ αὐτὰ θεῖναι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁμωνυμία περὶ τὸ
 κοῦφον, εἰ μὴ τῷ σταθμῷ λέγοιτο τοῦ πλείονος καὶ
 ἐλάττονος, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἰσχνὸν καὶ λεπτόν, ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ
 εἶδει παρὰ τὰ τέτταρα.

12. 'Αλλ' εἰ μὴ οὕτω τις ἀξιώσει τὸ ποιὸν διαιρεῖν,
 τίνι ἂν διέλοι; ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν, εἰ δεῖ τὰς μὲν σώματος

¹ F³⁸ (= Ficinus), Sleeman, Bréhier, Theiler: τὸ Enn.

¹ A critical reference to the discussion of "passive" qualities in Aristotle *Categories* 8. 9a35–b11.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

ations and specific differences of quality. But there would also be room for enquiry how qualities are members of the same species if these particular ones derive from being affected, some in this way, but others not even belonging to the same things; and if some [derive from being affected] by coming into being, but others by producing [the affection], they would be called qualities equivocally.¹ And what about the shape of each individual thing? For if this is meant in the sense in which each thing is form, the thing is not [in this sense] a quale; but if it is meant in the sense in which a thing is beautiful or ugly in a way posterior to the form of its substrate, there would be some sense in it. And would not the rough and the smooth and the rare and the dense be correctly called qualia? For it is certainly not by the distances [of the parts] from each other or their nearness that something is subtle or dense or there is roughness, and it is not everywhere the result of the irregularity or regularity of the position [of the parts]; and even if these were their origins, nothing prevents them even so from being qualia. And knowledge of light and heavy will reveal where one ought to put them. But there might be an ambiguity about "light" if it is not used in the sense of more and less weight, since it has in it the idea of "lean" and "fine", which is in another species besides the four.²

12. But if one does not think it proper to divide the quale in this way, in what way could one divide it? We should consider, then, if we ought to say that some qualities belong to the body and some to the

² There seems to be a reference here to Andronicus, who according to Simplicius *In Categ.* 8, 263. 19-22 made a special genus for *λέπτων, παχύ* etc.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

λέγοντα, τὰς δὲ ψυχῆς, τοῦ δὲ σώματος μερίζειν κατὰ
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰς μὲν ὅψει νέμοντα,¹ τὰς δ' ἀκοῇ ἢ
 5 γεύσει, ἄλλας ὁσφρήσει ἢ ἀφῇ. τὰς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς;
 ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, θυμοειδοῦς, λογιστικοῦ. ἢ ταῖς
 διαφοραῖς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν, αἷ γίνονται κατ' αὐτάς, ὅτι
 γεννητικαὶ αὗται τούτων. ἢ τῷ ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ·
 καὶ πάλιν διαιρετέον τὰς ὠφελείας καὶ τὰς βλάβας. τὰ
 10 αὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν τῷ ποιεῖν διάφορα ἢ τῷ
 ὠφελίμῳ καὶ βλαβερῷ· οἰκεῖαι γὰρ διαφοραὶ
 ποιότητος. ἢ γὰρ δοκεῖ ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ τὸ βλάβος ἀπὸ
 τῆς ποιότητος καὶ ποιοῦ ἢ ζητητέον τρόπον ἄλλον.
 ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς καὶ ὁ ποιὸς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα
 15 ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν γένος ἀμφοῖν. καὶ εἰ ὁ
 πυκτικὸς ἐν ποιότητι, πῶς οὐ καὶ ὁ ποιητικός; καὶ εἰ
 τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν· ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖ εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι
 τὸ ποιητικὸν οὐδ' αὖ τὸ παθητικόν, εἰ ὁ παθητικὸς
 ποιός. καὶ ἴσως βέλτιον ἐνταῦθα ὁ ποιητικός, εἰ κατὰ
 δύναμιν λέγεται, ἢ δὲ δύναμις ποιότης. εἰ δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν
 20 ἡ δύναμις ἢ τις δύναμις, οὐδ' οὕτω πρὸς τι οὐδὲ ποιὸν
 ἔστι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὡς τὸ μείζον τὸ ποιητικόν· τὸ γὰρ μείζον
 τὴν ὑπόστασιν, καθὼ μείζον, πρὸς τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ δὲ
 ποιητικὸν τῷ τοιόνδε εἶναι ἤδη. ἀλλ' ἴσως κατὰ μὲν τὸ
 τοιόνδε ποιόν, ἢ δὲ δύναται εἰς ἄλλο ποιητικόν

¹ Igal, H-S²: λέγοντα Enn.: δίδοντα Theiler, H-S¹.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

soul, and classify the bodily ones according to the senses, allotting some to sight and some to hearing or taste, and others to smell or touch. But how are we to classify those of the soul? As belonging to the appetitive, emotional or rational part. Or by the differences of the activities which occur in accordance with them, because these qualities are such as to produce these activities. Or by helpfulness and harmfulness; and again one must divide the helps and the harms. But the same grounds of differentiation apply to bodily qualities, by doing different things or by helpfulness and harmfulness: for these are proper differences of quality. For one either thinks that help and harm come from quality and the quale or one must adopt a different method of investigation. But we must consider also how the qualified by the quality is in the same category [as the quality]: for there is certainly not one genus for both. And if the boxer is in the category of quality, why not also the doer and maker? And if this is so, then also the ability to do and make; so that there is no need to refer doing to the relative, nor again the ability to be affected [by the doing] if the one who is affected is qualified [by the doing]. And perhaps the doer and maker is better placed here, if he is called so in regard of power, and power is quality. But if power, or any power, appertains to substance, it is not in this way either a relative, and not, furthermore, a quale. For ability to do is not like more: for the more has its reality, in so far as it is more, in relation to the less, but ability to do by being such as it is already. But perhaps it is a quale by being such as it is, but in so far as it has power directed to something else, it is called ability to do as a relative.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

25 λεγόμενον πρὸς τι. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ πυκτικὸς πρὸς τι,
καὶ ἡ πυκτικὴ αὐτή; πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ ὅλως ἡ πυκτικὴ·
καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς θεώρημα, ὃ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο. καὶ περὶ
τῶν ἄλλων δὲ τεχνῶν ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἐπισκεπτέον καὶ
λεκτέον ἴσως· ἢ μὲν διατιθείσι τὴν ψυχὴν, ποιότητες, ἢ
30 δὲ ποιούσι, ποιητικαὶ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ
πρὸς τι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον πρὸς τι, καθὼς ἔξεις
λέγονται. ἀρ’ οὖν ἄλλη τις ὑπόστασις κατὰ τὸ
ποιητικὸν τοῦ “ποιητικόν” οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ὄντος ἢ
καθόσον ποιόν; τάχα μὲν γὰρ ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων
35 καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν προαίρεσιν ἐχόντων τῷ
νενευκέναι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν¹ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ
ποιητικόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀψύχων δυνάμεων, αἷς ποιότητας
εἵπομεν, τί τὸ ποιητικόν; ἢ ὅταν συντύχη αὐτῷ ἄλλο,
ἀπέλαυσε καὶ μετέλαβε² παρ’ ἐκείνου οὐ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ
αὐτὸ καὶ ποιεῖ εἰς ἄλλο καὶ πάσχει, πῶς ἔτι τὸ
40 ποιητικόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μείζον τρίπηχυ ὃν καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ
μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον ἐν τῇ συντυχίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀλλ’
ἔρεϊ τις τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μεταλήψει μεγέθους
καὶ μικρότητος· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο μεταλήψει ποιητικοῦ καὶ
παθητικοῦ. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ εἰ αἱ τῆδε

¹ Kirchhoff (*ad faciendum* Ficinus): ποιὸν Enn.

² UF^{3mg} (= Ficinus), Creuzer: μετέβαλε wBxC, H-S.

¹ This is common Platonic doctrine: cp. *Phaedo* 100E5-6. But Plotinus is anxious, as appears in what follows, that it should not be interpreted in a way which asserts that there

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Why then is not the boxer relative, and boxing itself? For boxing is altogether directed to somebody else: for certainly there is no part of the art which is not other-directed. And perhaps we should consider and speak of the other arts, or most of them, like this: in so far as they dispose the soul, they are qualities, but in so far as they do or make they belong to the category of doing and making, and in this way are other-directed and relative; since they are also relative in another way, in that they are called states. Is there then another reality of the doer and maker, according to its ability to do and make, when it is not another thing than it is in so far as it is a quale? Perhaps in the case of living things, and still more those which have the power of choice, one might say that there is a reality in them also according to their capacity to do and make, because of their inclination to act so; but in the case of lifeless powers, which we call qualities, why bring in doing and making? Now, whenever a thing encounters another, it gets something from it and takes a share from that other of what it has. But if the same thing both acts on and is affected by something else, how is doing and making still there? Since the more also is three cubits long in itself and is more or less on the occasions when it meets something else. But someone will say that the greater and the less are so by participation in largeness and smallness¹; so this [acting on and being affected] will also be by participation in activity and passivity. But one must are Forms of qualities, and contradicts his own doctrine that there are no qualities in the intelligible world, but what we call qualities here below are activities of substances there. See II. 6 and VI. 2. 14.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

45 ποιότητες καὶ αἱ ἐκεῖ ὑφ' ἑν· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς
 τιθεμένους κακεῖ· ἢ καὶ μὴ εἶδη τις διδῶ, ἀλλὰ νοῦν
 λέγων εἰ ἔξιν λόγοι, ἢ κοινόν τι ἐπ' ἐκείνης καὶ ταύτης
 τῆς ἔξεως· καὶ σοφία δὲ συγχωρεῖται. ἢ εἰ ὁμώνυμος
 πρὸς τὴν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἡρίθμηται δηλονότι ἐν τούτοις·
 50 εἰ δὲ συνωνύμως, ἔσται τὸ ποιὸν κοινὸν ἐνταῦθα κακεῖ,
 εἰ μὴ τις τὰ κεῖ λέγοι πάντα οὐσίας· καὶ τὸ νοεῖν τοῖνυν.
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, [ἢ]¹
 εἰ τὸ διττὸν ὧδε κακεῖ, ἢ ὑφ' ἑν ἄμφω.

13. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτὲ ὧδε ἐπισκεπτέον· εἰ τὸ χθὲς
 καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσιν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη χρόνου, διὰ
 τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσται καὶ ταῦτα, ἐν ᾧ περ καὶ ὁ
 χρόνος; ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἔσται, εἶδη
 5 ὄντα χρόνου, δίκαιον δήπου ἐν ᾧ ὁ χρόνος τετάχθαι.
 λέγεται δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ χρόνος· ὥστε τί δεῖ κατηγορίας
 ἄλλης; εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν ὡς οὐ μόνον χρόνος τὸ ἦν καὶ ἔσται,

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

¹ A Peripatetic would deny the Forms, but admit a transcendent incorporeal *Noûs* and *σοφία* (which Plotinus, as usual, interprets in his own way).

² In ch. 5 Plotinus makes it clear that time is not quantity, though definite lengths of time are quanta; cp. also VI. 3. 11. His doctrine of time in this treatise is by no means as developed and carefully thought out as it is in the

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enquire here also if the qualities here and those in the intelligible world come under one genus: this is directed to those who posit qualities in the intelligible world as well; or even if someone does not grant that there are Forms, all the same when he speaks of intelligence,¹ if he is speaking of a state, he certainly [implies that there is] something common to the state in the intelligible world and this one here; and it is agreed that there is wisdom. Now if the term "wisdom" is used of it equivocally in relation to the wisdom here below, it is clearly not counted among the things of this world; but if it is used univocally then the quale will be common to both worlds, unless someone says that all the things in the intelligible world belong to the category of substance; in which case being intelligent will be substance there too. But this is a general question about the other categories as well, whether there are two genera here and there, or whether both fall under one.

13. About the "when" we must enquire in this way: if the "yesterday" and "to-morrow" and "last year" and such are parts of time, why are not these also in the same genus in which time is too? Since it is surely right that the "was" and the "is" and the "will be", being parts of time, should be classed in the same genus in which time is. But time is said to belong to the quantum²: so what need is there of another category? But if they were to say that it is not only time that the "was" and the "will be"

treatise which follows *On The Kinds of Being* in Porphyry's chronological order, III. 7 (45) *On Eternity and Time*, perhaps written because Plotinus did not feel that he had dealt with time adequately in *On The Kinds of Being*.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

- καὶ τὸ χθές καὶ πέρυσιν, τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ ἦν—ὑποβεβλήσθαι
γὰρ δεῖ ταῦτα τῷ ἦν—ἀλλ' οὖν¹ οὐ μόνον χρόνος, ἀλλὰ
10 ποτὲ χρόνος, πρῶτον μὲν ἔσται, εἰ τὸ “ποτὲ χρόνος”,
χρόνος· ἔπειτα, εἰ χρόνος παρεληλυθὼς τὸ χθές,
σύνθετόν τι ἔσται, εἰ ἕτερον τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ ἕτερον
ὁ χρόνος· δύο οὖν κατηγορίαι καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν
χρόνῳ φήσουσι τὸ ποτὲ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐ χρόνον, τοῦτο
15 τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγουσιν, οἷον Σωκράτης
ὅτι πέρυσιν ἦν, ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης ἔξωθεν ἂν εἴη, καὶ οὐχ
ἐν τι λέγουσιν. ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης ἢ ἡ πρᾶξις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
χρόνῳ τί ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐν μέρει τοῦ χρόνου; εἰ δ' ὅτι μέρος
χρόνου λέγουσι, καὶ καθότι μέρος ἀξιούσι μὴ χρόνον
ἀπλῶς τι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μέρος χρόνου παρεληλυθός,
20 πλείῳ ποιούσι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ἢ μέρος πρὸς τι ὃν
προσλαμβάνουσι. καὶ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς ἐγκείμενον τί
αὐτοῖς ἔσται ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ἦν, ὃ ἦν εἶδος χρόνου; ἀλλ' εἰ
τῷ ἀόριστον μὲν εἶναι τὸ ἦν, τὸ δὲ χθές καὶ τὸ πέρυσιν
ὠρίσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἦν ποῦ τάξομεν; ἔπειτα τὸ χθές
25 ἔσται “ἦν ὠρισμένον”, ὥστε ἔσται ὠρισμένος χρόνος τὸ
χθές· τοῦτο δὲ ποσός τις χρόνος· ὥστε, εἰ χρόνος ποσόν,
ποσὸν ὠρισμένον ἕκαστον τούτων ἔσται. εἰ δέ, ὅταν
λέγωσι χθές, τοῦτο λέγομεν, ὡς ἐν χρόνῳ παρεληλυθότι
ὠρισμένῳ γέγονε τόδε, ἔτι πλείῳ καὶ μᾶλλον λέγουσιν·
30 ἔπειτα, εἰ δεῖ ἐπείσάγειν ἄλλας κατηγορίας τῷ ἕτερον
ἐν ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἄλλας πολλὰς

¹ R^{2mg} (*inquam* Ficinus): om. Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

are, and the "yesterday" and "last year"—for these must be classed under the "was"—but (as was just said) not only time but some time, then, first of all, if it is "some time" it will be time: then, if the "yesterday" is time past, it will be something composite, if past is one thing and time is another: two categories, then, and not something single and simple. But if they are going to assert that what is when is that which is in time, but not time, if they mean by this "in time" the state of affairs, for example that Socrates was last year, the "Socrates" would be brought in from outside, and they are not talking about one thing. But what would Socrates or the affair in this particular time be except in a part of time? But if because they say "a part of time", and in that it is a part claim that they are not saying that something is simply time, but a past part of time, they are making still more, and are adding on the part *qua* part, which is a relative. And will the past be for them either something included in or the same as the "was", which was a part of time? But if [they make their distinction] because the "was" is indefinite, but the "yesterday" and the "last year" are defined, first of all, where are we going to class the "was"? Since the "yesterday" will be a "definite was", so that the "yesterday" will be a definite time; but this is a time of a certain quantity: so that, if time is a quantum, each of these will be a definite quantum. But if, whenever they say "yesterday", we take this to mean that this particular thing happened in a past definite time, they are mentioning still more and more things; then, if one must introduce other categories by putting one thing in another, as in this case what is in time, we shall discover many others

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἀνευρήσομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. λεχθήσεται δὲ σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποῦ.

14. Τὸ δὲ ποῦ, ἐν Λυκίῳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ. ἡ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαδημία καὶ τὸ Λύκιον πάντως τόποι καὶ μέρη τόπου, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ ὠδὶ εἶδη ἡ μέρη· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἀφωρισμένως μᾶλλον. εἰ οὖν τὸ
5 ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸ μέσον τόποι, οἷον Δελφοὶ τὸ μέσον, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ μέσον, οἷον Ἀθῆναι καὶ Λύκιον δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, τί δεῖ παρὰ τὸν τόπον ζητεῖν ἡμᾶς καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντας τόπον ἔφ' ἐκάστου τούτων σημαίνειν; εἰ δὲ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγομεν, οὐχ ἐν λέγομεν οὐδὲ ἀπλοῦν
10 λέγομεν. ἔπειτα, εἰ τοῦτον ἐνταῦθα λέγομεν, σχέσιν τινὰ γεννῶμεν τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε καὶ τοῦ δεξαμένου πρὸς ὃ ἐδέξατο· διὰ τί οὖν οὐ πρὸς τι, εἰ ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρου πρὸς ἐκάτερον σχέσεως ἀπεγεννήθη τι; εἶτα <τί>¹ διαφέρει τὸ ὦδε τοῦ Ἀθῆνησιν; ἀλλὰ τὸ ὦδε τὸ δεικτικὸν τόπον
15 φήσουσι σημαίνειν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ Ἀθῆνησιν· ὥστε τοῦ τόπου τὸ Ἀθῆνησιν. εἶτα, εἰ τὸ Ἀθῆνησι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ “ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐστί”, πρὸς τῷ τόπῳ καὶ τὸ ἐστι προσκατηγορεῖται· δεῖ δὲ οὐ· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ “ποιότης ἐστίν”, ἀλλὰ τὸ “ποιότης” μόνον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ τὸ

¹ Creuzer.

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from putting one thing in another. But this will be explained more clearly in the next discussion about the "where".

14. The "where", in the Lyceum and in the Academy. Now Academy and Lyceum are in every sense places, and parts of place, just as the "above" and the "here" are species or parts of place; the difference is only that Academy and Lyceum are more closely demarcated. If then the "above" and the "below" and the "middle" are places, Delphi, for instance, the middle,¹ and also the "to one side of middle", Athens and the Lyceum and the rest, for instance, why do we have to look for anything besides place, especially when we say that when we mention each and every one of them we are indicating a place? But if we are talking about one thing in another we are not talking about one thing and are not talking about anything simple either. Then further, when we say that this man is here, we are generating a relational state, of this man in this place and of the receptacle to what it receives: why then is there not a relation, if something was produced from the relatedness of one thing to the other? Then why is "here" different from "at Athens"? But they will assert that "here" signifies that which declares place; therefore so does "at Athens": so that "at Athens" belongs to place. Then, if this "in Athens" means "is in Athens", the "is" category is added to that of place; but it ought not to be added: just as one does not say "quality is", but only "quality". And, over and above all this, if what is in

¹ The *ὀμφαλός*, the navel-stone at Delphi, was in Greek tradition the central point of the earth.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

20 ἐν χρόνῳ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ ἄλλο παρὰ χρόνον καὶ τόπον, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιήσει, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὕλῃ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἐν ὄλῳ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν μέρεσι, καὶ γένος ἐν εἶδεσι καὶ εἶδος ἐν γένει; καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν πλείους αἱ κατηγορίαι ἔσονται.

15. Ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν λεγομένῳ τάδ' ἂν τις ἐπισκέψαιτο. λέγεται γάρ· ὥς, ἐπεὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἦν ποσότης καὶ ἀριθμός, τὸ ποσὸν γένος ἕτερον ἦν, καὶ ποιότητος οὕσης περὶ αὐτὴν ἄλλο γένος
5 τὸ ποιόν, οὕτω καὶ ποιήσεως οὕσης ἄλλο γένος τὸ ποιεῖν. ἀρ' οὖν τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ ἡ ποίησις, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ποιότης, ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ἐνταῦθα ποίησις, ποιεῖν, ποιῶν, ἢ ποιεῖν καὶ ποίησις εἰς ἓν ληπτέα; ἐμφαίνει δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα, ἢ δὲ
10 ποίησις οὐ· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν ποιήσει εἶναί τι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐνέργεια. ὥστε ἐνέργειαν μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν κατηγορίαν, ἢ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν¹ λέγεται θεωρεῖσθαι, ὥς ἐκεῖ ποιότης. καὶ <εἰ>² αὐτὴ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὥσπερ

¹ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν del. Theiler, H-S¹.

² Igal, H-S².

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time is something else besides time and what is in place is something else besides place, why will not what is in a pot make another category, and why is not what is in matter something else, and what is in a substrate something else, and the part in the whole and the whole in the parts, and the genus in the species and the species in the genus? And so we shall have more categories.

15. But in what is called "acting" [or doing and making]¹ these are the points which one would enquire into. For it is said that, since after substance there were the accompaniments of substance, quantity and number, the quantum was another genus, and because quality accompanies substance the quale was another genus; so, since there is activity, acting is another genus. Is the genus then the acting or the activity from which the acting comes, just like the quality from which the quale comes? Or in this case are activity, acting and the agent, or acting and activity, to be included in one genus? But acting indicates more clearly that there is also the agent, but activity does not; and acting is in some kind of activity, that is, of active actuality. So would active actuality rather be the category, which is said to be observed as an accompaniment of substance, like quality in the other case? And [is there a question] whether active actuality is an accompaniment of substance just like movement? And the movement of

¹ ποιεῖν and ἐνέργεια present considerable difficulties to the translator. "Doing and making" and "active actuality" go some way towards bringing out the full range of meaning of the two words, but are too cumbersome to use continually and not always necessary. Various more or less unsatisfactory compromises will be detected in what follows.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

κίνησις, καὶ ἓν γένος ἡ κίνησις τῶν ὄντων. διὰ τί γὰρ ποιότης μὲν ἓν τι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ποσότης ἓν τι,
 15 καὶ πρὸς τι διὰ τὴν σχέσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο, κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν οὔσης οὐκ ἔσται τι καὶ κίνησις ἓν γένος;

16. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν ἀτελεῖ
 ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐκώλυε τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν προτάττειν, εἶδος δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὡς ἀτελεῖ οὖσαν ὑποβάλλειν, κατηγοροῦντά γε αὐτῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
 5 προστιθέντα δὲ τὸ ἀτελές. τὸ γὰρ ἀτελές λέγεται περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐχ ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίκηται εἰς ἐνέργειαν—ἔστι γὰρ ἤδη—ἀλλ' ἵνα ἐργάσῃται τι, ὃ ἕτερόν ἐστι μετ' αὐτήν. καὶ οὐκ αὐτὴ τελειοῦται τότε, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἐστοχάζετο· οἶον
 10 βάδισις ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάδισις ἦν. εἰ δ' ἔδει στάδιον διανύσαι, οὕτω δὲ ἦν διανύσας, τὸ ἐλλείπον οὐ τῆς βαδίσεως οὐδὲ τῆς κινήσεως ἦν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ποσῆς βαδίσεως· βάδισις δὲ ἦν καὶ ὁποιοῦν καὶ κίνησις ἤδη· ὁ γοῦν κινούμενος καὶ ἤδη κεκίνηται, καὶ ὁ τέμνων ἤδη ἔτεμε. καὶ ὡς ἡ
 15 λεγομένη ἐνέργεια οὐ δεῖται χρόνου, οὕτως οὐδ' ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' ἡ εἰς τοσοῦτον κίνησις· καὶ εἰ ἐν ἀχρόνῳ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἢ ὅλως κίνησις. εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ

¹ The reference here is to the "Platonic Category" of the intelligible world *κίνησις* (Plato *Sophist* 254D); see VI. 2. 7–8.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

real beings is one genus.¹ For why is quality one single accompaniment of substance, and quality one, and the relative one because of the state of relatedness of one thing to another, but, when movement is an accompaniment of substance, will movement also not be a single genus?

16. But if someone were to say that movement was an incomplete active actuality,² nothing would prevent us from giving active actuality the priority and subordinating movement to it as a species as being incomplete, making its category active actuality, but adding the "incomplete". For the "incomplete" is said about it, not because it is not also active actuality, but it is altogether active actuality, but has also the "over and over again", not that it may arrive at active actuality—it is that already, but that it may do something, which is another thing subsequent to itself. And then [when it does do it] it is not itself brought to completion, but the business which was its object: walking, for instance, was walking from the beginning. But if one had to complete a lap, and had not yet arrived at the point of having completed it, what was lacking would not belong to walking or movement, but to walking a certain distance; but it was already walking, however short the walk was, and movement: for certainly the man who is in motion has already moved, and the man who is cutting, cut already. And just as what is called active actuality does not need time, so neither does movement, but [only] movement to a certain extent; and if active actuality is in timelessness, so is movement in that it is in a general way

² This is Aristotle's doctrine. See *Physics* Γ 2. 201b31–32; *Metaphysics* K 9. 1066a20–21.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

συνεχές προσλαβούσα πάντως ἐν χρόνῳ, καὶ ἡ ὄρασις
 μὴ διαλείπουσα τὸ ὄρᾶν ἐν συνεχείᾳ ἂν εἴη καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ.
 20 μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀλογία¹ ἡ λέγουσα ἀεὶ οἶόν τε
 εἶναι λαμβάνειν ἡστινοσοῦν κινήσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι μήτε
 τοῦ χρόνου ἀρχὴν ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο μήτε αὐτῆς
 ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτὴν διαιρεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἄνω· ὥστε ἐξ ἀπείρου συμβαίνοι ἂν τοῦ χρόνου
 25 κεινηθῆσθαι τὴν ἄρτι ἀρξαμένην καὶ αὐτὴν ἄπειρον εἰς τὸ
 ἀρξάμενον εἶναι. τοῦτο γὰρ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ χωρίζειν
 ἐνέργειαν κινήσεως καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν ἀχρόνῳ φάσκειν
 γενέσθαι, τὴν δὲ χρόνου δεῖσθαι λέγειν μὴ τὴν τόσῃν
 μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅλως τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς ἀναγκάζεσθαι ποσὴν
 λέγειν καίτοι ὁμολογοῦντας καὶ αὐτοὺς κατὰ
 30 συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ποσὸν αὐτῇ παρεῖναι, εἰ ἡμερησία εἴη ἡ
 ὀποσοῦσιν χρόνου. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐνέργεια ἐν ἀχρόνῳ,
 οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κίνησιν ἤρχθαι ἐν ἀχρόνῳ, ὃ δὲ
 χρόνος τῷ τοσὴνδε γεγονέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ μεταβολαὶ ἐν
 ἀχρόνῳ ὁμολογοῦνται γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι
 35 ὥσπερ οὐ καὶ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης
 μεταβολῆς. εἰ οὖν μεταβολή, διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ
 κίνησις; εἴληπται δὲ μεταβολή οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 μεταβεβληκέναι· οὐ γὰρ τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταβεβληκέναι
 εἰδέτο.

17. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μήτε τὴν ἐνέργειαν μήτε τὴν
 κίνησιν γένους δεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτά, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι

¹ Theiler, Harder, Cilento: ἀναλογία Enn.

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movement. But if it must be in every way in time because it has acquired the character of continuity, then sight which does not interrupt its seeing would be in continuity and in time. There is evidence for this in the stupid statement which says that it is always possible to take a piece of any movement whatever, and there is not a beginning of the time in which and from which it began, nor a beginning of the movement itself, but it is always possible to divide it up and back: so that it would result that the movement which has just begun has been in motion from infinite time, and that movement is infinite in respect of its beginning. This results because of separating of active actuality from movement and asserting that active actuality occurs in timelessness, but saying that movement needs time, not movement of a certain length only; but they are compelled to say that its nature is quantitative; and yet even they admit that the quantum is incidentally present to it, if it is a day long or of any time you like. Therefore, just as active actuality is in timelessness, so nothing prevents movement from originating in timelessness, but time has come by its becoming of a certain length. Since changes also are admitted to take place in timelessness, in the remark "as if there was not a change which takes place all at once".¹ If then change, why not also motion? But change has here been taken, not in the sense of completed change: for there was no need of change in completion of the process of change.

17. But if someone were to say that neither active actuality nor movement need a genus in and by

¹ Aristotle *Physics* A 3. 186a15-16.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἀνάγειν τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δυνάμει εἶναι
 ἐνεργητικοῦ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ δυνάμει κινητικοῦ ἢ κινητοῦ,
 5 λεκτέον ὡς τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι αὐτὴ ἡ σχέσις ἐγέννα, ἀλλ' οὐ
 τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον μόνον λέγεσθαι. ὅταν δὲ ἢ τις
 ὑπόστασις, καὶ ἑτέρου ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, τὴν γε πρὸ
 τοῦ πρὸς τι εἴληχε φύσιν. αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ
 κίνησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις δὲ ἑτέρου οὐσα οὐκ ἀφήρηται τὸ πρὸ
 10 τοῦ πρὸς τι εἶναί τε καὶ νοεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτά· ἢ οὕτω
 πάντα ἔσται πρὸς τι· πάντως γὰρ ἔχει ὅτιοῦν σχέσιν
 πρὸς ὅτιοῦν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. αὕτη τε ἡ ποίησις
 καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν διὰ τί εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι οὐκ ἀναχθήσεται; ἢ
 γὰρ κίνησις ἢ ἐνέργεια πάντως ἔσται. εἰ δὲ τὴν μὲν
 15 ποίησιν εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι ἀνάξουσι, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἓν γένος
 θήσονται, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὴν μὲν κίνησιν εἰς τὸ πρὸς τι, τὸ
 δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἓν τι γένος θήσονται, καὶ διαιρήσονται τὸ
 κινεῖσθαι ὡς ἓν διχῇ ἓν εἶδεσι τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ
 πάσχειν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς νῦν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν λέγουσι, τὸ δὲ
 πάσχειν;

18. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν τὰς μὲν
 ἐνεργείας φήσουσι, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, τὰς μὲν ἐνεργείας
 λέγοντες εἶναι τὰς ἀθρόας, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις, οἷον τὸ
 τέμνειν—ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ τὸ τέμνειν—ἢ πάσας κινήσεις ἢ
 5 μετὰ κινήσεως, καὶ εἰ πάσας πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τὰς

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

themselves, but they are to be referred to the relative in that active actuality belongs to that which is potentially active and actual, and movement to that which is potentially moving or moved, one must answer that it is the very state of relatedness which produces relatives, and they are not produced by the mere statement that a thing is related to another. But when there is some substantial reality, even if it belongs to something else or is related to something else, it certainly possesses its nature prior to the relativity. This active actuality, then, and movement and state, though belonging to another, do not lose their priority to the relative and being thought in and by themselves; otherwise in this way everything will be relative: for absolutely everything has a relation to something, as in the case of the soul. And why are not activity and acting to be referred to the relative? For movement and active actuality will be altogether so. But if they are going to refer activity to the relative, but make one genus of acting, why will they not refer movement to the relative, but posit being in motion as one genus, and divide being in motion, as one genus, into two, into the species of acting and being acted upon, instead of, as they do now, saying that acting is one genus and being acted upon another?

18. But we must investigate whether they are going to assert that in acting some activities are active actualities and some are movements, saying that those which occur all at once are active actualities and the others are movements, cutting for instance—for cutting goes on in time—or whether they are all movements or accompanied by movement; and whether all activities are related to passi-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ποιήσεις ἢ τινας καὶ ἀπολύτους, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ
λέγειν, καὶ εἰ τὰς πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν πάσας κινήσεις, τὰς
δ' ἀπολύτους ἐνεργείας, ἢ ἐν ἑκατέροις ἑκάτερον. τὸ
γοῦν βαδίζειν ἀπολελυμένον ὃν κίνησιν ἂν εἴποιεν, τὸ δὲ
10 νοεῖν οὐκ ἔχον τὸ πάσχον καὶ αὐτὸ ἐνέργειαν, οἶμαι. ἢ
οὐδὲ ποιεῖν φατέον τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ
ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ταῦτα, ποῦ λεκτέον· τάχα δὲ τὸ νοεῖν πρὸς
τὸ νοητόν, ὥσπερ τὴν νόησιν. καὶ γὰρ τὴν αἴσθησιν
πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν· ἀλλ' εἰ κακεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρὸς τὸ
15 αἰσθητόν, διὰ τί αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸ
αἰσθητόν; καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις δέ, εἰ πρὸς ἕτερον, σχέσιν μὲν
ἔχει πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δέ τι παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν, τὸ ἢ
ἐνέργεια ἢ πάθος εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τὸ πάθος παρὰ τὸ τινος
εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ τινος ἔστι τι ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἢ δὲ
20 δὴ βάδισις ἔχουσα καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ τινος εἶναι καὶ ποδῶν
εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ τινος ἔχει τὸ κίνησις εἶναι. ἔχοι ἂν οὖν καὶ
ἡ νόησις παρὰ τὸ πρὸς τι τὸ ἢ κίνησις εἶναι ἢ ἐνέργεια.

19. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ καὶ τινες ἐνέργειαι δόξουσιν
ἀτελεῖς εἶναι μὴ προσλαβοῦσαι χρόνον, ὥστε εἰς ταῦτόν

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

vity, or there are also some which are independent, walking and talking for instance, and whether all the activities which are related to passivity are movements, but the independent ones are active actualities, or whether there are some of each in each class. Walking at any rate, which is independent, they would say was a movement, but thinking, though it also has no passivity, an active actuality, I suppose. Or else it must be asserted that thinking and walking are not included in acting at all. But if they are not in acting, it must be said where they are; but perhaps the act of thinking is related to the object of thought just as thought [in general] is. For certainly sense perception is related to the sense-object; but if in that case sense-perception is related to the sense-object, why is not the actual [particular] act of sense-perception any longer related to the sense-object? And sense-perception, even if it is related to something else, has indeed a relatedness to that something, but has something over and above the relatedness, the being either an active actuality or a passive experience. If then the passive experience, over and above belonging to something and being caused by some agent, is something different so also is the active actuality. Certainly walking, which itself also has the characteristics of belonging to something, and in fact belonging to the feet, and of being caused by an agent, has the being a movement. Therefore thought also, over and above its relation, has the being either a movement or an active actuality.

19. But we must investigate whether some active actualities are going to appear as incomplete without acquiring an addition of time, so that they will

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ταῖς κινήσεσιν ἔλθειν, οἷον τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἡ ζωή. ἐν χρόνῳ
 γὰρ τελείῳ τὸ ζῆν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργεια
 5 οὐκ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, ἀλλὰ οἷον ἀξιούσι καὶ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι.
 ὥστε κινήσεις ἄμφω λεκτέον, καὶ ἐν τι τὴν κίνησιν καὶ
 γένος ἐν, θεωροῦντας παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ καὶ
 τὸ ποιὸν καὶ κίνησιν οὖσαν περὶ αὐτήν. καί, εἰ βούλει,
 τὰς μὲν σωματικές, τὰς δὲ ψυχικάς, ἢ τὰς μὲν παρ'
 10 αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων εἰς αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν,
 τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιήσεις εἴτε εἰς
 ἄλλα εἴτε ἀπολελυμένας, τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων πείσεις.
 καίτοι καὶ αἱ εἰς ἄλλα κινήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ ταῖς ἐξ ἄλλων.
 ἢ γὰρ τμησίς, ἢ τε παρὰ τοῦ τέμνοντος ἢ τε ἐν τῷ
 15 τεμνομένῳ, μία, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέμνειν ἕτερον καὶ τὸ
 τέμνεσθαι. τάχα δὲ οὐδὲ μία ἢ τμησίς ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 τέμνοντος καὶ ἢ ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τέμνειν
 τὸ ἐκ τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἐνεργείας καὶ κινήσεως ἑτέραν ἐν τῷ
 τεμνομένῳ διάδοχον κίνησιν γίνεσθαι. ἢ ἴσως οὐ κατ'
 αὐτὸ τὸ τέμνεσθαι τὸ διάφορον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο τὸ
 20 ἐπιγιγνόμενον κίνημα, οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 πᾶσχειν ἐν τούτῳ. τί οὖν, εἰ μὴ τι ἀλγοῖ; τί ἄλλο ἢ ἡ
 ἐνέργεια τοῦ ποιούντος ἐν τῷδε οὖσα; οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 οὕτω λεγόμενον ποιεῖν. καὶ διττὸν οὕτως εἶναι τὸ

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

come into the same genus as movements, life and living for instance. For the life of every man is in a complete time, and his well-being is not in partlessness, but is like they maintain that movement also is. So that both are to be called movements, and movement is one thing and one genus, as we observe besides the quantum in the substance the quale as well, and a movement which appertains to the substance. And, if you like, some movements are of body and some of soul, or some are self-originated and others are produced in the moving things by the agency of others, or some come from themselves and some from others, and the ones which come from themselves are activities, whether they are directed to other things or independent, but those which come from others are passivities. And yet the movements to other things are the same as the movements from other things: for cutting, the cutting which comes from the cutter and the cutting which takes place in what is being cut, is one, but cutting and being cut are different. But perhaps even the cutting originating from the cutter and the cutting going on in the cut are not one, but what cutting is is the process in which, from an active actuality and movement of this particular kind, another successive movement comes to be in what is being cut. Or perhaps the difference does not lie in the actual being cut, but in something else, the subsequent movement, feeling pain for instance: for there is certainly passivity in this. Well then, what is the case if there is not any pain? What else is there than the active actuality of the agent existing in this particular thing? For in this way this description also fits acting. And in this way acting is double, one

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, τὸ δ' ἐν ἄλλῳ συνιστάμενον·
 25 καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν
 ἐν ἄλλῳ πεποίηκε δύο νομίζειν εἶναι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὸ
 δὲ πάσχειν. οἷον καὶ τὸ γράφειν, καίτοι ὄν ἐν ἄλλῳ, οὐκ
 ἐπιζητεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο τι ἐν τῷ γραμματεῖ
 ποιεῖ παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ γράφοντος οἷον τὸ ἀλγεῖν·
 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι γεγράφθαι, οὐ τὸ πάσχειν λέγει. καὶ ἐπὶ
 30 τοῦ βαδίζειν, καίτοι οὔσης γῆς ἐφ' ἧς, οὐ προσποιεῖται
 τὸ πεπονθέναι. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐπὶ σώματος ζῶου βαίνῃ, τὸ
 πάσχειν ἐπινοεῖ, ὃ ἐπιγίγνεται ἄλγημα συλλογιζόμενος,
 οὐ τὸ βαδίζειν· ἢ ἐπενόησεν ἂν καὶ πρότερον. οὕτω καὶ
 ἐπὶ πάντων κατὰ μὲν τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν λεκτέον μετὰ τοῦ
 35 λεγομένου πάσχειν, τοῦ ἀντιθέτου. ὃ δὲ πάσχειν
 λέγεται, τὸ γενόμενον ὕστερον, οὐ τὸ ἀντίθετον οἷον τῷ
 καίειν τὸ καίεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ καίειν καὶ καίεσθαι
 ἐνὸς ὄντος, τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἄλγημα ἢ τι ἄλλο,
 οἷον μαραίνεσθαι. τί οὖν, εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐργάζοιτο,
 40 ὥστε λυπεῖν, οὐχ ὃ μὲν ποιεῖ, ὃ δὲ πάσχει, καὶ ἐκ μιᾶς
 ἐνεργείας τὰ δύο; [καὶ ὃ μὲν ποιεῖ, ὃ δὲ πάσχει]¹ ἢ ἐν τῇ
 ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς βουλήσεως τοῦ λυπεῖν, ἀλλὰ
 ποιεῖ τι ἕτερον, δι' οὗ λυπεῖ, ὃ ἐν τῷ λυπησομένῳ
 γενόμενον ἐν ὃν καὶ ταῦτόν πεποίηκεν ἄλλο, τὸ
 λυπεῖσθαι. τί οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν γενόμενον, πρὶν καὶ λύπην

¹ del. Kirchhoff: defendit Cilento.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

kind which does and one kind which does not occur in another; and it is no longer a distinction of acting and being passive, but acting in another has produced the supposition that there are two, acting and being passive. Writing, for instance, although it is in something else, does not require [the concept of] passivity, because it does not produce anything else, feeling pain for instance, in the writing-tablet beyond the actual activity of the writer; but if someone says that the tablet has been written on, he is not referring to passive suffering. And in the case of walking, though there is ground on which one walks, [the concept of] its passive suffering is not included. But when one steps on the body of a living being, one does have passive suffering in mind, since one reasons about the pain which occurs, not the walking; otherwise one would have thought of it before also. In this way too in all cases, where action is concerned one genus must be mentioned together with passive suffering, that of the opposite of action. But what is called passive suffering is what occurs subsequently, not the opposite like being burnt to burning, but what results from burning and being burnt which are one, either the pain which occurs in the burnt object or something else, like shrivelling. Well then, if someone does this very thing in order to cause pain, does not one act and the other suffer, even if the two come from one actual activity? Now, in the actual activity what belongs to the will to hurt is no longer contained, but the agent does something else, by which he causes pain, which something else, being one and the same when it occurs in what is going to be hurt, produces another effect, that of being hurt. Why then is not the one

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

45 ποιῆσαι, ἣ ὅλως λύπην οὐκ ἐμποιοῦν, οὐ πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦ
εἰς ὄν, οἶον τὸ ἀκούσαι; ἣ οὐ πάθος τὸ ἀκούσαι οὐδ'
ὅλως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηθῆναί ἐστι γενέσθαι
ἐν πάθει, ὃ μὴ ἀντίθετον τῷ ποιῆσαι.

20. Ἄλλ' ἔστω μὴ ἀντίθετον· ὅμως δὲ ἕτερον ὃν τοῦ
ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῇ ποιήσει. ἥ, εἰ κινήσεις
ἄμφω, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἶον ἀλλοιώσεις κινήσεις
κατὰ τὸ ποιόν. ἄρ' οὖν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποι-
5 οῦν<τος ἢ κινήσεις ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν>¹ ἦ, ἢ ἀλλοιώσεις
ποιήσεις καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἀπαθοῦς αὐτοῦ ὄντος; ἢ ἐὰν μὲν
ἀπαθὴς ᾖ, ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἄλλον,
οἶον τύπτων, καὶ πάσχει, οὐκέτι ποιεῖ. ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει
ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχειν. εἰ οὖν κατὰ ταῦτό² τὸ πάσχειν,
οἶον τὸ τρίβειν, διὰ τί ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχειν; ἢ, ὅτι
10 ἀντιτρίβεται, καὶ πάσχει. ἄρ' οὖν, ὅτι ἀντικινεῖται, καὶ
δύο κινήσεις φήσομεν περὶ αὐτόν; καὶ πῶς δύο; ἀλλὰ
μία. καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ποιήσεις καὶ πεῖσις; ἢ³ οὕτω
μὲν ποιήσεις τῷ ἀπ' ἄλλον, εἰς ἄλλον δὲ πεῖσις ἡ αὐτὴ
οὔσα. ἀλλὰ ἄλλην φήσομεν; καὶ πῶς ἄλλο τι διατίθῃσι
15 τὸν πάσχοντα ἀλλοιοῦσα καὶ ὁ ποιῶν ἀπαθὴς ἐκείνου;
πῶς γὰρ ἂν πάθοι ὁ ποιεῖ ἐν ἄλλῳ; ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ

¹ Igal, H-S².

² Igal, H-S²: κατ' αὐτὸ Enn.

³ Kirchhoff: καὶ Enn., H-S¹.

¹ Aristotle *Physics* E 3. 226a26.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

thing which occurs, before it also causes pain, or if it does not cause pain in its object at all, not a passive affection of that object, like hearing? Now hearing is not a passive affection, nor is sense-perception in general, but being hurt is coming into a passive state, which is not opposite to action.

20. But granted that it is not opposite, yet all the same it is different from action and not in the same genus as doing and making. Now if both are movements, it is in the same genus, as, for instance, "qualitative change is movement in respect of quality".¹ Whenever, therefore, the movement in respect of quality, the qualitative change, proceeds from the agent is it an action and is it doing, if the maker is unaffected? If the agent is unaffected, it is in the category of doing, but if the agent is acting on someone else, hitting him for instance, and is affected, the agent is no longer doing. Now nothing prevents the doer from also being affected. If then the affection is in respect of the same thing, for instance rubbing, why is it doing rather than being affected? It is because it is reciprocally rubbed that it is also affected. Are we then to say that there are two movements in it because it is reciprocally moved? How can there be two? But there must be one. And how can the same movement be both a doing and a being affected? It is a doing in that it comes from one thing and a being affected because it acts on another, being the same movement. But are we to say that it is another? And how does the movement in producing qualitative change dispose what is affected in a different way and the agent remain unaffected by that change in disposition? For how could it be affected by what it does in another?

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι ποιεῖ τὸ πάσχειν, ὃ ἦν οὐ πάσχειν κατὰ
τὸν ποιοῦντα; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ μὲν λευκαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ
κύκνου, ὁ δὲ λευκαίνεται ὁ γιγνόμενος κύκνος, πάσχειν
20 φήσομεν ἴοντα εἰς οὐσίαν; εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερον λευκαίνοιο
γενόμενος; καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν αὔξοι, τὸ δὲ αὔξοιτο, τὸ
αὐξόμενον πάσχειν; ἢ μόνον ἐν τῷ ποιῶ τὴν πείσιν; ἀλλ'
εἰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ποιοῖ, τὸ δὲ καλλύνοιτο, τὸ
καλλυνόμενον πάσχειν; εἰ οὖν τὸ καλλύνον χεῖρον
γίγνοιτο ἢ καὶ ἀφανίζοιτο, οἷον ὁ καττίτερος, τὸ δὲ
25 βέλτιον γίγνοιτο, ὁ χαλκός, πάσχειν τὸν χαλκὸν
φήσομεν, τὸν δὲ ποιεῖν; τὸν δὲ μαθάνοντα πῶς πάσχειν
τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐνεργείας εἰς αὐτὸν ἰούσης; ἢ
πάθησις πῶς ἂν εἴη μία γε οὐσα; ἀλλ' αὕτη μὲν οὐ
πάθησις, ὁ δὲ ἔχων πάσχων ἔσται τοῦ πάσχειν τίνος
30 λαμβανομένου; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἐνηργηκέναι αὐτόν· οὐ
γὰρ τὸ μαθάνειν ὥσπερ τὸ πληγῆναι ἐν ἀντιλήψει ὄν
καὶ γνωρίσει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν.

21. Τίνι οὖν γνωριούμεν τὸ πάσχειν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ
ἐνεργείᾳ τῇ παρ' ἄλλου, εἰ ὁ τὴν ἐνέργειαν
παραδεξάμενος αὐτοῦ ἐποιήσατο διαδεξάμενος. ἀλλ'
ἄρα ὅπου μὴ ἐνέργεια, πείσις δὲ μόνον; τί οὖν, εἰ
5 κάλλιον γίγνοιτο, ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ χεῖρον ἔχει; ἢ εἰ

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

Is it then the fact that the movement is in something else which produces being affected, which was not being affected in the case of the agent? But if on the one hand the rational form of the swan produces whiteness and [on the other] the swan coming into being is made white, are we going to say that the swan is affected as it proceeds to substantiality? But is it if it is made white afterwards when it has come into being? And if one thing is going to make something larger and the other is going to be made large, is that which is going to be made large affected? Or is being affected only in quality? But if one thing makes something beautiful and the other is made beautiful is that which is being made beautiful affected? If, then, that which makes beautiful becomes worse or even disappears, like the tin, and the other, the copper, becomes better, are we to say that the copper is affected and the tin acts? And how is the learner affected when the activity of the agent comes to him? How could the activity be a passivity when it is certainly one? But is this activity not a passivity, but will [the learner] who has it be passively affected, being affected being taken as somebody being affected? For it is not because the learner has not been active: for learning is not like being hit, since it consists in grasping and getting to know, and neither is seeing.

21. By what indication, then, are we to recognise being affected? Not, certainly, by the fact that the activity [affecting it] comes from another, if the one who received the activity took it over and made it his own. But is it when there is no activity and only passive affection? What then if it becomes more beautiful, and the activity has the worst of it? Or if

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

κατὰ κακίαν ἐνεργοῖ τις καὶ ἄρχοι εἰς ἄλλον ἀκολάστως; ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φαύλην καὶ πεῖσιν καλήν. τίνοι οὖν διοριούμεν; ἄρα τῷ τὸ μὲν εἰς ἄλλον παρ' αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀφ' ἐτέρου ἐν ἄλλῳ τὸ πάσχειν; τί οὖν, εἰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, μὴ εἰς ἄλλον δέ, οἶον τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ 10 δοξάζειν; τὸ δὲ θερμανθῆναι παρ' αὐτοῦ διανοηθέντος ἢ θυμωθέντος ἐκ δόξης μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν προσελθόντος; ἢ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν εἴτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἴτε εἰς ἄλλον ἰὸν κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ¹; ἢ οὖν ἐπιθυμία τί καὶ πᾶσα ὀρεξις, εἰ ἢ ὀρεξις κινεῖται ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ; εἰ μὴ τις μὴ προσποιοῖτο ἀφ' 15 οὗ κεκίνηται, ὅτι δὲ μετ' ἐκείνο ἐγγήγερται. τί οὖν διαφέρει τοῦ πεπληῆσθαι ἢ ὥσθέντα κατενεχθῆναι; ἀλλ' ἄρα διαιρετέον τὰς ὀρέξεις λέγοντα τὰς μὲν ποιήσεις, ὅσαι νῶ ἐπόμεναι, τὰς δὲ ὀλκὰς οὔσας πείσεις, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν οὐ τῷ παρ' ἐτέρου ἢ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ—σαπίει γὰρ 20 ἂν τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ—ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν συμβαλλόμενον αὐτὸ ὑπομείνῃ ἀλλοίωσιν τὴν μὴ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγουσαν, ἣτις ἐξίστησι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοίωσιν πεῖσιν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔχειν; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι θερμότητά ἐστιν ἴσχειν, εἴη δὲ τῷ μὲν 25 εἰς οὐσίαν συντελοῦν, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν καὶ οὐ

¹ ἰὸν κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ Igal: τι ὄν, κίνημα ἐξ αὐτοῦ Enn., H-S¹.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

someone is viciously active and starts an unscrupulous attack on another? Now, there is nothing to prevent activity from being bad and passive affection good. So by what shall we distinguish them? Perhaps by the fact that the one is directed from the agent to another, and the other, passive affection, is in another but comes from a different source? What then if it comes from oneself but is not directed to another, thinking or opining for instance? And what about getting heated as a result of one's own thought or of being put into a passion by an opinion, when nothing comes to one from outside? Is action, whether in oneself or going on to another, a self-caused movement? Then what is concupiscence and every sort of desire, if desire derives its movement from the desired object? Unless of course one does not make the assumption that it has derived its movement from the object, but only that it has been awakened after [the appearance of] the object. How then does desire differ from being hit, or pushed and knocked down? But perhaps we should divide desires, saying that some of them are actions, all that follow intellect, but those which drag one are passive affections, and that passive affection is not a matter of deriving from another or from oneself—for a thing can rot in itself—but that when without any contribution of its own a thing undergoes an alteration which does not bring it to substantiality and changes it for the worse, or not for the better, an alteration of this kind has the characteristic of passivity and being passively affected? But if being heated is acquiring heat, and this contributes to one thing's substantiality but not to another's, being affected and not being affected will be the same

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

πάσχειν ἔσται. καὶ πῶς οὐ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι διττόν; ἢ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, ὅταν εἰς οὐσίαν συντελῇ, καὶ τότε ἄλλου πάσχοντος εἰς οὐσίαν συντελέσει, οἷον θερμαινομένου τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ πάσχοντος, ἢ δὲ οὐσία ὁ ἀνδριάς, ὃς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐθερμαίνετο, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. εἰ οὖν
30 καλλίων ὁ χαλκὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ κατὰ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύει πάσχειν λέγειν· διττόν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πάσχειν, τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ χεῖρον γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ βέλτιον, ἢ οὐδέτερον.

22. Οὐκοῦν γίνεταί τὸ πάσχειν τῷ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ κίνησιν [τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν]¹ τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀλλοιούσθαι ὁπωσοῦν· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ κίνησιν τὴν ἀπόλυτον παρ' αὐτοῦ ἢ τὴν τελευτώσαν εἰς ἄλλο ἀπ'
5 αὐτοῦ, ὁρμωμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένου ποιεῖν. καὶ κίνησις μὲν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, ἢ δὲ διαφορὰ ἡ διαιρούσα τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν, καθόσον ποιεῖν, ἀπαθὲς τηροῦσα, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν ἐν τῷ διατίθεσθαι ἐτέρως ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, τῆς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὐσίας οὐδὲν
10 πάσχοντος, ὅταν τις οὐσία γίνηται. γίνεται τοίνυν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν σχέσει τινὶ ποιεῖν, ἐν ἄλλῃ δὲ πάσχειν· παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷδε θεωρούμενον ποιεῖν ἔσται, κίνησις οὐσα ἢ αὐτῇ, παρὰ δὲ τῷδε πάσχειν, ὅτι τάδε οὗτος διατίθεται· ὥστε κινδυνεύειν ἄμφω πρὸς τι εἶναι, ὅσα τοῦ ποιεῖν
15 πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν, εἰ μὲν παρὰ τούτῳ τὸ αὐτό, ποιεῖν, εἰ δὲ παρὰ τῷδε, πάσχειν. καὶ θεωρούμενον ἐκάτερον οὐ

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

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thing. And, surely, being heated is double. Now being heated, when it contributes to substantiality, will then also contribute to substantiality by something else being affected; for instance when the bronze is heated and affected, but the substance is the statue, which was not heated itself except incidentally. If then the bronze is more beautiful as a result of being heated or according to the degree of heat, there is nothing against saying it is passively affected: for being passively affected is double, one kind consisting in becoming worse, the other in becoming better, or neither.

22. Passive affection, then, occurs by having in oneself an alterative motion of any kind; and action is either having in oneself an independent self-derived motion or one which starts from oneself and ends in another, [a motion, that is,] starting from that which is said to act. There is motion in both cases, but the difference which separates action and passive affection keeps action, in so far as it is action, unaffected, but makes passive affection consist in being disposed otherwise than it was before; the substance of what is affected gains nothing which contributes to its substantiality, but what is affected is different, when a substance comes to be. So the same is action in one relationship and passive affection in another. It is the same motion, but looked at on one side it will be action, but on the other passive affection, because this is disposed in this way; so it seems likely that both are relation, in all cases where action is related to passive affection; if one looks at the same on one side it is action, but if on the other, it is affection. And each of the two is looked at not by itself, but [one] along with that

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καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ποιούντος καὶ πάσχοντος· οὗτος κινεῖ καὶ οὗτος κινεῖται, καὶ δύο κατηγορίαι ἐκάτερον· καὶ οὗτος δίδωσι τῷδε κίνησιν, οὗτος δὲ
 20 λαμβάνει, ὥστε λήψις καὶ δόσις καὶ πρὸς τι. ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὁ λαβών, ὥσπερ λέγεται ἔχειν χρῶμα, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἔχει κίνησιν; καὶ ἡ ἀπόλυτος κίνησις, οἷον ἡ τοῦ βαδίζειν, ἔχει βάδισιν, καὶ ἔχει δὲ νόησιν. ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, εἰ τὸ προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, εἰ καὶ τὸ προνοίας τυγχάνειν πάσχειν· εἰς ἄλλο γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ πρόνοια. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ
 25 προνοεῖν ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰ περὶ ἄλλου τὸ νοεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο πάσχειν. ἢ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν ποιεῖν—οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ νοοῦμενον, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ—οὐδὲ ποιήσις ὅλως. οὐδὲ δεῖ πάσας ἐνεργείας ποιήσεις λέγειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν τι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἢ ποιήσις. τί οὖν; εἰ βαδίζων ἵχνη
 30 εἰργάσατο, οὐ λέγομεν πεποιηκέναι; ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν ἄλλο τι. ἢ ποιεῖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο ἑώρα· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ποιεῖν λέγομεν οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνειν καὶ “ἐνήργησε τὸ φάρμακον”. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις.

23. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν, εἰ τὸ ἔχειν πολλαχῶς, διὰ τί οὐ πάντες οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἔχειν εἰς ταύτην τὴν κατηγορίαν ἀναχθῇσονται; ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποσόν, ὅτι ἔχει μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ ποιόν, ὅτι ἔχει χρῶμα, καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ
 5 τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἔχει υἱόν, καὶ ὁ υἱός, ὅτι ἔχει πατέρα, καὶ ὅλως κτήματα. εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν ἐκείναις, ὅπλα

¹ The Peripatetics.

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which acts, and [the other] with that which is affected: this one moves and this one is moved, and each is two categories; and this one gives motion to this, and this one receives it, so that there is taking and giving and this is relation. Or, if the recipient has, as in the phrase "have colour", why does it not also "have movement"? And independent movement, that of walking for instance, has walking, and also has thinking. But one must consider whether forethought is action, if being the object of forethought is being affected; since forethought is directed to something else and is about something else. Now forethought is not action, even if the thought is about something else, nor is being its object being affected. And thought is not action either—[it does not operate] in the object of thought itself, but is about it: it is not any kind of doing or making. And one should not call all activities doings or makings, or say that they do something. Doing is incidental. Well then, if someone walking produces footprints, do we not say he made them? But [he did so] because he was something else. Or [we may say that] the making is incidental and the activity [of footprint-making] is incidental, because he did not have this in view: since we speak of action in the case of lifeless beings, that fire heats, for instance, or "the drug acted". But that is enough of that.

23. But about having, if "having" is used in many different senses, why will they¹ not refer all the ways of having to this category? So the quantum, because it has size, and the quale, because it has colour, and the father and such, because he has a son, and the son because he has a father, and, in general, possessions. But if the other things are in

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

δὲ καὶ ὑποδήματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, πρῶτον μὲν
 ζητήσκειν ἂν τις, διὰ τί, καὶ διὰ τί ἔχων μὲν αὐτὰ μίαν
 ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ποιεῖ, καίων δὲ ἢ τέμνων ἢ
 κατορύττων ἢ ἀποβάλλων οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ ἄλλας; εἰ δ' ὅτι
 10 περικείται, κἂν ἱμάτιον κέηται ἐπὶ κλίνης, ἄλλη
 κατηγορία ἔσται, κἂν κεκαλυμμένος ἦ τις. εἰ δὲ κατὰ
 τὴν κάθεξιν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν ἔξιν, δηλονότι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 πάντα <αὐτὰ>¹ κατὰ τὸ ἔχειν λεγόμενα καὶ εἰς ἔξιν
 [αὐτά],¹ ὅπου ποτὲ ἢ ἔξιν, ἀνακτέον· οὐ γὰρ διοίσει
 15 κατὰ τὸ ἐχόμενον. εἰ μέντοι ποιότητα ἔχειν οὐ δεῖ λέγειν,
 ὅτι ἤδη ποιότης εἴρηται, οὐδὲ ποσότητα ἔχειν, ὅτι
 ποσότης, οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχειν, ὅτι οὐσία εἴρηται, διὰ τί δὲ
 ὅπλα ἔχειν εἰρημένης οὐσίας, ἐν ἣ ταῦτα; οὐσία γὰρ
 ὑπόδημα καὶ ὅπλα. πῶς δ' ὅλως ἀπλοῦν καὶ μιᾶς
 20 κατηγορίας “ὅδε ὅπλα ἔχει”; τοῦτο γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ
 ὠπλίσθαι. ἔπειτα πότερον ἐπὶ ζῶντος μόνον ἢ κἂν
 ἀνδριάς ἦ, ὅτῳ ταῦτα; ἄλλως γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἔχειν δοκεῖ
 καὶ ἴσως ὁμωνύμως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ “ἔστηκεν” ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν
 οὐ ταυτόν. ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγοις πῶς εὐλογον ἔχειν
 κατηγορίαν γενικὴν ἄλλην;

24. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κείσθαι—ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ αὐτὸ ὄν—
 ἀνακείσθαι, καθῆσθαι, καίτοι οὐ κείσθαι ἀπλῶς

¹ transposuit Schwyzer (*Gnomon* 42, 1970, 654): <τὰ>
 Kirchhoff.

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those categories [of quantity, quality and relation] but weapons and shoes and things around the body [are in this one], first of all one might enquire why, and why the person who *has* these things makes another category, but, if he burns them or cuts them or buries them or throws them out, does not make another or others. But if it is because they are around the body, if a cloak lies on a bed there will be one category and if someone has wrapped himself in it another. But if it is in accordance with possession and the state of possessing, obviously again all the other things spoken of in connection with having are also to be referred to the state of possessing, wherever one puts it: for there will be no differentiation according to what is possessed. If then one must not say that one has a quality, because quality has been mentioned already, or that one has quantity, because quantity has been mentioned, or that one has parts, because substance has been mentioned, then why should one say one has weapons, when substance has been mentioned, and they are in this category? For a shoe and weapons are substance. And how, altogether, is "this man here has weapons" a simple statement belonging to one category? For this means being armed. Then, can one say this only about a living man, or also if it is a statue which has the weapons? For each of the two appears to "have" them in a different way, and perhaps "have" is equivocal: since "stand" is not the same in both cases. And again, how is it reasonable that something which occurs in a few cases should have another general category?

24. About position—which also only occurs in a few cases—lying on, sitting: though these terms do

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

λεγομένων, ἀλλὰ “πὼς κείνται” καὶ “κείται ἐν σχήματι τοιῷδε”. καὶ τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἄλλο· τοῦ δὲ κείσθαι τί
 5 ἄλλο σημαίνοντος ἢ “ἐν τόπῳ ἐστίν”, εἰρημένου τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ τόπου, τί δεῖ εἰς ἐν δύο κατηγορίας συνάπτειν; ἔπειτα, εἰ μὲν τὸ “κάθηται” ἐνέργειαν σημαίνει, ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις τακτέον, εἰ δὲ πάθος, ἐν τῷ πεπονθέναι ἢ πάσχειν. τὸ δὲ “ἀνακείται” τί ἄλλο ἢ “ἄνω κείται”, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ “κάτω κείται” ἢ “μεταξὺ
 10 κείται”; διὰ τί δὲ ἀνακλίσεως οὔσης ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι οὐχὶ καὶ ὁ ἀνακείμενος ἐκεῖ; ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ ὄντος ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἀριστερός. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων.

25. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τέτταρα τιθέντας καὶ τετραχῶς διαιροῦντας εἰς “ὑποκείμενα” καὶ “ποιὰ” καὶ “πὼς ἔχοντα” καὶ “πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα”, καὶ κοινόν τι ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τιθέντας καὶ ἐνὶ γένει περιλαμβάνοντας τὰ
 5 πάντα, ὅτι μὲν κοινόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐν γένος λαμβάνουσι, πολλὰ ἂν τις λέγοι. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀσύνετον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλογον τὸ τί τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐφαρμόττον ἀσωμάτοις καὶ σώμασι. καὶ διαφορὰς οὐ καταλελοίπασιν, αἷς τὸ τί διαιρήσουσι. καὶ τὸ τί τοῦτο ἢ ὄν ἢ μὴ ὄν ἐστίν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ὄν, ἔν τι τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν·

¹ Again the Stoic *τι*; see ch. 2, n. 1, p. 16.

² For a good account of the Stoic Categories and of the misunderstandings about them which may have arisen

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not simply express position, but "they are in a certain position" or "he is posed in such and such an attitude". And the attitude is something else; but what else does position signify but "is in place" and, when place and attitude have been mentioned, what need is there to join up two categories into one? Then further, if "sits" signifies an activity, it must be ranked among activities, but if a passive affection, it must be placed in the class of having been or being affected. But what does "he lies on" mean except "he lies above", like "he lies under", or "he lies between"? And why, when lying on is in the category of relation, is not the man who is lying on something there too? Since being on the right is there too, and the one on the right and the left. So much for that.

25. But as for those who posit the four genera and make a fourfold division into subjects and qualia and things in a certain state and things in a certain state in relation to others, and posit over them a common something¹ and include all things in one genus, there is much that one could say against them because they assume a common something and one genus over all. For, really, how incomprehensible and irrational this something of theirs is, and how unadapted to bodiless things and bodies.² And they have not left any room for differences with which they will be able to differentiate the something. And this something is either existent or non-existent; if, then, it is existent, it is one of its species; but if it is

from the hostile character of most of our sources of evidence, of which these chapters are an important part, see J. M. Rist *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) ch. 9, "Categories and their Uses", 152-72.

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10 εἰ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἔστι τὸ ὄν μὴ ὄν. καὶ μυρία ἕτερα. ταῦτα μὲν
 οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑατέον, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν
 ἐπισκεπτέον. ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ
 τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες τὴν πρώτην
 αὐτοῖς δοκοῦσαν ἀρχὴν συντάττουσι τοῖς μετὰ τὴν
 15 ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πρότερα τοῖς ὕστερον
 εἰς ἓν ἄγουσιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ὄν ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν
 πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον εἶναι. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἐν οἷς τὸ
 πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ
 προτέρου λαμβάνει τὸ εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ
 20 γένος τὸ ἴσον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἕκαστον ἔχει παρὰ τοῦ γένους,
 εἴπερ τοῦτο δεῖ γένος εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν
 κατηγορούμενον· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ φήσουσι παρὰ τῆς
 ὕλης, οἶμαι, τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν. ἔπειτα τὸ
 ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἀριθμοῦντες οὐ τὰ ὄντα ἐξαριθμοῦνται,
 ἀλλ' ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦσι· διαφέρει δὲ ἀρχὰς
 25 λέγειν καὶ αὐτά. εἰ δὲ ὄν μὲν μόνον τὴν ὕλην φήσουσι, τὰ
 δ' ἄλλα πάθη τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ ἐχρῆν τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐν τι γένος προτάττειν· μάλλον δ' ἂν βέλτιον
 αὐτοῖς ἐλέγετο, εἰ τὸ μὲν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάθη, καὶ
 διηροῦντο ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ καὶ λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὑποκείμενα,
 30 τὰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ διαφορὰν
 οὐκ ἔχοντος, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μεμερίσθαι, ὥσπερ ὄγκον εἰς
 μέρη—καίτοι οὐδὲ μεμερίσθαι τῷ συνεχῇ λέγειν τὴν

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non-existent, the existent is non-existent. And there are innumerable other objections. Well, we should leave these for the present and consider the division itself. They rank subjects first and at this point rank matter before the others, and so rank what they think is the first principle along with the things which come after their first principle. And first of all they bring prior things into one [genus] with posterior things, when it is not possible for that which is prior and that which is posterior to be in one genus. For in things in which there is prior and posterior, the posterior takes its being from the prior, but in things which come under the same genus each receives an equal contribution to its being from the genus, if the genus is what is predicated in speaking of the essential nature of the species: since they, I think, will agree that existence comes to the other things from matter. Then, when they count the subject as one, they do not enumerate existing things, but are looking for the principles of existing things. But it makes a difference whether one speaks of the principles or the things themselves. But if they are going to say that only matter exists, and that the other things are affections of matter, they ought not to place a single genus before being and the others: rather, it would have been better put if they had distinguished one thing as substance and the rest as affections and then divided these. And [it is unreasonable] to call some things subjects and [put] others in [categories], when the subject is one and has no differentiation except by being divided, like a mass, into parts—yet it cannot even be divided because they say that its substance is continuous—it would

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οὐσίαν—βέλτιον λέγειν ἦν “τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον”.

26. Ὅλως δὲ τὸ προτάττειν ἀπάντων τὴν ὕλην, ὃ
δυνάμει ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐνέργειαν πρὸ δυνάμεως
τάττειν, παντάπασιν ἀτοπώτατον. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ
δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ποτε τάξεως ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος
5 ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τοῦ δυνάμει· οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἄξει,
ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἢ πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐνεργεῖα καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο
ἀρχή, ἢ, εἰ ἅμα λέγοιεν, ἐν τύχαις θήσονται τὰς ἀρχάς.
ἔπειτα, εἰ ἅμα, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐκεῖνο προτάττουσι; καὶ διὰ τί
τοῦτο μᾶλλον ὄν, ἢ ὕλη, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; εἰ δὲ ὕστερον
10 ἐκεῖνο, πῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος γεννᾷ, ἢ ἄποιος τὸ
ποιόν, οὐδ’ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ἐνέργεια· ἐνυπήρχε γὰρ ἂν τὸ
ἐνεργεῖα, καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι. καὶ ὁ θεὸς δεύτερος αὐτοῖς
τῆς ὕλης· καὶ γὰρ σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης ὦν καὶ εἶδους. καὶ
πόθεν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶδος; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὕλην ἔχειν
ἀρχοειδῆς ὦν καὶ λόγος, ἀσώματος ἂν εἴη ὁ θεός, καὶ τὸ
15 ποιητικὸν ἀσώματον. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν σύνθετος, ἅτε σῶμα ὦν, ἄλλην ὕλην τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ
εἰσάξουσιν. ἔπειτα πῶς ἀρχὴ ἡ ὕλη σῶμα οὐσα; οὐ γὰρ
ἐστὶ σῶμα μὴ οὐ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ
ποιότητος. εἰ δὲ ἄλλως τοῦτο σῶμα, ὁμωνύμως λέγουσι

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have been better to say "the subject" [in the singular].

26. But, speaking generally, it is in every way superlatively absurd to rank matter, something which is potential, before all things, but not to put actuality before potency. For it is not even possible for what is in potency ever to come to actuality if the potential holds the rank of principle among beings: for it certainly will not bring itself to actuality, but the actual must be before it, and then this potential will no longer be a principle; or, if they say that [potential and actual] are simultaneous, they will put the principles in the realm of chance. And then, if they are simultaneous, why do they not give the actual the first rank? And why is this one, matter, the more existent, and not that one? But if the actual is later, how [did it come into being]? For, certainly, matter does not generate form, that which is without quality the qualified, nor does actuality come from the potential: for [if it did] the actual would exist in the potential, and it would no longer be simple. And God for them comes second after matter: for he is a body, and composed of matter and form. And where did he get his form from? But if [he had it] without having matter, having the nature of a principle and being a rational formative power, God would be bodiless and the creative bodiless. But if even without matter God is composite in his essential nature, in that he is a body, they will be introducing another matter, that of God. Then how is matter a principle if it is body? For it is not possible for a body not to be many; and every body is composed of matter and quality. But if this one is body in a different way,

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

20 σῶμα τὴν ὕλην. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπὶ σώματος τὸ τριχῆ
διαστατόν, μαθηματικὸν λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ
ἀντιτυπίας τὸ τριχῆ, οὐχ ἓν λέγουσιν. ἔπειτα ἡ
ἀντιτυπία ποιὸν ἢ παρὰ ποιότητος. καὶ πόθεν ἡ
ἀντιτυπία; πόθεν δὲ τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν ἢ τίς διέστησεν;
25 οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ τριχῆ διαστατοῦ ἡ ὕλη, οὐδ' ἐν
τῷ τῆς ὕλης τὸ τριχῆ διαστατόν. μετασχοῦσα τοίνυν
μεγέθους οὐκέτ' ἂν ἀπλοῦν εἴη. ἔπειτα πόθεν ἡ ἔνωσις;
οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτοένωσις,¹ ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ ἐνότητος. ἐχρήν
δὴ λογίσασθαι ὥς οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν προτάττειν
ἀπάντων ὄγκον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄογκον καὶ τὸ ἓν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ
30 ἐνὸς ἀρξαμένους εἰς τὰ πολλὰ τελευτᾶν, καὶ ἐξ
ἀμεγέθους εἰς μεγέθη, εἴ γε οὐκ ἔστι πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ
ἐνὸς ὄντος, οὐδὲ μέγεθος μὴ ἀμεγέθους· εἴ γε τὸ
μέγεθος ἐν οὐ τῷ αὐτὸ ἓν, ἀλλὰ τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἓν καὶ
κατὰ σύμβασιν. δεῖ τοίνυν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτως καὶ κυρίως
35 πρὸ τοῦ κατὰ σύμβασιν· ἢ πῶς ἡ σύμβασις; καὶ ζητεῖν,
τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς συμβάσεως· τάχα γὰρ ἂν εὗρον τὸ μὴ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἓν. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὃ τῷ
μὴ αὐτὸ ἓν, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἄλλου.

¹ U, H-S²: αὐτὸ ἔνωσις wBxC, Perna: αὐτὸ ἓν Arnim (SVF II n. 315), H-S¹.

¹ This is the nearest Plotinus ever comes to any awareness that Stoic corporealism was not as gross and absurd as Platonist and Peripatetic opponents supposed. The Stoic conception of "body" was much subtler and more interesting than Plotinus represents it, here and elsewhere.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

they are calling matter body equivocally.¹ But if three-dimensionality is the common characteristic of body, they are speaking of mathematical body; but if resistance accompanies three-dimensionality, then they are talking about something which is not one. And then resistance is a quale or derives from quality. And where did the resistance come from? And where the three-dimensional extension, and who extended it? For matter is not contained in the definition of three-dimensionality, nor three-dimensionality in the definition of matter. If then matter participates in magnitude, it would no longer be simple. Then where does its unification come from? For it is certainly not absolute unification, but by participation in unity. They should certainly have worked out that it is not possible to put mass in the first place of all, but that which is without mass and the one, and starting with the one to conclude in the many and starting with the sizeless to conclude in magnitudes, if it is not possible for many to be unless one is, nor size unless the sizeless is: if, that is, size is one not by being itself one but by participation in the one and a coming together. There must therefore be the primarily and properly [existent] before that [which exists] by coming together or how does the coming together occur? And one must enquire what is the manner of the coming together: for [if the Stoics had done so] they might perhaps have found the one which is not incidentally one. By "incidentally one" I mean that which is one not by being the one itself, but from another.

See S. Sambursky *The Physics of the Stoics* (London 1959), 29–44 (with interesting parallels to modern physics); A. A. Long *Hellenistic Philosophy* (London 1974), 152–8.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

27. Ἐχρῆν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τηροῦντας τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἐν τῷ τιμίῳ μὴ τὸ ἄμορφον μηδὲ τὸ παθητὸν μηδὲ τὸ ζωῆς ἅμοιον καὶ ἀνόητον καὶ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον τίθεσθαι ἀρχήν, καὶ τούτῳ ἀναφέρειν καὶ 5 τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ θεὸς αὐτοῖς εὐπρεπείας ἕνεκεν ἐπεισάγεται παρά τε τῆς ὕλης ἔχων τὸ εἶναι καὶ σύνθετος καὶ ὕστερος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. ἔπειτα εἰ ὑποκείμενον, ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὴν ἔξω ὃν αὐτῆς παρέχει αὐτὴν ὑποκεῖσθαι τοῖς παρ' 10 αὐτοῦ πεμπομένοις εἰς αὐτήν. εἰ δ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶη ὑποκείμενος καὶ αὐτὸς σὺν αὐτῇ γενόμενος, οὐκέτι ὑποκείμενον τὴν ὕλην παρέξεται οὐδὲ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης αὐτὸς ὑποκείμενον· τίτιν γὰρ ὑποκείμενα ἔσται οὐκέτι ὄντος τοῦ παρέξοντος ὑποκείμενα αὐτὰ πάντων καταναλωθέντων εἰς τὸ λεγόμενον ὑποκείμενον; πρὸς τι 15 γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ποιοῦν εἰς αὐτὸ κείμενον. καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὑπόκειται πρὸς τὸ οὐχ ὑποκείμενον· εἰ τοῦτο, πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ὥστε παραλελειμμένον ἂν εἶη τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν δέονται ἄλλου ἔξωθεν, αὐτὸ δὲ πάντα δύναται γίνεσθαι 20 σχηματιζόμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ τῇ ὀρχήσει πάντα αὐτὸν ποιῶν, οὐκέτ' ἂν ὑποκείμενον εἶη, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὰ πάντα. ὥς γὰρ ὁ ὀρχηστής οὐχ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς σχήμασιν—ἐνέργεια γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα—οὕτως οὐδὲ ἦν λέγουσιν ἔσται τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑποκείμενον, εἰ τὰ ἄλλα παρ' αὐτῆς 25 εἶη· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα ὅλως ἔσται, εἴ γέ πως

¹ A brief allusion to one of Plotinus' favourite images, that of the cosmic dancer: cp. III. 2.16. 24-27 and 17. 8-11; IV. 4.33. 6-25.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

27. And in other ways, also, they ought to keep the principle of all things in the place of honour, and not to posit as principle the shapeless nor that which is without share in life and unintelligent and dark and is the indefinite, and then to attribute substance to this. For they bring in God for the sake of appearances, [a God] who has his being from matter and is composite and posterior, or rather is matter in a certain state. Then if matter is the substrate [or subject] there must necessarily be something else which acts upon it, being external to it, and makes it to be subjected to the things which are sent into matter by it. But if God himself was subjected in matter and himself came into being along with it, he will no longer make matter a subject, nor will he be the subject [or substrate] along with matter: for to what will they be substrates, when there will be nothing to make them substrates since everything has been used up in the so-called substrate? For the substrate is substrate in relation to something, not to what is in itself but to what acts upon it as it lies subjected. And the substrate is subjected in relation to what is not substrate: that is, to what is external, so that this would just have been left out. But if they do not require anything from outside, but the substrate itself is capable of becoming everything by being figured, like the dancer who in his dance makes himself everything,¹ then it will no longer be the substrate, but itself everything. For as the dancer is not the substrate of the figures—for all the rest are his active actuality—so what they call matter will not be the subject of all things, if all the rest come from it; or rather, all the rest will not even exist, if matter in a certain state is all the rest, just

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἔχουσα ὕλη τὰ ἄλλα, ὥς πως ἔχων [ὁ]¹ ὀρχούμενος τὰ
 σχήματα. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔσται, οὐδὲ ὅλως
 ὑποκείμενον αὕτη, οὐδὲ τῶν ὄντων ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ ὕλη
 μόνον οὕσα τούτῳ αὐτῷ οὐδὲ ὕλη· πρὸς τι γὰρ ἡ ὕλη. τὸ
 γὰρ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους, οἶον
 30 διπλάσιον πρὸς ἡμισυ, οὐκ οὐσία πρὸς διπλάσιον· ὃν δὲ
 πρὸς μὴ ὃν πῶς πρὸς τι, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός; τὸ δὲ
 καθ' αὐτὸ ὃν καὶ ἡ ὕλη ὃν πρὸς ὃν. εἰ γὰρ δυνάμεις ἐστίν,
 ὃ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὴ οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν αὕτη
 οὐσία· ὥστε συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτιωμένοις τοὺς ἐκ μὴ
 35 οὐσιῶν οὐσίας ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν ἐξ οὐσίας μὴ
 οὐσίαν· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος καθόσον κόσμος οὐκ οὐσία.
 ἄτοπον δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ
 σώματα μὴ μᾶλλον οὐσίας, καὶ τούτων μᾶλλον μὴ τὸν
 κόσμον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον, καθόσον μόριον αὐτοῦ,
 40 οὐσίαν· καὶ τὸ ζῶον μὴ παρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχειν τὴν
 οὐσίαν, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ὕλης μόνον, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πάθημα
 ὕλης καὶ ὕστερον. παρὰ τίνος οὖν ἔσχεν ἡ ὕλη τὸ
 ἐψυχῶσθαι, καὶ ὅλως τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ ὑπόστασις; πῶς δὲ ἡ
 ὕλη ὅτε μὲν σώματα γίνεται, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτῆς ψυχῆ; καὶ
 γὰρ εἰ ἄλλοθεν προσίοι τὸ εἶδος, οὐδαμῇ ψυχὴ ἂν
 45 γένοιτο ποιότητος προσελθούσης τῇ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ σώματα
 ἄψυχα. εἰ δὲ τι αὐτὴν πλάττοι καὶ ψυχὴν ποιοί, πρὸ τῆς
 γινομένης ψυχῆς ἔσται ἡ ποιούσα ψυχῆ.

¹ del. Igal, H-S².

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

as the dancer in a certain state is the figures. But if all the rest are not going to exist, this matter will not in any way be a substrate, and not the matter of existing things, but, since it is purely and simply matter, will by this very fact not be matter: for matter is relative. For the relative is in relation to something else, and something of the same genus, double to half for instance, not substance to double; but how is being to non-being a relation, except incidentally? But the relation of being in itself to matter is one of being. For if it is potentiality, which is going to be, and that is not substance, it will not be itself substance; so that this is what happens to the Stoics: they blame those who make substances out of non-substances, but themselves make non-substance out of substance; for their universe, in so far as it is universe, is not substance. But it is absurd that matter, the substrate, is substance, but bodies are not more substantial and the universe more substantial than bodies, [but the universe according to them] is only substance in so far as it is a part of the substrate; and that the Living Being does not have its substantiality from soul but only from matter, and that the soul is an affection of and posterior to matter. From what, then, did matter derive its ensoulment, and in general from what did the real existence of soul derive? And why does matter sometimes become bodies, but another part of it becomes soul? For, even if the form comes from somewhere else, soul would in no way come into being when quality comes to matter, but soulless bodies. But if something moulds matter and makes soul, the soul which makes will be prior to the soul which comes to be.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

28. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν λεγομένων πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην τούτων μὲν παυστέον, μὴ καὶ ἄτοπον ἢ τὸ πρὸς οὕτω φανεράν ἀτοπίαν φιλονεικεῖν, δεικνύντα, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὡς τὸ μάλιστα ὄν προτάττουσι
 5 καὶ τὸ ὕστατον πρῶτον. αἷτιον δὲ ἡ αἰσθησις αὐτοῖς ἡγεμῶν γενομένη καὶ πιστὴ εἰς ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θέσιν. τὰ γὰρ σώματα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, εἶτα αὐτῶν τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλληλα φοβηθέντες τὸ μένον ὑπ' αὐτὰ τοῦτο ᾤήθησαν τὸ ὄν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις μᾶλλον τὸν τόπον ἢ τὰ σώματα νομίσειεν εἶναι τὸ ὄν,
 10 ὅτι οὐ φθείρεται ὁ τόπος νομίσας. καίτοι καὶ οὗτος αὐτοῖς μένει, ἔδει δὲ οὐ τὸ ὅπως οὖν μένον νομίσαι τὸ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἰδεῖν πρότερον, τίνα δεῖ προσεῖναι τῷ ἀληθῶς ὄντι, οἷς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ μένειν. οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ σκιὰ αἰεὶ μένοι παρακολουθοῦσα ἀλλοιουμένῳ ἄλλῳ, μᾶλλον
 15 ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκεῖνο. τό τε αἰσθητὸν μετ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν τῷ πλήθει μᾶλλον ἂν τὸ ὅλον ὄν εἴη ἢ ἓν τι τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον [ὑποβάθρα ἐκεῖνο]¹ μὴ ὄν, πῶς ἂν <ὑποβάθρα>¹ ἐκεῖνο; πάντων τε θαυμαστότατον τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει πιστουμένους ἕκαστα τὸ
 20 μὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἀλωτὸν τίθεσθαι ὄν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἀντιτυπὲς αὐτῇ διδόασι· ποιότης γὰρ τοῦτο. εἰ δὲ τῷ νῷ λέγουσι λαβεῖν, ἄτοπος ὁ νοῦς οὗτος ὁ τὴν ὕλην αὐτοῦ προτάξας καὶ τὸ ὄν αὐτῇ δεδωκώς, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτῷ. οὐκ

¹ Theiler.

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28. But, though there are many things which are said against this hypothesis, we must stop here for fear that it may be absurd to strive for victory with so manifest an absurdity by showing that they give non-being the first rank as that which is most of all being and so rank the last first. The cause of this is that sense-perception became their guide and they trusted it for the placing of principles and the rest. For they considered that bodies were the real beings, and, since they were afraid of their transformation into each other, they thought that what persisted under them was reality, as if someone thought that place rather than bodies was real being, considering that place does not perish. Yet place also does persist for them, but they ought not to have considered that what persists in any kind of way was real being, but to see first what characteristics must belong to what is truly real, on the existence of which persistence for ever depends. For if a shadow always persisted which accompanied a being in process of alteration, it would not exist more than that being. And the sense-world with that [persistent substrate] and many other things would by its multiplicity be more real, being the whole, than any one of the things in it; but if indeed the whole is not real, how could that [substrate] be its foundation? But the most extraordinary of all is that, though they are assured of the existence of each and every thing by sense-perception, they posit as real being what cannot be apprehended by sense. For they do not rightly attribute resistance to it: resistance is a quality. But if they say they grasp it by intellect, it is an odd sort of intellect which ranks matter before itself and attributes real being to matter but not to itself. So,

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ὧν οὖν ὁ νοῦς αὐτοῖς πῶς ἂν πιστὸς εἴη περὶ τῶν
κυριωτέρων αὐτοῦ λέγων καὶ οὐδαμῇ αὐτοῖς συγγενῆς
25 ὧν; ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν
ὑποκειμένων ἱκανῶς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις.

29. Τὰ δὲ ποια αὐτοῖς ἕτερα μὲν δεῖ εἶναι τῶν
ὑποκειμένων, καὶ λέγουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν αὐτὰ δεύτερα
κατηρίθμουν. εἰ τοίνυν ἕτερα, δεῖ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀπλᾶ εἶναι·
εἰ τοῦτο, μὴ σύνθετα· εἰ τοῦτο, μὴδ' ὕλην ἔχειν, ἥ ποιά·
5 εἰ τοῦτο, ἀσώματα εἶναι καὶ δραστήρια· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη πρὸς
τὸ πάσχειν αὐτοῖς ὑπόκειται. εἰ δὲ σύνθετα, πρῶτον μὲν
ἄτοπος ἢ διαίρεσις ἀπλᾶ καὶ σύνθετα ἀντιδιαστέλλουσα
καὶ ταῦτα ὑφ' ἐν γένος, ἔπειτα ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ
ἕτερον τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν τις διαιρῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
10 τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ
ἄλλο τι. εἰ δὲ τὰ ποια ὕλην ποιᾶν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ
λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἔνυλοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν
τι ποιήσουσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τοῦ συνθέτου ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐξ
ὕλης καὶ εἰδούς ἔσσονται· οὐκ ἄρα αὐτοὶ εἶδη οὐδὲ λόγοι.
15 εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν μηδὲν εἶναι τοὺς λόγους ἢ ὕλην πως
ἔχουσαν, τὰ ποια δηλονότι πως ἔχοντα ἐροῦσι καὶ ἐν τῷ
τρίτῳ γένει τακτέον. εἰ δὲ ἦδε ἡ σχέσις ἄλλη, τίς
ἢ διαφορά; ἢ δῆλον, ὅτι τό πως ἔχειν ἐνταῦθα
ὑπόστασις μᾶλλον· καίτοι εἰ μὴ κακεὶ ὑπόστασις, τί

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since their intellect is not real for them, how could it be trustworthy when it speaks about things more authentic than itself and is in no way related to them? But about this nature and about substrates we have spoken sufficiently elsewhere.

29. Qualia for them must be different from the subject-substrates, and this is what they mean; otherwise they would not have counted them second. If then they are different, they must also be simple; if this is so, not composite; and if this is so, they must not have matter, in so far as they are qualia; and if this is so, they must be bodiless and active: for matter is subjected to them for passivity. But if they are composite, first of all the division is absurd which sets simples and composites over against one another, and that under one genus, and then puts the other one in each of the species, as if someone dividing knowledge said that one kind was literary knowledge and another literary knowledge plus something else. But if they were to say that qualia are qualified matter, first of all their rational forming principles will be immanent in matter; they will not make something composite when they have come to be in matter, but before the composite which they make they will be composed of matter and form; they will not, then, themselves be forms or forming principles. But if they were to say that the forming principles are nothing but matter in a certain state, they obviously will be saying that qualia are things in a certain state, and they ought to be classed in the third genus. But if this is a different kind of state, what is the difference? Now clearly in this case being in a certain state is more of an existence. But if it is not an existence there too, why do they count it

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

20 καταριθμοῦσιν ὡς ἓν γένος ἢ εἶδος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ τὸ
 αὐτὸ τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ὄν δύναται εἶναι. ἀλλὰ τί
 τοῦτο τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ πως ἔχον; ἢ γὰρ ὄν ἢ οὐκ ὄν· καὶ εἰ
 ὄν, πάντως ἀσώματον· εἰ δὲ οὐκ ὄν, μάτην λέγεται, καὶ
 ὕλη μόνον, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐδέν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τό πως ἔχον· ἔτι
 25 γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐκ ὄν. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον λεχθὲν καὶ πολλῶ
 μᾶλλον. μόνον ὄν ἄρα ὕλη. τίς οὖν τοῦτό φησιν; οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ αὐτὴ ἢ ὕλη. εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτὴ· πῶς γὰρ ἔχουσα ὁ νοῦς·
 καίτοι τὸ “πῶς ἔχουσα” προσθήκη κενή. ἢ ὕλη ἄρα
 λέγει ταῦτα καὶ καταλαμβάνει. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔλεγεν
 ἔμφρονα, θαῦμα ἂν ἦν, πῶς καὶ νοεῖ καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργα
 30 ποιεῖ οὔτε νοῦν οὔτε ψυχὴν ἔχουσα. εἰ δ' ἀφρόνως λέγοι
 αὐτὴν τιθεῖσα ὃ μὴ ἔστι μηδὲ δύναται, τίνι ταύτην δεῖ
 ἀνατιθέναι τὴν ἀφροσύνην; ἢ, εἰ ἔλεγεν, αὐτῇ· νῦν δὲ
 οὔτε λέγει ἐκείνη, ὃ τε λέγων πολὺ τὸ παρ' ἐκείνης ἔχων
 λέγει, ὅλος μὲν ὢν ἐκείνης, εἰ καὶ μόριον ψυχῆς¹ ἔχει,
 35 ἀγνοίᾳ δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως τῆς λέγειν τὰληθῆ περὶ
 τῶν τοιούτων δυναμένης.

30. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς πως ἔχουσιν ἄτοπον μὲν ἴσως τά πως
 ἔχοντα τρίτα τίθεσθαι ἢ ὅπως οὖν τάξεως ἔχει, ἐπειδὴ
 περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα πάντα. ἀλλὰ διαφορὰν τῶν
 πως ἐχόντων φήσουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν τὴν
 5 ὕλην ὠδὶ καὶ οὕτως, ἄλλως δὲ ἐν τοῖς πως ἔχουσι, καὶ

¹ μόριον ψυχῆς Igal, H-S²: μόνον ψυχὴν Enn.: ψυχὴν Theiler, H-S¹.

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as one genus or species? For certainly that which is and that which is not cannot be under the same genus. But what is this being in a certain state imposed upon matter? It is either existent or non-existent; and if it is existent, it is altogether bodiless; but if it is non-existent, it is an empty appellation and there is only matter, but the quale is nothing. But neither is the thing in a certain state anything: for it is still more non-existent. And the fourth class mentioned is even still more non-existent. So, then, only matter is existent. Who, then, asserts this? Not, presumably, matter. But perhaps matter does assert it: for matter in a certain state is intellect; though the "in a certain state" is a meaningless addition. Matter, then, says this and understands it. And if it talked sense, it would be surprising how it thinks and does the works of soul, when it has neither intellect nor soul. But if it was talking senselessly, making itself what it is not and cannot be, to whom should we attribute the senselessness? Well, if it did speak, to itself; but, as things are, matter does not speak, but the speaker speaks with a large contribution from matter, to which he entirely belongs; even if he has a bit of soul, he speaks in ignorance of himself and of the power which is able to speak the truth about such things.

30. In the case of things in a certain state, it is perhaps absurd to put things in a certain state third, or however they are placed in the order, since everything in a certain state is in relation to matter. But they will say that things in a certain state have a distinctive difference and that it is one thing for matter to be in this or that particular state, but something else in the case of things in a certain

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

ἔτι τὰ μὲν ποιά περὶ τὴν ὕλην πως ἔχοντα, τὰ ἰδίως δέ
 πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ποιά. ἀλλὰ τῶν ποιῶν αὐτῶν οὐδὲν
 ἢ ὕλης πως ἐχούσης ὄντων πάλιν τὰ πως ἔχοντα ἐπὶ τὴν
 ὕλην αὐτοῖς ἀνατρέχει καὶ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἔσται. πῶς δέ
 10 ἐν τό πως ἔχον πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕσης; πῶς
 γὰρ τὸ τρίπηχυ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἓν, τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ, τοῦ
 δὲ ποιοῦ ὄντος; πῶς δὲ τὸ ποτέ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πῶς δὲ ὅλως
 πως ἔχοντα τὸ χθὲς καὶ τὸ πέρυσι καὶ τὸ ἐν Λυκίῳ καὶ
 Ἀκαδημίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πῶς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πως ἔχων; οὔτε
 15 γὰρ αὐτὸς οὔτε τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ χρόνῳ, οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῷ
 τόπῳ οὔτε ὁ τόπος. τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πῶς πως ἔχον; ἔπει
 οὐδ' ὁ ποιῶν πως ἔχων, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πως ποιῶν ἢ ὅλως
 οὐ πως,¹ ἀλλὰ ποιῶν μόνον· καὶ ὁ πάσχων οὐ πως ἔχων,
 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πως πάσχων ἢ ὅλως πάσχων οὕτως. ἴσως
 20 δ' ἂν μόνον ἀρμόσει ἐπὶ τοῦ κείσθαι τὸ “πῶς ἔχων” καὶ
 ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ “πῶς ἔχων”, ἀλλὰ
 “ἔχων”. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑφ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
 ἐτίθεσαν, ἕτερος λόγος ἦν ἂν ζητούντων εἴ τινα διδόασιν
 ὑπόστασιν ταῖς τοιαύταις σχέσεσι, πολλαχοῦ οὐ
 διδόντων. ἔτι δ' ἐν γένει τῷ αὐτῷ <τὸ>² ἐπιγινόμενον
 25 πρᾶγμα τοῖς ἤδη οὖσιν ἄτοπον συντάττειν [τὸ ἐπι-
 γινόμενον]³ εἰς ταῦτὸν γένος τοῖς πρότερον οὖσι· δεῖ

¹ Gollwitzer: οὐκ ὦν BxUC, Creuzer: οὐκ ὄν w, Perna.

² H-S.

³ del. Kirchhoff.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

state, and, besides, that qualia are in a certain state in relation to matter, but the things which are specifically in a certain state are so in relation to qualia. But, if the qualia themselves are nothing but matter in a certain state, again the things in a certain state go back for the Stoics to matter and are so in relation to matter. But how is the class of things in a certain state one when there is a great deal of difference between them? For how can the "three-cubits-long" and the "white" [be got] into one class, when one of them is quantitative and the other qualitative? And how the when and the where? And how altogether are "yesterday" and "last year" and "in the Lyceum" and "in the Academy" in a certain state? And, generally speaking, how is time in a certain state? For time is not so, nor are the things in time itself, nor the things in place nor place. But how is doing being in a certain state? Since the doer is not existing in a certain state but doing in a certain way, or not at all in a certain way, but just doing; and the one who is affected is not existing in a certain state but rather being affected in a certain way or simply being affected like this. But perhaps "being in a certain state" will only fit position and possession; but in the case of possession one is not "in possession of a certain state" but "in possession". But as regards the relative, if they did not class it under one genus with the other [things in a certain state] it would take another discussion to enquire if they give any reality to such [relative] states, since they often do not do so. And again it is absurd to put a thing which is subsequent to things already existing into the same genus as the things

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 1.

γὰρ πρότερον ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ ἥμισυ καὶ διπλάσιον.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσοι ἄλλως τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἔθεντο, εἴτε ἄπειρα εἴτε πεπερασμένα, εἴτε
30 σώματα εἴτε ἀσώματα, ἢ καὶ τὸ συναμφότερον, χωρὶς
περὶ ἐκάστων ἔξεστι ζητεῖν λαμβάνουσι καὶ τὰ παρὰ
τῶν ἀρχαίων πρὸς τὰς δόξας αὐτῶν εἰρημένα.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING I

which were there before: for one and two must be there first for there to be half and double.

But as for all the others who have made other assumptions about beings or the principles of beings, whether they said they were infinite or limited, bodies or bodiless, or both, one is free to enquire about each and every one of them, taking into account as well what the ancients said against their opinions.

VI. 2. (43) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ

1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν λεγομένων δέκα γενῶν
ἐπέσκεπται, εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰς ἓν ἀγόντων
γένος τὰ πάντα τέτταρα ὑπὸ τὸ ἓν οἶον εἶδη τιθεμένων,
ἀκόλουθον ἂν εἴη εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων
5 φαίνεται τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡμῖν πειρωμένοις εἰς τὴν
Πλάτωνος ἀνάγειν δόξαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἓν ἔδει τίθεσθαι τὸ
ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ζητεῖν, οὐτ' εἰ γένος ἓν ἐπὶ πάσιν, οὐτε
εἰ γένη μὴ ὑφ' ἓν, οὐτ' εἰ ἀρχάς, οὐτε εἰ τὰς ἀρχάς καὶ
γένη τὰς αὐτὰς δεῖ τίθεσθαι, οὐτε εἰ τὰ γένη καὶ ἀρχὰς
10 τὰ αὐτά, ἢ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας καὶ γένη, τὰ δὲ γένη
οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν, ἢ ἐφ' ἑκατέρων τινὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς
καὶ γένη καὶ τινὰ γένη καὶ ἀρχάς, ἢ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐτέρων
πάντα καὶ θάτερα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐτέρων τινὰ καὶ θάτερα.
ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐχ ἓν φαμεν τὸ ὄν—διότι δέ, εἴρηται καὶ τῷ
15 Πλάτωνι καὶ ἐτέροις—ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως γίγνεται καὶ

¹ The critical discussion of the ten Aristotelian categories occupies the first 24 chapters of VI. 1, of the Stoic categories the last 6. Note the importance which Plotinus gives here to the highest Stoic genus, *τι* (cp. VI. 1. 25 and below lines 21–5), which he did not quite understand and which annoyed him particularly, perhaps because Severus the Middle Platonist, who was read in his school (*Life* ch. 14, 11), had taken it seriously and used it in his exegesis of the *Timaeus*: see below n. 1, p. 112.

VI. 2. ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

1. Now that our enquiry about what are called the ten genera has been completed, and we have spoken about those who bring all things into one genus and posit four species of a sort under the one,¹ the next thing would be to say how these things look to us, trying to lead back our own thoughts to the thought of Plato. Now if it was necessary to assume that being is one, there would be no need to investigate whether there is one genus over all, or whether the genera cannot be classed under one, or whether the principles [can or cannot be], or whether one should assume that principles are the same as genera or genera as principles, or whether all the principles are also genera but the genera not [all] principles, or the other way round, or whether in both groups some principles are also genera and some genera also principles, or whether in one group all are the others, but in the other some are also the others.² But since we maintain that being is not one—Plato and others have explained why³—it becomes, per-

² On the difference between principles and genera see ch. 2, 15–19. It is of great importance for Plotinus' exegesis of the *Sophist*.

³ The reference to Plato is to *Sophist* 244B–245C and *Parmenides* 141C9–10. "Others": Aristotle and the Stoics; cp. VI. 1. 1. 5–9.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

περὶ τούτων ἐπισκέψασθαι πρότερον εἰς μέσον θέντας,
 τίνα ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν καὶ πῶς. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ
 τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς
 διελέσθαι τάδε, τί τε τὸ ὄν λέγομεν, περὶ οὗ ἡ σκέψις
 ὀρθῶς γίνοιτο νυνί, καὶ τί δοκεῖ μὲν ἄλλοις εἶναι ὄν,
 20 γινόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ λέγομεν εἶναι, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.
 δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διηρημένα οὐχ ὡς
 γένους τοῦ τί εἰς ταῦτα διηρημένου, οὐδ' οὕτως οἰεσθαι
 τὸν Πλάτωνα πεποιθέναι. γελοῖον γὰρ ὑφ' ἐν θέσθαι
 τὸ ὄν τῷ μὴ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις Σωκράτη ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ
 25 θεῖτο καὶ τὴν τούτου εἰκόνα. τὸ γὰρ "διελέσθαι"
 ἐνταυθὰ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφορίσαι καὶ χωρὶς θεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δόξαν
 ὄν εἶναι εἰπεῖν οὐκ εἶναι ὄν, ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς ἄλλο τὸ
 ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄν εἶναι. καὶ προστιθεὶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ "ἀεὶ"
 ὑπέδειξεν, ὡς δεῖ τὸ ὄν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, οἷον μηδέποτε
 30 ψεύδεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ὄντος φύσιν. περὶ δὲ τούτου τοῦ
 ὄντος λέγοντες καὶ περὶ τούτου ὡς οὐχ ἑνὸς ὄντος
 σκεψόμεθα· ὕστερον δέ, εἰ δοκεῖ, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ
 τοῦ γινομένου καὶ κόσμου αἰσθητοῦ τι ἐροῦμεν.

2. Ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἓν φαμεν, ἀρα ἀριθμὸν τίνα ἡ
 ἄπειρον; πῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸ οὐχ ἓν; ἡ ἐν ἅμα καὶ πολλὰ
 λέγομεν, καὶ τι ποικίλον ἐν τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν ἔχον.
 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῦτο τὸ οὕτως ἐν ἡ τῷ γένει ἐν εἶναι,

¹ *Timaeus* 27D5. The attack here is clearly on a Stoicising Platonist exegesis of this passage, probably that of Severus (Proclus *In Tim.* vol. I, p.227, 13–18 Diehl).

² In VI. 3.

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haps, compulsory to enquire about these points, centring our discussion first on what number [of kinds of being] we intend and in what sense. Since, then, we are enquiring about being or beings, we must in our discussion first of all make a distinction between what we call being, about which at present our investigation would be correctly conducted, and what others think is being, but we call it becoming, and say that it is never really real. But in thinking of these two classes which are distinct from each other one must not think of them as if there was a genus of "something" divided into them, or suppose that Plato made this division. For it is absurd to put being under one genus with non-being, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one genus. For "making a distinction" here¹ means marking off and setting apart, and saying that what seems to be being is not being, [and by this Plato] indicates to them that what is truly being is something else. And by prefixing "always" to being he indicated that being must be of such a kind as never to belie the nature of being. So we are speaking of this being, and this is the being about which we shall enquire on the assumption that it is not one; afterwards,² if it seems proper, we shall say something about becoming and what comes to be and the universe perceived by the senses.

2. Since, then, we maintain that being is not one, do we say that it is a number or infinite? What do we really mean by "not one"? Now we say that it is at the same time one and many, and that it is a richly variegated one keeping its many together in one. It is therefore necessary that this, which is one in this way, should either be generically one, and the

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

5 εἶδη δ' αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄντα, οἷς πολλὰ καὶ ἓν, ἣ πλείω ἐνὸς
 γένη, ὑφ' ἓν δὲ τὰ πάντα, ἣ πλείω μὲν γένη, μηδὲν δὲ
 ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον περιεκτικὸν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτό,
 εἴτε καὶ αὐτῶν γενῶν ἐλαττόνων ὄντων ἢ εἰδῶν καὶ ὑπὸ
 10 πάντων τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, ὃν δὴ λέγομεν τὸ ὄν, τὴν
 σύστασιν εἶναι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, οὐ μόνον γένη ταῦτα εἶναι,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἅμα ὑπάρχειν· γένη μὲν, ὅτι
 ὑπ' αὐτὰ ἄλλα γένη ἐλάττω καὶ εἶδη μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ
 ἄτομα· ἀρχὰς δέ, εἰ τὸ ὄν οὕτως ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ ἐκ
 τούτων τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχει. εἰ μέντοι πλείω μὲν ἦν ἐξ ὧν,
 15 συνελθόντα δὲ τὰ ὅλα ἐποίει τὸ πᾶν ἄλλο¹ οὐκ ἔχοντα
 ὑπ' αὐτά, ἀρχαὶ μὲν ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὐκ ἂν· οἷον εἴ τις
 ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἐποίει τὸ αἰσθητόν, πυρὸς καὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἂν ἦσαν, γένη δὲ οὐ· εἰ μὴ
 ὁμωνύμως τὸ γένος. λέγοντες τοίνυν καὶ γένη τινα
 20 εἶναι, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ ἀρχάς, ἄρα τὰ μὲν γένη, ἕκαστον
 μετὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά, ὁμοῦ μιγνύντες ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντα,
 τὸ ὅλον ἀποτελοῦμεν καὶ σύγκρασιν ποιούμεν ἀπάντων;
 ἀλλὰ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ καθαρὸν αὐτὸ
 ἕκαστον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν γένη ἐάσομεν, τὰ δὲ
 25 καθέκαστον μίξομεν; τίνα οὖν ἔσται ἐφ' αὐτῶν τὰ γένη;
 ἢ ἔσται κακείνα ἐφ' αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρὰ, καὶ τὰ μιχθέντα

¹ coniecimus: ἀλλ' wBxC: ἀλλ' Creuzer (*alia* Ficinus):
om. U.

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beings its species, by which it is many and one; or that it should be more genera than one, but all [grouped] under one; or that there should be more genera, but none of them subordinated to any other, but each including those below it (whether they themselves are lesser genera or species with individuals [grouped] under them) and all contributing to one nature; the intelligible universe, which is certainly what we call being, would be constructed from all of them. If this is so, these must certainly not only be genera but at the same time also principles of being: genera, because there are other lesser genera under them and subsequently species and individuals; principles, if being is thus composed of many and the whole derives its existence from these. If then there were a number of originaive constituents and they came together as wholes and made the all while having nothing else subordinated to them, they would be principles, but not genera; as if someone made the sense-world out of the four elements, fire and such: for these would be principles, but not genera; unless "genus" is used equivocally. If we say, then, that they are a kind of genera, but that these same genera are also principles, then shall we achieve the completion of the whole by mixing the genera, all of them, together with each other, each with the things which come under it, and make a blend of everything? But then each and every thing will be potential and not actual, and each will not be itself in a pure state. But shall we let the genera go and mix up the individuals? What then will the genera by themselves be? They will be by themselves and pure and their mixed-up members will not abolish them. And how

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

οὐκ ἀπολεί αὐτά. καὶ πῶς; ἢ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς ὕστερον· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ συγκεχωρήκαμεν καὶ γένη εἶναι καὶ προσέτι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς καὶ τρόπον ἕτερον ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνθεσιν, πρῶτον λεκτέον πόσα λέγομεν γένη καὶ πῶς

30 διίσταμεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων αὐτὰ καὶ οὐχ ὑφ' ἐν ἄγομεν, ὥσπερ ἐκ τύχης συνελθόντα καὶ ἐν τι πεποιηκότα· καίτοι πολλῶ εὐλογώτερον ὑφ' ἐν. ἢ, εἰ μὲν εἶδη οἷόν τε ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἅπαντα εἶναι καὶ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις τὰ ἄτομα καὶ μηδὲν τούτων ἔξω, ἦν ἂν ἴσως ποιεῖν οὕτως. ἐπειδὴ

35 δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη θέσις ἀναίρεσις ἐστὶν αὐτῆς—οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ εἶδη εἶδη ἔσται, οὐδ' ὅλως πολλὰ ὑφ' ἐν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν, μὴ ἐτέρου ἢ ἐτέρων¹ ἔξω ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν πολλὰ ἐγένετο τὸ ἐν, ὥστε καὶ εἶδη γεννηῖσαι, εἰ μὴ τι ἦν παρ' αὐτὸ ἄλλο; οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ πολλὰ, εἰ μὴ τις

40 ὥς μέγεθος κερματίζει². ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἕτερον τὸ κερματίζον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κερματιεῖ ἢ ὅλως διαιρήσει, πρὸ τοῦ διαιρεθῆναι ἔσται διηρημένον. ταύτῃ μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀποστατέον τοῦ “γένος ἐν”, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἕκαστον ὅτιοῦν ληφθὲν ἢ ὄν ἢ οὐσίαν λέγειν. εἰ δέ

45 τις λέγοι ὄν, τῷ συμβεβηκέναι φήσει, οἷον εἰ λευκὸν λέγοι τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ λευκὸν λέγει.

¹ Kirchhoff: ἐτέρον Enn.

² coniecimus: —σει wU (vix recte, sed cf. μερίσεις VI. 4. 8. 20): —ση BxC: —εἰ Volkmann.

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can this be? We will discuss this later¹; but now, since we have agreed that there are genera, and further that they are principles of substance and principles and a composition in another way, first it must be stated how many genera we say there are and how we distinguish them from each other and do not bring them under one, as if they came together by chance and made some one thing; yet it would be much more reasonable if they did come under one. Now, if it was possible for them all to be species of being, with the individuals immediately subsequent to them, and nothing outside these, it might perhaps be possible to proceed like this. But since such an arrangement would be the abolition of substance—for the species would not be species, nor altogether would there be many under one, but all would be one, and there would be no other or others outside that one: for how could the one become many, so as to generate species, unless there was something else besides itself? For it could not by its own means become many, unless somebody cuts it up like a magnitude; but even so the cutter would be another. But if it is going to do the cutting up, or in general the dividing, itself, it will be divided before the division. Thus, and for many other reasons, we must abandon the "one genus", also because it is not possible to take any and every individual thing and call it being or substance. But if one does call it substance, one will do so by incidental predication, as if one called substance white: for one is not speaking of what is [essentially] white.

¹ Ch. 19, 12-17.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

3. Πλείω μὲν δὴ λέγομεν εἶναι καὶ οὐ κατὰ τύχην
 πλείω. οὐκοῦν ἀφ' ἐνός. ἥ, εἰ καὶ ἀφ' ἐνός, οὐ
 κατηγορουμένου δὲ κατ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ εἶναι, οὐδὲν
 κωλύει ἕκαστον οὐχ ὁμοειδὲς ὃν ἄλλω χωρὶς αὐτὸ εἶναι
 5 γένος. ἄρ' οὖν ἔξωθεν τοῦτο τῶν γενομένων γενῶν τὸ
 αἷτιον μὲν, μὴ κατηγορούμενον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τῷ τί
 ἐστίν; ἥ τὸ μὲν ἔξω· ἐπέκεινα γὰρ τὸ εἶν, ὥς ἂν μὴ
 συναριθμούμενον τοῖς γένεσιν, εἰ δι' αὐτὸ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ
 ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ γένη εἶναι. καὶ πῶς ἐκείνο οὐ
 10 συνηρίθμηται; ἥ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦμεν, οὐ τὸ ἐπέκεινα.
 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οὕτως· τί δὲ τὸ συναριθμούμενον; ἐφ' οὗ
 καὶ θαυμάσειεν ἂν τις, πῶς συναριθμούμενον τοῖς
 αἰτιατοῖς. ἥ, εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἐν γένος αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,
 ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ οἷς αἷτιον συναριθμεῖται, ὥς αὐτὸ τὸ γένος
 15 καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς—καὶ ἔστι διάφορα τὰ ἐφεξῆς πρὸς
 αὐτό, καὶ οὐ κατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν ὥς γένος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι
 κατ' αὐτῶν—ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι ἔχοντα ὑφ'
 αὐτά. οὐδὲ γάρ, εἰ σὺ τὸ βαδίζειν ἐγέννας, ὑπὸ σέ ὥς
 γένος τὸ βαδίζειν ἦν ἂν· καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο
 20 ὥς γένος αὐτοῦ, ἦν δὲ τὰ μετ' αὐτό, γένος ἂν ἦν τὸ

¹ This is the One-Being, the Second Hypostasis, sharply distinguished as usual from the Absolute One, the First Hypostasis; the subject of the One-Being and its relation to

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3. We certainly say that there are several genera, and that it is not by accident that there are several. They derive therefore from one. Now, even if they do derive from one, but a one which is not included in the definition of their being, nothing prevents each one of them, since it has not the same specific form as another, from being itself a separate genus. Is then this one which is outside the genera which have come into being [from it] their cause, but not predicated in the definitions of what each of the others are? Yes, it is outside, for the One is transcendent, so as not to be numbered with the genera, if the others exist through it, which are on equal terms with each other as far as being genera goes. And how does it come about that it is not numbered with them? We are looking for beings, not what transcends being. So much, then, for this One; but what about the one which is numbered with the others¹? One might wonder about this, how it is numbered with those caused by it. Now if it and the others were under one genus, it would be absurd; but if it is numbered with those of which it is the cause, as if it was the absolute genus and the others were subsequent—and the subsequents are different from it, and it is not predicated of them as their genus or anything else with reference to them—then they too must be genera, if they have things classed under them. For if you generated walking, walking would not be classed under you as its genus; and if there was nothing else before it as its genus, but there were things after it, walking would be a genus in the

beings, and why "one" is not a genus like "being", is taken up again in ch. 9.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

βαδίζειν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. ὅλως δὲ ἴσως οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν φατέον αἷτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι, ἀλλ' οἶον μέρη αὐτοῦ καὶ οἶον στοιχεῖα αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντα μίαν φύσιν μεριζομένην ταῖς ἡμῶν ἐπινοίαις, αὐτὸ δὲ εἶναι ὑπὸ δυνάμεως θαυμαστῆς ἐν εἰς πάντα, καὶ φαινόμενον πολλὰ καὶ γινόμενον
 25 πολλά, οἶον ὅταν κινηθῇ κατὰ¹ τὸ πολύνουν² τῆς φύσεως, ποιεῖν τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε οἶον μοίρας αὐτοῦ προφέροντας ταύτας ἐν ἑκαστον τίθεσθαι καὶ γένος λέγειν ἀγνοοῦντας ὅτι μὴ ὅλον ἅμα εἶδομεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος προφέροντες πάλιν αὐτὰ συνάπτομεν οὐ
 30 δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον αὐτὰ κατέχειν σπεύδοντα πρὸς αὐτά. διὸ πάλιν μεθίεμεν εἰς τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἐῶμεν ἐν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν εἶναι. ἀλλὰ ἴσως σαφέστερα ταῦτα ἔσται κακείνων ἐγνωσμένων, ἣν τὰ γένη λάβωμεν ὁπόσα· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ πῶς. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δεῖ
 35 λέγοντα μὴ ἀποφάσεις λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ἔννοιαν καὶ νόησιν ἰέναι τῶν λεγομένων, ὥδι ποιητέον.

4. Εἰ τὴν σώματος φύσιν ἰδεῖν ἐβουλόμεθα, οἶόν τί ἐστιν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὅλῳ ἢ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ φύσις, ἀρ' οὐ καταμαθόντες ἐπὶ τινος τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥς ἔστι τὸ

¹ Igal, H-S²: καὶ Enn.

² Igal, H-S²: πολύχουν EBUC, H-S¹: πολύχουν A (duo puncta supra χ) x, Perna.

¹ We thankfully accept here Igal's excellent emendation πολύνουν (cp. ch. 21, 4). The reading with most MSS authority πολύχουν ("downiness" or "furriness"), printed in H-S¹, can surely on reflection only commend itself to cats, and the πολύχουν of other MSS, generally adopted by editors, is not used elsewhere by Plotinus and does not give as exactly appropriate a sense.

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realm of real beings. But in general, perhaps not even the one should be asserted to be the cause of the others, but they are something like parts of it, and something like elements of it, and all one nature divided into parts by our conceptions, but [this one] itself is by a wonderful power one into all, both appearing all and becoming all, as if when it is in motion, and, by its nature's fullness of intelligence,¹ it makes the one be not one, and we bring forward as it were parts of it and posit these, each of them as one and call it a genus, being unaware that we do not know the whole all at once, but bring forward piece by piece and join them up again, being unable to hold them back for long as they hasten to themselves.² Therefore we let them go into the whole, and allow them to become one, or rather to be one. But perhaps all this will be clearer when we know what is coming next, if we grasp how many genera there are: for this will tell us how they are. But since in our discourse we should not just make statements,³ but form some idea and come to some understanding of what is being said, we must proceed as follows.

4. If we wanted to see the nature of body, [and asked ourselves] something like what the nature of body itself was in this [perceptible] universe, when we had got to know thoroughly in the case of one of

² A good example of Plotinus' continual insistence on the inadequacy of discursive reason to give an adequate account of the One-Being: cp. V. 8 (31). 5-6; VI. 7 (38). 35. 28-30; III. 5 (50). 9. 26-29 and Klaus Wurm *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin & New York 1973).

³ For Plotinus' use of ἀπόφασις in the sense of "declaration", "assertion", cp. III. 7.1.9.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

μὲν ὡς ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῦ, οἶον ἐπὶ λίθου, τὸ δὲ ὁπόσον
 5 αὐτοῦ, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ὁποῖον, οἶον τὸ χρῶμα, καὶ ἐπὶ
 παντὸς ἄλλου σώματος εἵπομεν ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῇ σώματος
 φύσει τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν οἶον οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ ποσόν, τὸ
 δὲ ποιόν, ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ διαιρεθέντα
 εἰς τρία, καὶ σῶμα ἂν ἦν ἐν τὰ τρία; εἰ δὲ
 10 καὶ κίνησις αὐτοῦ παρῇν σύμφυτος τῇ συστάσει, καὶ
 τοῦτο ἂν συνηριθμήσαμεν, καὶ τὰ τέτταρα ἦν ἂν ἓν, καὶ
 τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐν ἀπήρτιστο πρὸς τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ
 φύσιν τοῖς ἅπασιν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ περὶ
 οὐσίας νοητῆς καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ γενῶν καὶ ἀρχῶν ὁ λόγος
 ἐστίν, ἀφελόντας χρὴ τὴν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι γένεσιν καὶ
 15 τὴν δι' αἰσθήσεως κατανόησιν καὶ τὰ μεγέθη—οὕτω
 γὰρ καὶ τὸ χωρὶς καὶ τὸ διεστηκότα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 εἶναι—λαβεῖν τινα νοητὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄν
 καὶ μᾶλλον ἓν. ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θαῦμα πῶς πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τὸ
 οὕτως ἓν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν σωμάτων συγκεχώρηται τὸ
 20 αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ
 ἕτερον τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ σχῆμα ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ
 χωρίζεται. εἰ δέ τις λάβοι ψυχὴν μίαν ἀδιάστατον
 ἀμεγέθη ἀπλούστατον, ὡς δόξει τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς διανοίας
 ἐπιβολῇ, πῶς ἂν τις ἐλπίσειε πολλὰ εὐρήσειν πάλιν αὐ;
 25 καίτοι νομίσας εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶν, ὅτε διηρεῖτο τὸ ζῶον
 εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, καὶ σῶμα μὲν πολυειδὲς καὶ

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its parts—a stone for instance—that there was what functioned as its substrate, and its quantity, the magnitude, and its quality, colour for instance, should we not say in the case of every other body that there was what might be called substance, and quantity, and quality, all together, but divided by our reasoning into three, and that body was the three as one? But if it also had movement as a natural part of its constitution, and we counted this in as well, then the four also would be one, and the one body would be brought to completion by them all in respect of its unity and its own nature. In the same way, certainly, when the discussion is about intelligible substance and the genera and principles there, one must remove the coming into being in the sphere of bodies and the understanding through sense-perception and the magnitudes—for it is [because bodies have size in] this way that there is separation and they stand apart from each other—and grasp an intelligible existence and that which really and truly is and is more one. In this it is also remarkable how that which is one in this way is many and one. For in the case of bodies it has been agreed that the same body is one and many; for the same one [can be divided] to infinity, and its colour is different from its shape; for they are in fact separated. But if someone takes one soul, without spatial separation of parts, without magnitude, supremely simple, as it will seem at the first application of the mind to it, how would one expect to find that it was after all many? For one would have thought that one could stop at this, when one had divided the living being into soul and body, and found the body multiform and composite and vari-

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σύνθετον καὶ ποικίλον, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐθάρρει ὡς ἀπλοῦν
 εὐρὼν καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι τῆς πορείας ἐλθὼν ἐπ' ἀρχήν.
 ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπειδὴ περ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ
 τόπου προεχειρίσθη ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ
 30 τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, λάβωμεν, πῶς τὸ ἐν τούτῳ πολλά ἐστι,
 καὶ πῶς τὰ πολλά ἐν ἐστίν, οὐ σύνθετον ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν,
 ἀλλὰ μία φύσις πολλά· διὰ γὰρ τούτου ληφθέντος καὶ
 φανεροῦ γενομένου καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν γενῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ
 ὄντι ἔφαμεν ἀλήθειαν φανερὰν ἔσεσθαι.

5. Πρῶτον δὲ τούτῳ ἐνθυμητέον ὡς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ
 σώματα, οἷον τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν
 πολλά ἐστι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ μεγέθεσι καὶ
 εἶδεσι μερῶν καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλοι, ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐξ
 5 ἐνός, ἢ [παντάπασιν]¹ ἐξ ἐνός ἥξει² πάντη πάντως ἐνός
 ἢ μᾶλλον μὲν ἐνός ἢ οἷον τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον
 ὄντος ἢ τὸ γενόμενον—ὅσω γὰρ πρὸς ἐν ἢ ἀπόστασις,
 τόσω καὶ πρὸς ὄν—ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξ ἐνός μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ
 ἐνός, ὡς πάντη ἐν ἢ αὐτοέν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν διεστηκὸς
 πλήθος ἐποίει—λείπεται εἶναι ἐκ πλήθους ἐνός. τὸ δὲ
 10 ποιοῦν ἦν ψυχὴ· τούτῳ ἄρα πλήθος ἐν. τί οὖν; τὸ πλήθος

¹ del. Igal.

² Igal: ἢ ἔξει Enn.: ἢ ἔξ ἐτι suspic. Theiler, scr. H-S.

¹ The phrase occurs in Plato *Republic* 508C1 and 517B5. Plotinus' use of it here, and the presentation of soul as the handiest example of a being "from the intelligible place", show clearly that the distinction between *ψυχή* and *νοῦς* was

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ous, but was confident that one had found that the soul was simple and could rest from one's journey since one had come to the principle. Since, then, this soul has come ready to hand for us from the "intelligible place",¹ as in the former discussion the body did from the perceptible, let us apprehend how this one is many, and how the many are one, not a one compounded from many, but one nature which is many; for through this, when it has been apprehended and has become clear, we maintained that the truth about the genera in real being would become clear.

5. But first we should think about this: that since bodies, of animals and plants for instance, are, each and every one of them, many in virtue of the colours and shapes and sizes and specific forms of their parts, and the fact that one is in one place and one in another, but all come from one, they will come either from a one which is in every way and altogether one or from a one which is more one than is that which comes from it,² so that it is also more real than that which has come into being—for the extent of the departure from being is as great as that of the departure from unity—since, then, they are from a one, but not a one such as to be in every way one or the absolute One—for this would not have made a discrete plurality—it remains that they must be from a plurality which is one. But what made them is soul: this then is a plurality which is one. What then? Is the plurality the rational forming principles not always for him very clear-cut (Plato, of course, makes no such distinction).

² I adopt Igal's emendations here (see critical notes): they seem to me to be required to give a tolerable sense.

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οἱ λόγοι τῶν γινομένων; ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ λόγοι
δὲ ἄλλοι; ἢ καὶ αὐτὴ λόγος καὶ κεφάλαιον τῶν λόγων,
καὶ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνεργούσης οἱ λόγοι· ἢ
δὲ οὐσία δύναμις τῶν λόγων. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τοῦτο
15 τὸ ἐν ἐξ ὧν εἰς ἄλλα ποιεῖ δεδεδειγμένον. τί δ' εἰ μὴ ποιοῖ,
ἀλλὰ τις αὐτὴν μὴ ποιοῦσαν λαμβάνοι ἀναβαίνων αὐτῆς
εἰς τὸ μὴ ποιοῦν; οὐ πολλὰς καὶ ἐνταῦθα εὐρήσει
δυνάμεις; εἶναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν πᾶς ἂν τις συγχωρήσειεν·
ἄρα δὲ ταῦτόν ὥς εἰ καὶ λίθον ἔλεγεν εἶναι; ἢ οὐ ταῦτόν.
20 ἀλλ' ὅμως κάκει ἐπὶ τοῦ λίθου τὸ εἶναι τῷ λίθῳ ἦν οὐ τὸ
εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ λίθῳ εἶναι· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ εἶναι
ψυχῇ μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἔχει τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι. ἄρ' οὖν ἄλλο τὸ
εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ λοιπόν, ὃ συμπληροῖ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὄν, διαφορὰ δὲ ποιεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν; ἢ τι
25 ὄν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως, ὥς ἄνθρωπος λευκός,
ἀλλ' ὥς τις οὐσία μόνον· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τῷ μὴ ἔξωθεν
τῆς οὐσίας ἔχειν ὃ ἔχει.

6. 'Αλλ' ἄρα οὐκ ἔξωθεν μὲν ἔχει τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας,
ἵνα ἢ μὲν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι ἦ, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι;
ἀλλ' εἰ κατὰ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι καὶ ἔξωθεν τὸ τοιόνδε, οὐ
τὸ ὅλον καθὼς ψυχὴ ἔσται οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τι, καὶ μέρος
5 αὐτῆς οὐσία, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ὅλον οὐσία. ἔπειτα τὸ εἶναι

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of the things which have come into being? Or is it rather itself one thing and the forming principles different from it? On the contrary, it is a forming principle itself and the sum of the forming principles, and the principles are its activity when it is active according to its substance; but the substance is the potentiality of the principles. It has then been demonstrated from what it does to other things that this one is indeed many. But what if it was not doing anything, but one was to consider it not doing by ascending to that of it which does not do? Will one not find many powers here too? For everyone would agree that the soul exists: but is this really the same thing as saying that a stone exists? Certainly not. But all the same there in the case of the stone also, existing for the stone is not [just] being but being a stone; so here, existing for soul has being soul along with being. Is then being one thing, and the rest something else, which contributes to the completion of the substance of the soul, and is there being [as such] and an essential difference makes the soul? No, the soul is a particular being but not in the way that a man is white, but only and simply like a particular substance; and this is the same as saying that it does not have what it has from outside its substance.

6. But, surely, does it not have [something] from outside its substance to make it in one respect existent but in another existent in a particular way? But if it is existent in a particular way, and the particularity comes from outside, it will not be substance as a whole and in so far as it is soul, but in a particular respect, and a part of it will be substance, but not the whole of it substance. Then what

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- αὐτῇ τί ἔσται ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ λίθος; ἢ δεῖ τοῦτο τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς ἐντὸς εἶναι οἶον πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα, ὅσα αὐτῇ· καὶ ζωὴν τοίνυν· καὶ συνάμφω ἐν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ζωὴν. ἀρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔν, ὥς
- 10 ἓνα λόγον; ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἔν, οὕτω δὲ ἔν, ὥς αὖ δύο ἢ καὶ πλείω, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ πρῶτα. ἢ οὖν οὐσία καὶ ζωὴ, ἢ ἔχει ζωὴν. ἀλλ' εἰ ἔχει, τὸ ἔχον καθ' αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν ζωῇ, ἢ τε ζωὴ οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχει θάτερον τὸ ἕτερον, λεκτέον ἐν ἄμφω. ἢ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ τοσαῦτα,
- 15 ὅσα ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῷ ἐνί· καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα πολλὰ· καὶ ἐν μὲν ὄν, ποιοῦν δὲ ἑαυτὸ αὐτὰ ἐν τῇ οἶον κινήσει πολλὰ· καὶ ὅλον ἔν, οἶον δὲ θεωρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν ἑαυτὸ πολλὰ· ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἀνέχεται ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐν εἶναι πάντα δυνάμενον, ὅσα ἐστὶν. ἢ δὲ θεωρία αἰτία τοῦ φανῆναι αὐτὸ πολλὰ, ἵνα νοήσῃ· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐν φανῇ, οὐκ
- 20 ἐνόησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἤδη ἐκεῖνο.

7. Τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ πόσα τὰ ἐνορώμενα; ἐπειδὴ ἐν ψυχῇ εὗρομεν οὐσίαν ἅμα καὶ ζωὴν—καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν ἢ οὐσία ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ, ζωὴ δὲ καὶ ἐν νῷ—ἐπεισαγαγόντες καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν τούτου

5 ζωὴν, κοινὸν τὸ ἐπὶ πάσῃ ζωῇ τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τι γένος θησόμεθα. οὐσίαν δὲ καὶ κίνησιν τὴν πρώτην ζωὴν οὖσαν δύο γένη θησόμεθα. καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔν, χωρίζει αὐτὰ τῇ νοήσει ὃ ἐν οὐχ ἐν εὐρών· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἡδυνήθη¹

¹ Igal, H-S²: δυνηθῇ Enn.: δυνηθείη Kirchhoff: δυνηθείης Theiler.

¹ "The stone" as an image of lifelessness occurs several times in Plotinus: cp. VI. 5 (23). 11. 5-14 and possibly III. 2

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will existence be to it, without all the rest, different from a stone¹? Now this being of soul must be within, like a "source and principle",² or rather must be all that it is; so it must be life; and both must be one, being and life. Is it then one like a single forming principle? No, the underlying reality is one, but so one that it is also two or even more, all that soul primarily is. It is therefore substance and life, or it has life. But if it has it, that which has is, in itself, not in life, and the life not in substance; but if one does not have the other, one must say that both are one. Or rather one and many, and as many as appear in the one; and one for itself, but many in relation to the others; and it is one being, but makes itself many by what we may call its movement; and it is one whole, but when it undertakes, one might say, to contemplate itself, it is many: as if it cannot bear its being to be one when it is capable of being all the things that it is. And its contemplation is the cause of its appearing many, that it may think: for if it appears as one, it did not think, but is that One.

7. What, then, are the constituents seen in soul, and how many are there? Since we find in soul substance and life together, and substance is common to all soul, and life also common, and life is also in Intellect, if we bring in also Intellect and its life, we shall posit as common to all life a single genus, movement. And we shall posit substance and movement, which is the primary life, as two genera. For even if they are one, [the observer] separates them in thought, finding the one not one; otherwise it would (47). 17. 67 (see my note ad loc.). For further examples see *Lexicon Plotinianum* s. v. *λίθος*.

² Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9.

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χωρίσαι. ὅρα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σαφῶς τοῦ εἶναι τὴν
 10 κίνησιν ἢ τὴν ζωὴν χωριζομένην, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ
 ἀληθινῷ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῇ σκιᾷ καὶ τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ τοῦ εἶναι.
 ὥς γὰρ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ ἐλλείπει καὶ
 μάλιστα τὸ κύριον, ἢ ζωή, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς
 τὸ εἶναι σκιὰ τοῦ εἶναι ἀφηρημένον τοῦ μάλιστα εἶναι, ὃ
 ἐν τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ ἦν ζωή. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔσχομεν ἐντεῦθεν
 15 χωρίσαι τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ ζῆν. ὄντος μὲν
 δὴ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ γένος· κίνησις δὲ οὕτε ὑπὸ τὸ ὄν
 τακτέα οὐτ' ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος,
 εὐρεθείσα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὥς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· ἐνέργεια γὰρ
 αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐδέτερον ἄνευ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἢ ἐπινοία, καὶ αἱ
 20 δύο φύσεις μία· καὶ γὰρ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει. καὶ
 εἰ χωρὶς μέντοι ἐκάτερον λάβοις, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄντι κίνησις
 φανήσεται καὶ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τὸ ὄν, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
 ἐν ὅς ὄντος ἐκάτερον χωρὶς εἶχε θάτερον, ἀλλ' ὁμως
 ἢ διάνοια δύο φησὶ καὶ εἶδος ἐκάτερον διπλοῦν ἔν.
 25 κινήσεως δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν φανείσης οὐκ ἐξιστάσης τὴν
 ἐκείνου φύσιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἷον τέλειον
 ποιούσης, αἰετὲς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἐν τῷ οὕτω
 κινεῖσθαι μενούσης, εἴ τις μὴ στάσιν ἐπεισάγοι,
 ἀτοπώτερος ἂν εἴη τοῦ μὴ κίνησιν διδόντος·
 προχειροτέρα γὰρ ἢ τῆς στάσεως περὶ τὸ ὄν ἔννοια καὶ
 30 νόησις τῆς περὶ τὴν κίνησιν οὔσης· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ
 τὰ ὑτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἓνα λόγον ἔχον ἐκεῖ. ἔστω
 δὴ καὶ στάσις ἓν γένος ἕτερον ὄν κινήσεως, ὅπου καὶ

¹ Plato *Sophist* 248A12.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

not have been possible to separate them. But observe in other things also how movement and life are clearly separated from being, even if not in the true being, yet in the shadow and that which has the same name as being. For as in the portrait of a man many things are wanting, and especially the decisively important thing, life, so in the things perceived by sense being is a shadow of being, separated from that which is most fully being, which was life in the archetype. But then, this gives us grounds for separating living from being and being from living. Now there are many species of being and there is a genus of being; but movement is not to be classed under being nor yet over being, but with being; it is found in being not as inhering in a subject; for it is its active actuality and neither of them is without the other except in our conception of them, and the two natures are one nature: for being is actual, not potential. And if, none the less, you take either of them separately, movement will appear in being and being in movement, as if in the "one-being" each taken separately had the other, but all the same discursive thought says that they are separate and that each form is a double one. But since movement appears in the sphere of being, not as changing the nature of being, but rather in being as if making it perfect, if one does not introduce rest as well one would be even more perverse than one who did not grant that there was movement; for the notion, and intellectual perception, of rest comes readier to hand where being is concerned than that of movement; for "existing in the same state and in the same way"¹ and having a single definition are there in being. So let rest be one genus, different from move-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

ἐναντίον ἂν φανείη. τοῦ δὲ ὄντος ὡς ἕτερον, πολλαχῇ
 δῆλον ἂν εἴη καὶ διότι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ταυτόν εἴη, οὐ μᾶλλον
 τῆς κινήσεως ταῦτό τῷ ὄντι. διὰ τί γὰρ ἡ μὲν στάσις τῷ
 35 ὄντι ταυτόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις οὐ, ζωή τις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν-
 ἔργεια καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι; ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 ἐχωρίζομεν τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ ὡς ταυτόν τε καὶ οὐ
 ταυτόν αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς δύο ἄμφω ἐλέγομεν καὶ αὖ ἓν, τὸν
 αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν στάσιν χωριούμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὖ
 40 οὐ χωριούμεν τοσοῦτον χωρίζοντες τῷ νῷ, ὅσον ἄλλο
 γένος θέσθαι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. ἢ εἰ συνάγοιμεν πάντα εἰς ἓν
 τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὸ ὄν μηδὲν μηδαμῇ διαφέρειν λέγοντες,
 τὸ τε ὄν τῇ κινήσει ὡσαύτως, τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν
 κίνησιν διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὄντος εἰς ταυτόν συνάξομεν, καὶ
 45 ἔσται ἡμῖν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ στάσις ἓν.

8. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ τρία ταῦτα τίθεσθαι, εἴπερ ὁ νοὺς χωρὶς
 ἕκαστον νοεῖ· ἅμα δὲ νοεῖ καὶ τίθησιν, εἴπερ νοεῖ, καὶ
 ἔστιν, εἴπερ νενόηται. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι μετὰ ὕλης
 ἐστί, τούτων οὐκ ἐν τῷ νῷ τὸ εἶναι. [ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐλα]¹
 5 ἃ δ' ἔστιν αὐλα, εἰ νενόηται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι.
 ἴδε δὲ νοῦν καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ βλέψον εἰς αὐτὸν ἀτενίσας,
 μὴ ὄμμασι τούτοις δεδορκῶς. ὁρᾷς δὴ οὐσίας ἐστίαν καὶ
 φῶς ἐν αὐτῷ αὐπνον καὶ ὡς ἔστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ὡς
 διέστηκεν, ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ ζωὴν μένουσαν καὶ νόησιν οὐκ
 10 ἐνεργοῦσαν εἰς τὸ μέλλον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ ἤδη, μᾶλλον δὲ
 “ἤδη καὶ αἰεὶ ἤδη”, καὶ τὸ παρὸν αἰεὶ, καὶ ὡς νοῶν ἐν

¹ del. H-S.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

ment, in that it would seem to be its opposite. But that it is different from being could be made clear in many ways, especially because, if it was the same as being, it could not be any more the same as being than motion. For why is rest the same as being, but motion not, when motion is its life and the active actuality of its substance and its very being? But, just as we separated movement from it as being the same and not the same as it, and spoke of them as two and yet again one, in the same way we shall also separate rest from it and yet again not separate it, separating it so far in the mind as to posit it as another genus among real beings. Otherwise, if we were to bring rest and being into one, saying that there was not in any way any difference between them, and bring being into one with movement in the same way, we shall bring rest and movement into identity through the medium of being, and movement and rest will be one for us.

8. But one must posit these three, if Intellect thinks each of them separately; but it does at once know and posit them, if it thinks, and they exist, if they have been thought. For the being of things whose being involves matter is not in the intellect; but if things which are without matter have been thought, this is their being. But behold Intellect, pure Intellect, and look upon it with concentrated gaze, not seeing it with these bodily eyes of ours. You see the hearth of substance and a sleepless light on it, and how they stand on it and how they stand apart, existing all together, abiding life and a thought whose activity is not directed towards what is coming but what is here already, or rather "here already and, always here already", and the always

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

- ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἔξω. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ νοεῖν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ
 κίνησις, ἐν δὲ τῷ “ἑαυτόν” ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὄν· ὦν γὰρ
 νοεῖ καὶ ὄντα ἑαυτόν, καὶ εἰς ὃ οἶον ἐπερείδετο, ὄν. ἡ μὲν
 γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἡ εἰς αὐτὸν οὐκ οὐσία, εἰς ὃ δὲ καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ,
 15 τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ βλεπόμενον τὸ ὄν, οὐχ ἡ βλέψις· ἔχει δὲ
 καὶ αὕτη τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ εἰς ὄν, ὄν. ἐνεργεία δὲ
 ὄν, οὐ δυνάμει, συνάπτει πάλιν αὐτὰ δύο καὶ οὐ
 χωρίζει, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ αὐτὸν ἐκείνο καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἑαυτόν. ὄν δὲ
 τὸ πάντων ἐδραιότατον καὶ περὶ ὃ τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν στάσιν
 20 ὑπεστήσατο καὶ ἔχει οὐκ ἐπακτόν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν
 αὐτῷ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ νόησις οὐκ ἄρξαμένη
 στάσις, καὶ ἀφ’ οὗ ὥρμηται οὐχ ὀρμήσασα στάσις· οὐ
 γὰρ ἐκ κινήσεως κίνησις οὐδ’ εἰς κίνησιν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν
 ἰδέα ἐν στάσει πέρας οὔσα νοῦ, ὃ δὲ νοῦς αὐτῆς ἡ
 κίνησις.
- 25 “Ὡστε ὄν πάντα καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ δι’ ὅλων
 ὄντα γένη, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὕστερόν τι ὄν καὶ τις στάσις
 καὶ τις κίνησις. τρία δὲ ταῦτα ἰδὼν τις, ἐν προσβολῇ
 τῆς τοῦ ὄντος φύσεως γεγενημένος, καὶ τῷ παρ’ αὐτῷ
 ὄντι τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰδὼν τὰ ἄλλα, τὴν κίνησιν τὴν
 30 ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινήσει, καὶ τῇ στάσει τὴν στάσιν,
 καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ἐφαρμόσας, ὁμοῦ μὲν γενομένοις καὶ
 οἶον συγκεχυμένοις συμμίσξας οὐ διακρίνων, οἶον δ’

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

present, and it is a thought thinking in itself and not outside. In its thinking, then, there is activity and motion, and in its thinking itself, substance and being: for, existing, it thinks itself as existent, and the being on which it is, so to speak, founded. For its self-directed activity is not substance, but being is that to which the activity is directed and from which it comes: for that which is looked at is being, not the look; but the look, too, possesses being, because it comes from and is directed to being. And since it is in act, not in potency, it gathers the two together and does not separate them, but makes itself being and being itself. And since being is the most firmly set of all things and that about which the other things [are set], it has made rest exist and possesses it not as brought in from outside but from itself and in itself. It is that in which thought comes to a stop, though thought is a rest which has no beginning, and from which it starts, though thought is a rest which never started: for movement does not begin from or end in movement. And again the Form at rest is the defining limit of Intellect, and Intellect is the movement of the Form.

So all things are being, rest and motion; these are all-pervading genera, and each subsequent thing is a particular being, a particular rest, and a particular motion. Now when anyone sees these three, having come into intuitive contact with the nature of being, he sees being by the being in himself and the others, motion and rest, by the motion and rest in himself, and fits his own being, motion and rest to those in Intellect: they come to him together in a sort of confusion and he mingles them without distinguishing them; then as it were separating them a little and

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

ὀλίγον διαστήσας καὶ ἐπισχὼν καὶ διακρίνας εἰσιδὼν ὃν
 καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν, τρία ταῦτα καὶ ἕκαστον ἓν, ἃρ'
 35 οὐχ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἴρηκε καὶ διέστησεν ἐν ἑτερότητι
 καὶ εἶδε τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑτερότητα τρία τιθεὶς καὶ ἐν
 ἕκαστον, πάλιν δὲ ταῦτα εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ πάντα ἓν,
 εἰς ταῦτόν αὖ συνάγων καὶ βλέπων ταυτότητα εἶδε
 γενομένην καὶ οὖσαν; οὐκοῦν πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις
 ἀνάγκη δύο ταῦτα προστιθέναι, ταῦτόν, θάτερον, ὥστε
 40 τὰ πάντα γένῃ γίνεσθαι πέντε πᾶσι, καὶ ταῦτα διδόντα
 τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ ἑτέροις καὶ ταῦτοῖς εἶναι· καί τι γὰρ
 ταῦτόν καί τι ἕτερον ἕκαστον· ἀπλῶς γὰρ ταῦτόν καὶ
 ἕτερον ἄνευ τοῦ “τι” ἐν γένει ἂν εἴη· καὶ πρῶτα δὲ γένῃ,
 ὅτι μηδὲν αὐτῶν κατηγορήσεις ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι. τὸ γὰρ ὃν
 45 κατηγορήσεις αὐτῶν· ὄντα γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς γένος· οὐ
 γὰρ ὅπερ ὃν τι. οὐδ’ αὖ τῆς κινήσεως οὐδὲ τῆς στάσεως·
 οὐ γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ ὄντος· ὄντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν ὡς εἶδη αὐτοῦ,
 τὰ δὲ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ. οὐδ’ αὖ τὸ ὃν μετέχον τούτων
 ὡς γενῶν αὐτοῦ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπαναβέβηκεν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ
 πρότερα τοῦ ὄντος.

9. Ἄλλ’ ὅτι μὲν ταῦτα γένῃ πρῶτα, ἐκ τούτων ἂν
 τις, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, βεβαιώσαιο· ὅτι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα
 καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις, πῶς ἂν τις πιστεύσειε; διὰ
 τί γὰρ οὐ καὶ τὸ ἓν; διὰ τί δ’ οὐ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν
 5 δέ, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἅπερ ἤδη ἕτεροι

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

holding them away from him and distinguishing them he perceives being, motion and rest, three and each of them one. Does he not then say that they are different from each other and distinguish them in otherness, and see the otherness in being when he posits three, each of them one? And again, when he brings them back to unity and sees them in a unity, all one, does he not collect them into sameness and, as he looks at them, see that sameness has come to be and is? So we must add these two, the same and the other, to those first three, so that there will be in all five genera for all things, and the last two also will give to subsequent things the characters of being other and same; for each individual thing is a particular "same" and a particular "other"; for "same" and "other" without the "particular" would apply to genera. These are the primary kinds because you cannot apply any predicate to them which forms part of the definition of their essence. You will certainly predicate being of them, for they exist, but not as their genus, for they are not particular beings. Nor can you predicate being as the genus of motion and rest, for they are not specific forms of being; for some things exist as species of being, others as participating in being. Nor again does being participate in these others as if they were its genera: for they do not transcend being and are not prior to it.

9. But that these genera are primary one could confirm from these arguments, and perhaps also from others; but how could one be confident that there are only these [primary genera] and not others in addition to them? For why not also the one? And why not the quale and the quantum and the relative and the others, which other philosophers have al-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

- κατηρίθμηνται; τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν, εἰ μὲν τὸ πάντως ἓν, [ἐν]¹
 ᾧ μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόσεστι, μὴ ψυχή, μὴ νοῦς, μὴ ότιοῦν,
 οὐδενὸς ἂν κατηγοροῖτο τοῦτο, ὥστε οὐδὲ γένος. εἰ δὲ
 τὸ προσὸν τῷ ὄντι, ἐφ' οὗ τὸ ἓν ὃν λέγομεν, οὐ πρώτως
 10 ἓν τοῦτο. ἔτι ἀδιάφορον ὃν αὐτοῦ πῶς ἂν ποιήσειεν εἶδη;
 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ, οὐ γένος. πῶς γὰρ καὶ διαιρήσεις;
 διαιρῶν γὰρ πολλὰ ποιήσεις· ὥστε αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ
 ἔσται καὶ ἀπολεί ἑαυτό, εἰ ἐθέλοι γένος εἶναι. ἔπειτά τι
 προσθήσεις διαιρῶν εἰς εἶδη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶεν διαφοραὶ ἐν
 15 τῷ ἓν, ὥσπερ εἰσὶ τῆς οὐσίας. ὄντος μὲν γὰρ δέχεται ὁ
 νοῦς εἶναι διαφοράς, ἐνὸς δὲ πῶς; εἴτα ἐκάστοτε μετὰ
 τῆς διαφορᾶς δύο τιθεὶς ἀναιρεῖς τὸ ἓν, ἐπείπερ
 πανταχοῦ ἢ μονάδος προσθήκη τὸ πρότερον ποσὸν
 ἀφανίζει. εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι ἓν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ
 κινήσει ἓν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὸν εἶναι, εἰς μὲν ταῦτόν
 20 ἄγων τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἓν, ἐν ᾧ λόγῳ τὸ ὃν οὐκ ἐποίει τῶν
 ἄλλων γένος, ὅτι μὴ ὅπερ <ὄν> ὄντα,² ἀλλ' ἕτερον
 τρόπον ὄντα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν κοινὸν ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔσται,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως. εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντων
 λέγοι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἓν τι ἐφ' αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, εἰ
 μὲν ταῦτόν αὐτῷ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ἓν, ἥδη τοῦ ὄντος

¹ delendum suspic. Müller, del. Volkmann.

² <ὄν> ὄντα Müller: ὄντα Enn.: ὄν τι Igal, H-S².

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

ready counted up ¹? Well then, as for the one, if it is the absolutely One to which nothing else is added, not soul, not intellect, not anything at all, this could not be predicated of anything, so that it is not a genus. But if it is the one added to being, that of which we speak as one-being, this is not primarily one. Again, if it is undifferentiated in itself how could it make specific forms? But if it cannot do this, it is not a genus. For how could there be divisions? For in dividing you will make many: so that the one itself will be many and will destroy itself—if it wanted to be a genus. Then, you will add something to it in dividing it into specific forms. For there could be no differentiations in the one, as there are of substance. For the mind accepts that there are differentiations of being, but how could there be of one? Then, every time [you differentiate] you abolish the one by positing two with the differentiation, since everywhere the addition of a unit makes the previous quantum disappear. But if someone were to say that the one in being and the one in movement and the others is a common term, bringing being and one into identity, then, as in the argument that did not make being the genus of the others, because they are not beings as being is, ² but beings in another way, so the one also will not be a common term over them, but it will be one primarily, and the others one in a different way. But if he were to say that he does not make the one the genus of all [genera] but one [genus] by itself, like the others, if being and the one are identical for him, since being has already been

¹ The reference is to the Aristotelian categories.

² I retain the <ὅν> ὅντα of Müller here.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

25 ἡριθμημένου ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ὄνομα εἰσάγει. εἰ δὲ ἔν
 ἐκάτερον, τινὰ φύσιν λέγει, καὶ εἰ μὲν προστίθῃσί
 <“τι”>,¹ τι ἔν λέγει, εἰ δὲ μηδέν, ἐκείνο, ὃ οὐδενὸς
 κατηγορεῖται, πάλιν αὖ λέγει· εἰ δὲ τὸ τῷ ὄντι συνόν,
 εἵπομεν μὲν ὅτι οὐ πρῶτως ἔν λέγει. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει
 30 πρῶτως εἶναι τοῦτο ἐξηρημένου ἐκείνου τοῦ παντελῶς
 ἔν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὄν μετ’ ἐκείνο λέγομεν ὄν καὶ ὄν πρῶτως
 ὄν. ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἦν τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὄν ἢ, εἴπερ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἦν
 πρῶτως· τούτου δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἔν. ἔπειτα χωρισθὲν
 τῇ νοήσει τοῦ ὄντος διαφορὰς οὐκ ἔχει· ἔπειτα ἐν τῷ
 35 ὄντι, εἰ μὲν ἐπακολούθημα αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάντων καὶ
 ὕστερον· πρότερον δὲ τὸ γένος. εἰ δὲ ἅμα, καὶ πάντων·
 τὸ δὲ γένος οὐχ ἅμα. εἰ δὲ πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τις καὶ αὐτοῦ
 μόνον· εἰ δὲ ἀρχὴ αὐτοῦ, οὐ γένος αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοῦ,
 οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ δέοι ἂν καὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 πάντων. ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ ἔν ἐν τῷ ὄντι πλησιάζον τῷ
 40 ἐνὶ καὶ οἶον συνεκπίπτον τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ ὄντος τὸ μὲν πρὸς
 ἐκείνῳ ἔν ὄντος, τὸ δὲ μετ’ ἐκείνο ὄντος, ᾧ δύναται καὶ
 πολλὰ εἶναι, μένον αὐτὸ ἔν καὶ οὐ θέλον μερίζεσθαι οὐδὲ
 γένος εἶναι βούλεσθαι.

¹ Bouillett, Harder, Theiler.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

counted among the genera, he is introducing a [mere] name. But if each of them is one [different from the other], then he means [by the one] a nature, and if he adds "some" he means some particular one, but if he adds nothing, he means, yet again, the one which is predicated of nothing; but if he means the one which goes with being, we have said that he does not mean the primarily one. But what prevents this from being primarily one if that which is absolutely one is left out of account? For we do call the being which comes after it being and say that it is primarily being. Now we do so because that which is before it is not being, or, if what is before it was being, it would not be primarily being; but in this case what is before it is one. Then, when it is separated in thought from being it does not have differentiations; then, in being, if it is a consequence of being, it is a consequence of and posterior to all; but the genus is prior. But if it is simultaneous, it is simultaneous with all; but the genus is not simultaneous. But if it is prior, it is a principle, and a principle only of being; but if it is its principle, it is not its genus; but if it is not its genus, it is not the genus of the others either; or it would be necessary for being also to be the genus of all the other [genera]. For in general it appears likely that, since the one in being is near to the one and in a way coincides with being, and being in so far as it is close to that [absolute One] is one, but in so far as it is posterior to it, being, by which it is able also to be many, the one in being, remaining itself one and being unwilling to be divided into parts, does not want to be a genus either.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

10. Πῶς οὖν ἕκαστον τοῦ ὄντος ἔν; ἢ τῷ τι ἔν οὐχ
 ἔν—πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη τῷ τι ἔν—ἀλλ' ὁμωνύμως ἔν
 ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος πλήθους, ὥστε ἔν
 ἐνταῦθα ὡς στρατὸς ἢ χορός. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ ἐκεῖ ἔν ἐν
 5 τούτοις, ὥστε οὐ κοινὸν τὸ ἐν οὐδ' ἐθεωρεῖτο ἐν τῷ ὄντι
 καὶ τοῖς τι οὖσι τὸ αὐτό. ὥστε οὐ γένος τὸ ἔν· ἐπεὶ πάν
 γένος καθ' οὗ ἀληθεύσεται <τὸ ἔν ὡς γένος>,¹ οὐκέτι
 καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα· καθ' οὗ δὲ παντὸς ὄντος ἀληθεύεται
 τὸ ἔν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα [καθ' οὗ ἀληθεύσεται τὸ ἔν ὡς
 10 γένος],² κατὰ τούτου ἔσται οὐχ ὡς γένος. ὥστε οὔτε
 τῶν πρώτων γενῶν ἀληθεύσεται ὡς γένος, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ
 τὸ ἔν ὃν οὐ μᾶλλον ἔν ἢ πολλὰ οὐδέ τι τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν
 οὕτως ἔν ὡς μὴ πολλὰ, οὔτε κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 ὑστέρων ἢ πάντως πολλὰ. τὸ δ' ὅλον γένος οὐδὲν ἔν·
 ὥστε, εἰ τὸ ἔν γένος, ἀπολεί τὸ εἶναι ἔν. οὐ γὰρ
 15 ἀριθμὸς τὸ ἔν· ἀριθμὸς δ' ἔσται γενόμενον γένος.
 ἔτι τὸ ἔν ἀριθμῷ ἔν· εἰ γὰρ γένει ἔν, οὐ κυρίως ἔν. ἔτι
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἔν οὐχ ὡς γένος κατ' αὐτῶν,
 ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν λέγεται, οὐ γένος δὲ λέγεται,
 οὕτως οὐδ' εἰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ ἔν, γένος ἂν εἴη οὔτε τοῦ

¹ transpos. H-S².

² del. Page, Harder.

¹ Plotinus is here using the Stoic scale of degrees of unification; it appears more clearly in ch. 11, 8-9 and VI. 9.4-8; cp. also *N.* 5.4. 31. For the scale in the Stoics see *SVF*

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

10. How then is each individual belonging to being one? Now by being a particular one it is not one—for it is already many by being a particular one—but each of the specific forms is equivocally one: for a specific form is a multiplicity, so that “one” here is [used as it is of] an army or a chorus.¹ So then the one there [in being] is not in these, so that the one is not a common term and it is not the same one which is observed in being and in particular beings. So that the one is not a genus; since every genus of which the one is truly predicated as genus can no longer have the opposites truly predicated of it; but in that the one and the opposites are truly predicated of every being, the one will not be predicated as their genus. So that it will not be truly predicated of the first genera either, since the one being also is not more one than many, nor is any one of the other genera one in such a way as not to be many, nor can [the one be truly predicated] of the others which come after, which are in every way many. But in general, no genus is one: so, if the one is a genus, it will destroy its unity. For “the one is not a number”²; but it will be a number if it has become a genus. Further, the one is one in number: for if it was one in genus, it would not be properly one. Further, just as in the numbers the one is not there as a genus predicated of them but is said to exist in them, but not said to be their genus, so, even if the one is in the beings, it would not be the genus either of being or of the other [genera] or of all of II 366–8 and 1013; Philo *On The Eternity of the World* 79; Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* VIII 102 (= *Against the Logicians* I 102 in Bury’s Loeb edition).

² Aristotle *Metaphysics* N 1. 1088a6.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

20 ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν πάντων. ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ
 ἀπλοῦν ἀρχὴ μὲν ἂν εἴη τοῦ οὐχ ἀπλοῦ, οὐ μὴν τούτου
 καὶ γένος—ἀπλοῦν γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀπλοῦν—οὔτω
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχή, οὐκ ἔσται τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ
 γένος. ἔσται οὖν οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. ἀλλ'
 εἶπερ ἔσται, τῶν “ἐν” ἐκάστων, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιώσειε
 25 χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἐν. τινῶν οὖν ἔσται. ὥσπερ
 γὰρ τὸ ὄν οὐ πάντων γένος, ἀλλὰ τῶν “ὄν” εἰδῶν, οὔτω
 καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν “ἐν” ἐκάστων εἰδῶν. τίς οὖν διαφορὰ
 ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο καθὼς ἐν, ὥσπερ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο ὄντος
 διαφορὰ; ἀλλ' εἰ συμμερίζεται τῷ ὄντι καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ
 30 τὸ ὄν τῷ μερισμῷ καὶ τῷ ἐν πολλοῖς θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ
 γένος, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοσαῦτα φαινόμενον ὅσα ἡ
 οὐσία καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἴσα μεριζόμενον οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος; ἢ
 πρῶτον οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἴ τι ἐνυπάρχει πολλοῖς, γένος
 εἶναι οὔτε αὐτῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχει, οὔτε ἄλλων· οὐδ' ὅλως,
 35 εἴ τι κοινόν, πάντως γένος. τὸ γοῦν σημεῖον ἐνυπάρχον
 ταῖς γραμμααῖς οὐ γένος οὔτε αὐτῶν οὔτε ὅλως, οὐδέ γε,
 ὥσπερ ἐλέγετο, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐν οὔτε τῶν ἀριθμῶν
 οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ <ἐν> ἐν¹ πολλοῖς
 καὶ διαφοραῖς οἰκείαις χρῆσθαι καὶ εἶδη ποιεῖν καὶ ἐν
 40 τῷ τί ἐστι. τοῦ δὲ ἑνὸς τίνες ἂν εἶεν διαφοραὶ ἢ ποῖα

¹ <ἐν> ἐν Ficinus, suspic. Creuzer, scr. Theiler: ἐν BxUC,
 Kirchhoff: ἐν, w, Perna, Creuzer.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

them. Further, just as the simple might be principle of the non-simple, but could not also be its genus—for [if it were,] the non-simple would also be simple—so with the one, if the one is principle, it will not also be genus of the things posterior to it. It will not therefore be the genus either of being or of the other [genera]. But if it is going to be a genus, it will be the genus of the particular "ones", as if one were to think it right to separate the one from substance. It will be, then, a genus of particular things. For, just as being is not the genus of all things but of the specific forms which "are", so the one will be the genus of the particular specific forms which "are one". What then will be the difference of one from another in so far as they are one, as there is a difference of being of one from another? But if the one is divided along with being and substance, and being by the division and by being observed in many things as the same is a genus, why could not the one be a genus since it appears as many things as substance and is divided into an equal number of parts? Now, first of all it is not necessary, if something exists in many things, that it should be a genus, either of the things in which it exists or of other things; nor, in general, if something is common, is it at all necessary for it to be a genus. At any rate the point, which exists in the lines, is not a genus, either of them or generally speaking, nor, as was said, is the one in the numbers a genus either of the numbers or the other things. For that which is common and one in many things must employ differentiations which belong to itself and make specific forms and make them in its essential being. But what are the differentiations of the one or what

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

γεννᾶ εἶδη; εἰ δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶδη ποιεῖ, ἃ περὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν εἴη τῷ ὄντι, καὶ ὄνομα μόνον θάτερον, καὶ ἄρκεῖ τὸ ὄν.

11. Ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, πῶς ἐν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἔν, καὶ πῶς ὁ λεγόμενος μερισμὸς καὶ ὅλως ὁ τῶν γενῶν, καὶ εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος ἐκάτερος. πρῶτον οὖν, πῶς ὅλως ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὁτιοῦν λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν, εἴτα εἰ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν
 5 τῷ ἐνὶ ὄντι λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἐκεῖ λέγεται. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πάντων ἐν οὐ ταυτόν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν νοητῶν—ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν—οὔτ' ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμοίως· οὐ γὰρ ταυτόν ἐν χορῷ καὶ στρατοπέδῳ καὶ νηὶ καὶ οἰκίᾳ οὐδ' αὖ ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ. ἀλλ' ὅμως πάντα τὸ αὐτὸ
 10 μιμεῖται, τυγχάνει δὲ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐν τῷ νῷ· ψυχὴ γὰρ μία καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον νοῦς εἰς καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔν. ἄρ' οὖν ἐν ἐκάστῳ τὸ ὄν αὐτοῦ λέγοντες ἐν λέγομεν καὶ ὡς ἔχει ὄντος, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἐνός; ἢ συμβέβηκε μὲν τοῦτο, οὐ μέντοι, καθὸ ὄν,
 15 καὶ ἔν, ἀλλ' ἔστι μὴ ἦττον ὄν ὑπάρχον ἦττον εἶναι ἔν. οὐ γὰρ ἦττον <ὄν>¹ στρατὸς ἢ χορὸς οἰκίας, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἦττον ἔν. ἔοικεν οὖν τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἐν πρὸς ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον βλέπειν, καὶ καθόσον τυγχάνει ἀγαθοῦ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον τοῦ ἐν ἐν

¹ Igal, H-S².

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

specific forms does it generate? But if it makes the same specific forms as occur in the sphere of being, it would be the same as being, and one of the two would be only a name, and being is sufficient.

11. But we must investigate how the one is in being, and how what we speak of as division [works], and in general the division of the genera, and if it is the same [as the division of being] or different in each of the two cases. First, then, how in general each and every thing is called one, and then if we mean the same [by "one" when we speak of it] in the one being and as transcendent. Now the one over all things is not the same; for [we do not mean] the same [by "one"] in the case of perceptible and of intelligible things—and certainly being is not [one in the same sense as the others]—[and it does not mean] the same in the case of perceptible things in comparison with each other; for it is not the same in a chorus and an army and a ship and a house, and not the same in these last and in what is continuous. But nevertheless all try to represent the same [One], but some attain only a remote resemblance, some come nearer, and attain it already more truly in Intellect: for soul is one and Intellect and being are still more one. So we then in each thing when we say its being also say its "one", and is it with its "one" as it is with its being? This happens incidentally, but a thing is not therefore one in proportion to its being, but it is possible to have no less real an existence but to be less one. For an army or a chorus has no less being than a house, but all the same it is less one. It seems then that the one in each thing looks more to good, and in so far as it attains to good it is also one, and being more or less one lies in this; for each thing

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

20 τούτῳ· εἶναι γὰρ θέλει ἕκαστον οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ
 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔν ὥς δύναται σπεύδει
 ἐν γενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν φύσει αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει συνιόντα εἰς
 ταῦτόν ἐνοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς θέλοντα· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων
 σπεύδει ἕκαστα, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ εἰς αὐτά· καὶ
 ψυχὰι πᾶσαι εἰς ἓν ἂν βούλοιντο ἰέναι μετὰ τὴν αὐτῶν
 25 οὐσίαν. καὶ ἀμφοτέρωθεν δὲ τὸ ἔν· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ καὶ
 τὸ εἰς ὃ· καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔν καὶ σπεύδει εἰς τὸ
 ἔν. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπέστη ἐν τοῖς
 οὐσιν ὅτιοῦν ὑποστάν τε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέχοιτο μὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔν
 τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχον. τὰ μὲν δὴ φύσει οὕτω· τὰ δὲ ἐν ταῖς
 30 τέχναις αὐτῇ ἐκάστη ἕκαστον πρὸς τοῦτο καθόσον
 δύναται καὶ ὥς δύναται ἐκείνα οὕτως ἄγει.¹ τὸ δὲ ὄν
 μάλιστα πάντων τούτου τυγχάνει· ἐγγὺς γάρ. ὅθεν τὰ
 μὲν ἄλλα λέγεται ὃ λέγεται μόνον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος· καὶ
 γάρ, εἴ ποτε λέγοιμεν εἰς, πρὸς δύο λέγομεν· εἰ δὲ καὶ
 35 ἄλλως τὸ ἔν λέγομεν, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ προστιθέντες λέγομεν.
 ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος λέγομεν τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἔν ὄν καὶ
 ἀξιούμεν ὥς ἔν ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν σφόδρα αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν συνουσίαν. γίννεται οὖν τὸ ἔν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ὥς
 ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, οὐχ ὡσαύτως δέ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως, ὥστε καὶ
 τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔν. τί οὖν τὸ ἔν
 40 αὐτῷ ἔν; οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ κοινὸν
 θεωρούμενον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν ταῖς γραμμαῖς κοινὸν
 τὸ σημεῖον καὶ οὐ γένος τῶν γραμμῶν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 ἀριθμοῖς κοινὸν τὸ ἔν δὴ ἴσως τοῦτο καὶ οὐ γένος· οὐδὲ

¹ Sleeman, Theiler: λέγει BxUC: λέγοι w: ποιεῖ Müller: τελεῖ Seidel.

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wishes not just for being, but for being together with the good. For this reason things which are not one strive as far as they can to become one, natural things by their very nature coming together, wishing to be united in identity with themselves; for all individual things do not strive to get away from each other, but towards each other and towards themselves; and all souls would like to come to unity, following their own nature. And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which they go; for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One. For in this way they also strive towards the Good; for nothing whatever among the real beings could have come to exist or endure in existence if its striving was not directed towards the One. This is how it is with the things in nature. But as for the things of art, each art brings each of its products to this as far as it can and as far as their capacity allows. Being attains this most of all: for it is near. For this reason the other things are called only what they are called, man for instance; for even if we do sometimes say "one man", we say this in comparison with two; but if we do use the one in other contexts, we do so by adding, beginning from itself. But in the case of being we call this whole "one-being" and by indicating it as one claim its close communion with the Good. So the one in it also is principle and goal, but not in the same way, but otherwise, as there is prior and posterior also in that which is one. What then is the one in it? Is it not observed to be alike in all the parts and common? Now, first of all the point is common in lines and is not the genus of lines; there is something common in numbers, very likely this one, and it is not a genus:

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ¹ ἐπὶ μονάδος
 45 καὶ δυάδος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ἐν τῷ
 ὄντι οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ μὲν πρῶτα, τὰ δ' ὕστερα εἶναι, καὶ
 τὰ μὲν ἀπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ταῦτόν δὲ ἐν
 πᾶσι τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ὄντος, διαφορὰ οὐκ οὔσα αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ
 εἶδη ποιεῖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἶδη, οὐδὲ γένος αὐτὸ δύναται εἶναι.

12. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω. πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν ἐν τῷ ἐν εἶναι ἕκαστον ἀψύχους οὐσιν; ἢ κοινὸν
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ
 εἶναι ὅλως αὐτούς, ἡμεῖς περὶ ὄντων εἵπομεν, καθὼς ἐν
 5 ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ τὸ σημεῖον ζητοῖεν πῶς ἀγαθοῦ μετέχει,
 εἰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ φήσουσιν εἶναι, εἰ μὲν ἄψυχον φήσουσι,
 τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων
 ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δ' ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ἐν κύκλῳ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ
 ἐκείνου τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ ὁρεξις πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ σπεύδει ὥς
 10 δύναται διὰ τούτου ἐκεῖ. ἀλλὰ πῶς τὰ γένη ταῦτα; ἄρα
 κατακερματιζόμενα² ἕκαστα; ἢ ὅλον ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὦν
 γένος. καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἐν; ἢ τὸ γένει ἐν ὥς ἐν πολλοῖς ὅλον.
 ἄρ' οὖν μόνον ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ'
 αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μετέχουσιν. ἀλλ' ἴσως σαφέστερον
 ἔσται ὕστερον.

13. Νῦν δέ, πῶς τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τοῖς
 πρῶτοις, καὶ αὖ τὸ ποιόν; ἢ ποσὸν μὲν οὐ πρῶτον μετὰ
 τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἅμα μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος. κίνησις

¹ Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.

² κατακ. U, Igal, H-S²: καὶ τὰ κ. wBxC.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

for the one in the one itself is not the same as the one in the unit and the two and the other numbers. And then in being also nothing prevents some things from being prior and others posterior, and some simple and some composite. And if the one is the same in all things which belong to being, as there is no differentiation of it it does not make specific forms; but if there are no specific forms, it cannot itself be a genus.

12. And so much for this. But how does the good for numbers lie in their being each of them one when they are soulless? Now this is common also to other soulless things. But if anyone were to say that numbers do not exist at all, we for our part were speaking of existing things, in so far as each of them is one. But if they were to enquire how the point partakes of the good, if they are going to assert that it exists by itself, then, if they assert that it is soulless, their enquiry is the same as in the case of other things of the kind; but if in others, in the circle for instance, this is the good of the point and its desire is directed to this, and it will strive as far as it can towards the transcendent through this circle. But how can the genera be these things? Can they really be particulars, all chopped up small? No, the generic one is like a whole in many things. Does it exist only in the things which participate in it? No, but it exists both independently and in the things which participate in it. But perhaps this will be clearer later.

13. But now, why is the quantum not in the primary genera, and also the quale? Now, the quantum is not primary with the others because they are simultaneous with being. For movement is with

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια ὄντος ζωὴ αὐτοῦ οὐσα· καὶ
5 στάσις ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ συνεισῆει· μᾶλλον δὲ συνῆν τὸ
εἶναι τούτοις ἐτέροις καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὥστε συνορᾶσθαι
καὶ ταῦτα. ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὕστερός τε ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ,
καὶ τὸ “ὕστερος” παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, καὶ ἐφεξῆς
ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ὕστερα ἐν προτέροις· ὥστε
10 ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις οὐκ ἂν καταριθμοίτο· ζητητέον δέ,
εἰ ὅλως γένος. τὸ μέντοι μέγεθος ἔτι μᾶλλον ὕστερον καὶ
σύνθετον· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐν τῷδε καὶ γραμμὴ δύο τινὰ καὶ
ἐπίπεδον τρία. εἰ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔχει καὶ τὸ
συνεχὲς μέγεθος τὸ ποσόν, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὄντος
15 γένους πῶς ἂν τοῦτο ἔχοι; ἐνὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ
πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον. εἰ δὲ κοινὸν ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν τὸ
ποσοῖς, τί τοῦτό ἐστι ληπτέον, καὶ εὐρόντας θετέον
γένος ὕστερον, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· καὶ εἰ γένος μὴ ἐν
τοῖς πρώτοις, εἷς τι ἀνακτέον τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν εἰς τὰ
20 πρῶτα. δῆλον τοίνυν ἴσως, ὅτι ὅσον τι δηλοῖ ἢ τοῦ
ποσοῦ φύσις καὶ μετρεῖ τὸ ὅσον ἐκάστου αὐτῇ τε ὅσον
τι. ἀλλ’ εἰ κοινὸν ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους τὸ ὅσον, ἢ ὁ
ἀριθμὸς πρῶτος, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, ἢ ὅλως ὁ
μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν μίξει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὸ δὲ
25 μέγεθος κινήσεως τις ἢ ἐκ κινήσεως, τῆς μὲν κινήσεως εἰς
ἀόριστον προϊούσης, τῆς δὲ στάσεως ἐν τῇ ἐποχῇ τοῦ
προϊόντος μονάδα ποιούσης. ἀλλὰ περὶ γενέσεως

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being as the activity of being, since it is its life; and rest came in as well in substance itself; and still more is being same and other associated with these three classes, so that sameness and otherness also are seen together with them. But number is posterior to these classes and posterior to itself, and the posterior comes from the prior and numbers come one after another in order, and the posterior exist in the prior; so number could not be counted among the first genera; and we should enquire whether it is a genus at all. But magnitude is still more subsequent and composite; for it is number in this particular thing—and a line is some sort of two and a surface three. If then the continuous magnitude has its quantitateness from number, if number is not a genus how could this have [the status of a genus]? And there is prior and posterior also in magnitudes. But if it is common to both numbers and magnitudes to be quantitative, we must grasp what this [being quantitative] is and, when we have found it, posit it as a posterior genus, not among the primary genera; and if it is a genus not among the primary ones, it must be referred back to one of the primary genera or to one of those which go back to them. So it is perhaps clear that the nature of the quantum signifies a definite quantity and it measures how much each thing is and is itself a so much. But if definite quantity is common to number and magnitude, then either number is primary and magnitude comes from it, or number consists altogether in a mixture of movement and rest, but magnitude is a movement or derives from movement; movement goes forward into the indefinite, but rest in holding back what is going forward makes the unit. But we must consider later

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

ἀριθμοῦ καὶ μεγέθους, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑποστάσεως ὕστερον
καὶ ἐπινοίας θεωρητέον. τάχα γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς
πρώτοις γένεσι, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ὕστερον ἐν συνθέσει· καὶ
30 ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἐστώτων, τὸ δὲ μέγεθος ἐν κινήσει. ἀλλὰ
ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον, ὥς φαμεν.

14. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιού, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις; ἢ
ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ὕστερον καὶ μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. [δεῖ δὲ τὴν
οὐσίαν παρακολουθοῦντα ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν πρώτην, μὴ
ἐκ τούτων δὲ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν μηδὲ διὰ τούτων
5 συμπληροῦσθαι· ἢ εἴη ἂν ὑστέρα ποιότητος καὶ
ποσότητος.]¹ ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς συνθέταις οὐσίαις καὶ ἐκ
πολλῶν, ἐν αἷς καὶ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ ποσότητες² διαλλαγὴν
ἐποίησαν αὐτῶν, καὶ ποιότητες εἶεν ἂν καὶ κοινότης τις
ἐν αὐταῖς θεωρηθήσεται· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις γένεσι τὴν
10 διαίρεσιν οὐχ ἀπλῶν καὶ συνθέτων δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ'
ἀπλῶν καὶ τῶν τὴν οὐσίαν συμπληρούντων, οὐ τὴν τινὰ
οὐσίαν. [τὴν μὲν γὰρ τινὰ οὐσίαν συμπληροῦσθαι καὶ ἐκ
ποιότητος οὐδὲν ἴσως ἄτοπον, ἐχούσης ἤδη τὴν οὐσίαν
πρὸ τῆς ποιότητος, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ἔξωθεν, αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν
οὐσίαν ἃ ἔχει οὐσιώδη ἔχειν.]¹ καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις
15 ἡξιούμεν τὰ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας συμπληρωτικὰ ὁμωνύμως
ποιὰ εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἔξωθεν μετὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχοντα
ποιὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ
μετ' αὐτὰς ἤδη πάθη. νῦν δὲ λέγομεν οὐκ οὐσίας ὅλως
εἶναι συμπληρωτικὰ τὰ τῆς τινὸς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ οὐσίας
20 προσθήκη γίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος εἰς
οὐσίαν· ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐσία ἄνωθεν, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν διαφορὰν
ἐλθεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ζῶον ἤδη, πρὶν ἐπὶ τὸ λογικὸν ἦκειν.

¹ del. H-S² ut e Simpl. huc insertum (cf. Schwyzer, *Mus. Helv.* 26, 1969, 265).

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the coming into being of number and magnitude, or rather their real or notional existence. For perhaps number is among the first genera, but magnitude comes later in a composition; and number is of static things, but magnitude is in movement. But, as we say, we will discuss these questions later.

14. But as for the quale, why is it not among the primary genera? It is because this also is posterior and comes after substance. In composite substances, then, which are made up of many elements, and in which numbers and quantities produce their differentiation, there might also be qualities, and a certain common element will be discerned in them; but in the primary genera the distinction which must be made is not between simples and composites but between simples and those which make an essential contribution to substance, not to a particular substance. All the same, we did think it right to say elsewhere that the elements which contributed to the essential completion of substance were qualities only in name, but those which came from outside subsequent to substance were qualities [in the proper sense], and that those which were in substances were their activities, but those which came after them were already passive affections. But now we are saying that the elements of particular substance make no contribution at all to the completion of substance as such; for there is no substantial addition to the substance of man by reason of his being man; but he is substance at a higher level, before coming to the differentiation, as is also the living being before coming to the "reasonable".

² Rieth: ποιότητες Enn.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

15. Πῶς οὖν τὰ τέτταρα γένη συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν
οὕτω ποιὰν οὐσίαν ποιοῦντα; οὐδὲ γὰρ τινά. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
τὸ ὄν πρῶτον, εἴρηται, καὶ ὥς ἡ κίνησις οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο
οὐδ' ἡ στάσις οὐδὲ θάτερον οὐδὲ ταυτόν, δῆλον· καὶ ὅτι
5 οὐ ποιότητα ἐνεργάζεται ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, ἴσως μὲν
φανερὸν, λεχθὲν δὲ μᾶλλον ποιήσει σαφέστερον. εἰ γὰρ ἡ
κίνησις ἐνέργειά ἐστίν αὐτῆς, ἐνέργεια δὲ τὸ ὄν καὶ
ὅλως τὰ πρῶτα, οὐκ ἂν συμβεβηκὸς εἴη ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ'
ἐνέργεια οὐσα ἐνέργεια ὄντος οὐδ' ἂν συμπληρωτικὸν
10 ἔτι λέγοιτο, ἀλλ' αὕτη· ὥστε οὐκ ἐμβέβηκεν εἰς ὕστερόν
τι οὐδ' εἰς ποιότητα, ἀλλ'· εἰς τὸ ἅμα τέτακται. οὐ γὰρ
ἔστιν ὄν, εἴτα κεκίνηται, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὄν, εἴτα ἔστη· οὐδὲ
πάθος ἡ στάσις· καὶ ταυτόν δὲ καὶ θάτερον οὐχ ὕστερα,
ὅτι μὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο πολλά, ἀλλ' ἦν ὅπερ ἦν ἐν
15 πολλά· εἰ δὲ πολλά, καὶ ἐτερότης, καὶ εἰ ἐν πολλά, καὶ
ταυτότης. καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἀρκεῖ· ὅταν δὲ
μέλλῃ πρὸς τὰ κάτω προῖεναι, τότε ἄλλα, ἃ οὐκέτι
οὐσίαν ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ ποιὰν οὐσίαν καὶ ποσὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ
γινέσθω γένη οὐ πρῶτα.

16. Τὸ δὲ “πρὸς τι” παραφυάδι ἐοικὸς πῶς ἂν ἐν
πρώτοις; ἐτέρου γὰρ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ οὐ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ
σχέσις [καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο].¹ “ποῦ” δὲ καὶ “πότε” ἔτι
πόρρω. τό τε γὰρ “ποῦ” ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, ὥστε δύο· τὸ δὲ

¹ del. Hardey, Theiler.

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15. How then do the four genera contribute to the completion of substance when they do not yet make it a kind of substance? For they do not make it a particular substance. It has been said that being is primary, and it is clear that movement cannot be other [than primary], nor rest, nor other, nor same; and it is perhaps also obvious that this movement does not produce quality, but if we say something about this, it will perhaps be clearer. For if movement is the activity of substance, and being and the primary genera altogether are actively actual, movement could not be something incidental, but, being the activity of what is actively actual, could not any longer be called something which contributes to the completion of substance, but is substance itself: so that it has not entered some subsequent genus, not even quality, but is ranked as simultaneous. For being is not first being and then in movement, nor is it first being and then at rest; nor is rest a passive affection of it; and same and other do not come after it, because it did not become many afterwards, but was what it was, one-many; but if it is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is also sameness. And these are enough for its substance; but when it is going to proceed to the lower levels, then there are others, which no longer make substance, but qualified and quantified substance, and let us grant that these are non-primary genera.

16. But how could "relation", which is like a side-shoot, be among the first [genera]? For the state of being related is of one thing to another and not of a thing to itself. "Where" and "when" are still further away. For the "where" means one thing in another, so that there are two; but the genus must be one, and

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

- 5 γένος ἐν δεῖ εἶναι, οὐ σύνθεσιν· καὶ οὐδὲ τόπος ἐκεῖ· νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατ' ἀλήθειαν. ὃ τε χρόνος εἰ ἐκεῖ, σκεπτέον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως οὐ. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέτρον καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς μέτρον, ἀλλὰ κινήσεως, δύο καὶ σύνθετον τὸ ὅλον καὶ κινήσεως ὕστερον, ὥστε οὐχ ὅπου
- 10 κίνησις ἐν ἴσῃ διαιρέσει. τὸ δὲ “ποιεῖν” καὶ τὸ “πάσχειν” ἐν κινήσει, εἰ ἄρα ἐκεῖ τὸ πάσχειν· καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν δὲ δύο· ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ πάσχειν· οὐδέτερον οὖν ἀπλοῦν. καὶ τὸ “ἔχειν” δύο καὶ τὸ “κεῖσθαι” ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ οὕτως, ὥστε τρία.

17. Ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς; ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἦν δὴ λέγομεν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, καθ' ἧς οὐδὲν κατήγορεύεται, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς μὴ

5 ἔχοντες ἄλλως σημῆναι οὕτω λέγομεν, γένος οὐδενὸς ἂν εἶη. οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἄλλων λέγεται ἢ ἦν ἂν καθ' ὧν λέγεται ἕκαστον ἐκείνο λεγόμενον. καὶ πρὸ οὐσίας δὲ ἐκείνο, οὐκ ἐν οὐσίᾳ. εἰ δ' ὥς ποιὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅλως τὸ ποιὸν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις. τί οὖν ἢ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις οὐκ ἀγαθόν; ἢ

¹ A very curious and paradoxical kind of intelligible “place” does appear in V. 8.4. 15–19 (cp. VI. 7.31–33): but the intelligible *χώρα* there is very different from the Aristotelian *τόπος* here. Plotinus’ unwillingness to dismiss the question of time in the intelligible as summarily as he dismisses that of place should be noted. Perhaps he was already planning the work *On Eternity and Time* (III. 7 [45]), which follows VI, 1–3 immediately in Porphyry’s chronological order. There are passages in this and one or two elsewhere in the *Enneads* which anticipate and may have provided the starting-point for the doctrine of a higher time on the intelligible level in Iamblichus and his successors. See IV. 4 (28). 16. 13–16; VI. 7 (38). 1. 54–58; III.

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not a compound; and there is not any place in the intelligible world; but now we are speaking of the things which truly exist. And we must consider whether time is there; but it is more likely that it is not.¹ But if it is a "measure", and not just a measure, but a "measure of movement", there are two [components] and the whole is composite and posterior to movement, so that it is not where movement is in a division on the same level. But "acting" and "being affected" are in movement—if being affected is really in the intelligible world at all; and "acting" involves two; and so likewise does "being affected"; neither, therefore, is simple. And "having" implies two, and "position" means one thing in another, so that there are three.

17. But why are not the beautiful and the good and the virtues among the primary genera—and knowledge and intellect? As for the good, if it is the first, the nature which we certainly do call that of the good, of which nothing is predicated, but we call it this because we cannot indicate it in any other way, it could not be the genus of anything. For it is not predicated of other things, or each of the other things of which it was predicated would be spoken of as the good. And that good is before substance, not in substance. But if it is the good as a *quale*, the qualified in general is not among the primary gen-

7 (45). 7. 7–10; on anticipations of the later doctrine in the much-discussed chapter 11 of III. 7 see Peter Manchester "Time and the Soul in Plotinus III 7 [45] 11" in *Dionysius II*, 1978; for the later doctrine itself see S. Sambursky and S. Pines *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism* (a collection of passages with introduction and commentary), Jerusalem 1971.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

10 πρῶτον μὲν ἄλλως καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνως ὥς τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ
 ὥς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν οὐχ ὥς ποιόν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα ἔφαμεν γένη ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ διότι κοινόν τι ἦν
 ἕκαστον καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς ἑωρᾶτο, γένος. εἰ οὖν καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν ὁρᾶται ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τοῦ ὄντος
 ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς πλείστοις, διὰ τί οὐ γένος καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 15 πρῶτοις; ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς μέρεσιν οὐ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ
 πρῶτως καὶ δευτέρως καὶ ὑστέρως· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι θάτερον
 παρὰ θατέρου, τὸ ὕστερον παρὰ τοῦ προτέρου, ἢ ὅτι
 παρ' ἐνὸς πάντα τοῦ ἐπέκεινα, ἀλλὰ δ' ἄλλως κατὰ
 φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν μεταλαμβάνει. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ γένος
 20 ἐθέλει τις θέσθαι, ὕστερον· ὕστερον γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ
 τοῦ τί ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἂν αἰεὶ συνῇ, ἐκεῖνα δὲ
 ἦν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν καὶ εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὄν καὶ ἡ οὐσία
 οὐ δύναται μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἔχειν
 25 ταῦτα, ἡριθμημένα γένη, καὶ εἶναι ἐν πολλὰ. εἰ
 μέντοι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ὄντι—μὴ ὀκνοῖμεν
 λέγειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸ ἐν
 τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐκεῖθεν ἀγαθοειδὲς ἢ—
 ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθὸν τούτῳ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν· τοῦτο
 30 δὲ ἢ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο δὲ ἢ κίνησις, ἢ ἡδὴ ἐστὶν ἐν τι
 τῶν γενῶν.

18. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ, εἰ μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἢ πρώτη
 καλλονή, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν καὶ παραπλήσια λέγοιτο τοῖς ἐπὶ

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era. Well then, is the nature of being not good? First, it is so otherwise, and not in that way in which the first is; and the way in which it is good is not as a quale, but in itself. But we said that the other genera also were in themselves, and it was because it was something common and was seen in many things that it was a genus. If then the good is seen in each part of substance or of being, or in most of them, why is it not a genus, and among the primary ones? Now it is not the same in all the parts, but is present primarily and secondarily and subsequently: either because one good comes from another, the posterior from the prior, or because all come from the one transcendent Good, but different ones partake of it in different ways according to their own nature. But if someone does want to posit it also as a genus, it will be posterior; for a thing's being good is posterior to its being and its being something, even if it always accompanies them, but those [primary genera] belong to being as being and enter into substance. For that is the reason for the "beyond being",¹ since being and substance cannot help being many, but it must contain these, the genera we have counted up, and be one-many. But if the good is the one in being—let us not shrink from saying that its natural activity towards the One is its good, that it may be by it in the form of good—the good for being is its activity towards the Good; but this is its life; but this is movement, which is already one of the genera.

18. As for the beautiful, if the primary beauty is that [transcendent First], what could be said about it

¹ This is one of the clearest indications in Plotinus of how he understood the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας of Plato *Republic* 509B8; cp. V. 5.6. 5–13.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λόγοις· καὶ εἰ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ οἶον ἀποστίλβον, ὅτι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν πάσι, καὶ ὅτι ὕστερον τὸ
 5 ἐπιστίλβειν. εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ οὐσία αὐτή, ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἴρηται. εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ὁρῶντας τῷ τοιόνδε πάθος ποιεῖν ἐστι, τοῦτο τὸ ἐνεργεῖν κίνησις, καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἢ ἐνέργεια, κίνησις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτοκίνησις ὅψις οὖσα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξις· ὥστε καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τὴν κίνησιν,
 10 εἰ δὲ βούλει, ὑπὸ τὴν στάσιν, ἢ καὶ ὑπ' ἄμφω· εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω, ὡς μικτόν· εἰ τοῦτο, ὕστερον τὸ μικτόν. ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὃν νοοῦν καὶ σύνθετον ἐκ πάντων, οὐχ ἓν τι τῶν γενῶν· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς νοῦς ὃν μετὰ πάντων καὶ ἤδη πάντα τὰ ὄντα, τὸ δὲ ὃν [μόνον]¹ ψιλὸν εἰς γένος
 15 λαμβανόμενον στοιχεῖον αὐτοῦ. δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὅλως ἀρετὴ ἐνέργειαί τινες νοῦ πάσαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἐν πρώτοις καὶ ὕστερα γένος² καὶ εἶδη.

19. Γένη δὴ ὄντα τὰ τέτταρα ταῦτα καὶ πρῶτα ἀρα καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἶδη ποιεῖ; οἶον τὸ ὃν διαιροῖτο ἂν ἤδη ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ· ἐπειδὴ ἔξωθεν τοῦ γένους λαβεῖν δεῖ τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ εἶναι μὲν τοῦ

¹ *delevimus*, ut glossam ad ψιλόν.

² A (γένου A³⁸) EBxUC, Igal, H-S²: γένους A^{pc}, Kirchhoff.

¹ For the possibility of beauty being either the First or the Second Hypostasis cp. I, 6.9. 40–43. In the great work III, 8 (30)—V. 8 (31)—V. 5 (32)—II. 9 (33) beauty is firmly identified as on the level of οὐσία, the Second Hypostasis. V. 5. 12 brings out the difference between this and the First

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would be the same and similar to what was said about the Good; and if it is that which, one might say, shines out upon the Idea, [we could say that it is not the same in all] the Forms and that the shining upon them is posterior. But if the beautiful is nothing else but substance itself, it has been included in what was said about substance.¹ But if it is the beautiful in relation to us who see it by affecting us in this kind of way, this active actuality is movement, and if the activity is directed towards the transcendent, it is [still] movement. And knowledge is self-movement, since it is a sight of being and an active actuality, not a state; so that it also comes under movement—but, if you like, under rest, or under both; but if under both, it is as something mixed; and if so, the mixed is posterior. But Intellect, since it is being as intelligent and a composite of all [the genera], is not one of the genera; and the true Intellect is being with all its contents and already all beings, but being in isolation, taken as a genus, is an element of it. But righteousness and self-control and virtues in general are all particular activities of Intellect; so that they are not among the primary [genera] and genus and species [of virtue] are posterior.

19. Granted that these four are genera, and primary genera, does each of them by itself make species? Does being, for instance, already divide by itself without the others? No: since it must take its differentiations from outside the genus, and they are particularly sharply. For the "shining" of beauty on the Idea see VI. 7.21–22. Cp. my "Beauty and the Discovery of Divinity in the Thought of Plotinus" (*Plotinian and Christian Studies* XIX).

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5 ὄντος διαφορὰς ἢ ὄν, οὐ μέντοι τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτό.
 πόθεν οὖν ἔξει; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων. εἰ δὴ ἐξ
 ὄντων, ἦν δὲ τὰ γένη τὰ τρία τὰ λοιπά, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ
 τούτων καὶ μετὰ τούτων προστιθεμένων καὶ
 συνδυαζομένων καὶ ἅμα γινομένων. ἀλλὰ ἅμα γινόμενα
 10 τοῦτο δὴ ἐποίει τὸ ἐκ πάντων. πῶς οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶ
 μετὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων; καὶ πῶς γένη πάντα ὄντα εἶδη
 ποιεῖ; πῶς δὲ ἡ κίνησις εἶδη κινήσεως καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα; ἐπεὶ κακείνο δεῖ παραφυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ
 ἀφανίζοιτο ἕκαστον ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι, μὴθ' αὖ τὸ γένος
 κατηγορούμενον ἢ μόνον ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις θεωρούμενον,
 15 ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνοις ἅμα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μιγνύμενον αὐ
 καθαρὸν καὶ μὴ μιγνύμενον ὑπάρχει, μὴδ' ἄλλως
 συντελοῦν εἰς οὐσίαν αὐτὸ ἀπολλύη. περὶ μὲν δὴ τούτων
 σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔφαμεν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν ὄντων νοῦν
 εἶναι ἕκαστον, πρὸ δὲ πάντων ὡς εἰδῶν καὶ μερῶν τὸ ὄν
 20 καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τιθέμεθα νοῦν εἶναι, τὸν ἤδη νοῦν
 ὕστερον λέγομεν εἶναι. καὶ δὴ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν
 χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ποιησώμεθα καὶ οἶον
 παραδείγματι χρῆσάμενοι εἰς γνώσιν τῶν λεγομένων
 αὐτοὺς ἐμβιβάζωμεν.

20. Λάβωμεν οὖν τὸν μὲν εἶναι νοῦν οὐδὲν
 ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν ἐν μέρει οὐδ' ἐνεργούντα περὶ ὅτιοῦν,
 ἵνα μὴ τις νοῦς γίγνοιτο, ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν
 μέρει εἰδῶν, καὶ ἡ ἐν εἶδει δὲ ἐπιστήμη πρὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ
 5 μερῶν· πᾶσα μὲν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν μέρει δύναμις πάντων,

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differentiations of being as being, but the differentiations are not being itself. Where will it get them from, then? Certainly not from non-beings. But if it got them from being and the three remaining genera existed, it is clear that the differentiations arose from them and with them, applied to being and coupled with it and coming to be simultaneous with it. But by coming to be simultaneous with it they made what is composed of all. How then do the others exist along with that which is from all? And how if they are all genera do they make species? How does movement make species of movement, and rest, and the other ones? For we must be careful about this, that each genus does not disappear in its species, and that the genus is not only predicated as observed in them, but that it is both in the species and in itself, and must be at once mingled and pure and unmingled, and must not contribute uselessly to substance by destroying itself. We shall have to consider these questions. But since we asserted that what is composed of all beings is each individual intelligence, but posited that the being and substance prior to all as species and parts was Intellect, we are saying that Intellect as it is is posterior. Well then, let us make this difficulty profitable for our enquiry and by using it as a kind of example embark upon getting to understand what we are saying.

20. Let us then apprehend one Intellect which in no way applies itself to partial things and is not active about anything in particular, so that it may not become a particular intellect, like the knowledge before the specific partial forms of knowledge and the knowledge in specific form before the parts in it; for every body of knowledge is none of its partial

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- ἕκαστον δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐκείνο, καὶ δυνάμει δὲ πάντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς καθόλου ὡσαύτως· αἱ μὲν ἐν εἶδει, αἱ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ δυνάμει κείνται, αἱ δὴ τὸ ἐν εἶδει λαβοῦσαι, δυνάμει εἰσὶν ἡ ὅλῃ· κατηγορεῖται γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα, οὐ μόριον τῆς πάσης· αὐτὴν γε μὴν δεῖ ἀκέραιον ἐφ' αὐτῆς εἶναι. οὕτω
- 10 δὴ ἄλλως μὲν νοῦν τὸν ξύμπαντα εἰπεῖν εἶναι, τὸν πρὸ τῶν καθέκαστον ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντων, ἄλλως δὲ νοῦς ἐκάστους,¹ τοὺς μὲν ἐν μέρει ἐκ πάντων πληρωθέντας, τὸν δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι νοῦν χορηγὸν μὲν τοῖς καθέκαστα, δύναμιν δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν ἐν τῷ καθόλου
- 15 ἐκείνους, ἐκείνους τε αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐν μέρει οὖσιν ἔχειν τὸν καθόλου, ὡς ἡ τις ἐπιστήμη τὴν ἐπιστήμην. καὶ εἶναι καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν τὸν μέγαν νοῦν καὶ ἐκάστους αὖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντας, καὶ ἐμπεριέχεσθαι αὖ τοὺς ἐν μέρει τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τοῖς ἐν μέρει, ἐκάστους ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ
- 20 ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκείνον καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῳ μὲν πάντας ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὄντι δυνάμει, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντι τὰ πάντα ἅμα, δυνάμει δὲ ἕκαστον χωρὶς, τοὺς δ' αὖ ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ὅ εἰσι, δυνάμει δὲ τὸ ὅλον. καθόσον μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο ὃ λέγονταί εἰσιν, ἐνεργείᾳ εἰσὶν ἐκείνο ὃ
- 25 λέγονται· ἢ δ' ἐν γένει ἐκείνο, δυνάμει ἐκείνο. ὃ δ' αὖ, ἢ μὲν γένος, δύναμις πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ εἰδῶν καὶ

¹ νοῦς ἐκάστους Igal, H-S²: ἐκ δὲ ἐκάστους A (exp. et in mg. scr. aliter ἐκάστου ἐκάστους δὲ A³) EBR^{ac}CU (δε): ἐκδεεκάστους J: ἐκάστους, ἐκάστους δὲ Creuzer: ἐκάστους R^{pc}, Kirchhoff.

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contents but the potentiality of all of them, but each part is actually that part which it is, and potentially all of them, and the same is true of universal knowledge: the specific bodies of knowledge, which lie potentially in the whole, those, that is, which grasp the specific contents, are potentially the whole; for the whole is predicated of them, not a part of the whole; yet it must certainly be pure and independent. Thus we can certainly say that universal Intellect exists in one way—that is the one before those which are actually the particular intellects—and particular intellects in another, those which are partial and fulfilled from all things; but the Intellect over all of them directs the particular intellects, but is their potentiality and contains them in its universality; and they on the other hand in their partial selves contain the universal Intellect, as a particular body of knowledge contains knowledge. And [we can say that] the great Intellect exists by itself, and so do the particular intellects which are in themselves, and again that the partial intellects are comprehended in the whole and the whole in the partial; the particular ones are on their own and in another, and that great Intellect is on its own and in those particular; and all are potentially in that Intellect which is on its own, which is actually all things at once, but potentially each particular separately, and the particular intellects are actually what they are, but potentially the whole. For in so far as they are this which they are called, they are actually that which they are called; but in that they are generically that whole, they are potentially that whole. And it again, in that it is the genus, is the potentiality of all the species under it and none of

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

οὐδὲν ἐνεργεῖα ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἡσυχᾷ· ἢ δὲ ὅ ἐστι πρὸ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐνεργεῖα, τῶν οὐ καθέκαστα. δεῖ δὴ, εἴπερ ἐνεργεῖα ἔσσονται οἱ ἐν εἶδει, τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι.

21. Πῶς οὖν μένων αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ἐν μέρει ποιεῖ; τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν πῶς ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων ἐκείνων τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφεξῆς. ὅρα τοίνυν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ νῷ καὶ ἀμηχάνῳ, οὐ πολυλάλῳ ἀλλὰ πολύνῳ νῷ τῷ πάντα
 5 νῷ καὶ ὄλῳ καὶ οὐ μέρει οὐδὲ τινὶ νῷ, ὅπως ἔνι τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ἀριθμὸν δὴ πάντως ἔχει ἐν τούτοις οἷς ὀρᾷ, καὶ ἔστι δὲ ἐν καὶ πολλά, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ δυνάμεις καὶ θαυμασταὶ δυνάμεις οὐκ ἀσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἅτε καθαραὶ οὔσαι μέγισταί εἰσι καὶ οἶον σφριγῶσαι καὶ ἀληθῶς
 10 δυνάμεις, οὐ τὸ μέχρι τινὸς ἔχουσαι· ἄπειροι τοίνυν καὶ ἀπειρία καὶ τὸ μέγα. τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ μέγα σὺν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ καλῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτὸ ἀγλαΐᾳ καὶ τῷ φωτὶ ὥς ἐν νῷ ὄντα ἰδὼν ὀρᾷς καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἤδη ἐπανθοῦν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ συνεχοῦς τῆς ἐνεργείας μέγεθος
 15 προφαινόμενον τῇ σῇ προσβολῇ ἐν ἡσυχῳ κείμενον, ἐνὸς δὲ καὶ δύο ὄντων καὶ τριῶν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τριπτόν ὄν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν πᾶν. τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ ἐνορωμένου καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ἄμφω εἰς ἐν ἰόντων καὶ οἶον γινομένων καὶ σχῆμα ὅρα. εἰσπίπτοντος δὲ τοῦ θατέρου καὶ διαιροῦντος καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν σχημάτων τε
 20 διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητος ἄλλαι. καὶ ταυτότης μὲν

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them in actuality, but all rest quietly in it; but in that it is actually what it is before the species, it belongs to the non-particulars. But certainly, if the intellects in specific form are going to exist, the activity proceeding from universal Intellect must be the cause.

21. How then does Intellect itself, remaining one in its essential structure, produce the partial beings? This is the same [as asking] how from those four primary genera the things which we call subsequent proceed. Well then, see how in this great, this overwhelming Intellect, not full of talk but full of intelligence, this Intellect which is all things and a whole, not a partial or particular intellect, all things which come from it are present. It certainly has number in the things which it sees, and it is one and many, and the many are its powers, wonderful powers, not weak but because they are pure the greatest of powers, fresh and full of life, we may say, and truly powers, without any limit to their action: so they are infinite, and infinity [is there] and greatness. Then when you see existing in it in the way proper to Intellect this greatness, along with the beauty that there is in it of its substance and the glory and the light around it, you see quality also, already in flower on it; and with the continuity of its activity you see magnitude, quietly at rest, appearing to your gaze; there are one and two and three, magnitude and all that is quantitative being the third. And when you see quantity and quality in it, both tending to one and in a way becoming one, then observe figure also appearing. Then otherness tumbles in and separates quantity and quality, and there are differences of figures and other qualities. And

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

συνοῦσα ἰσότητα ποιεῖ εἶναι, ἑτερότης δὲ ἀνισότητα ἐν
 ποσῷ ἐν τε ἀριθμῷ ἐν τε μεγέθει, ἐξ ὧν καὶ κύκλους καὶ
 τετράγωνα καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀνίσων σχήματα, ἀριθμούς τε
 ὁμοίους καὶ ἀνομοίους, περιττούς τε καὶ ἀρτίους. οὐσα
 25 γὰρ ἔννοους ζωὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἀτελής οὐδὲν
 παραλείπει ὧν εὐρίσκομεν νῦν νοερὸν ἔργον ὄν, ἀλλὰ
 πάντα ἔχει ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς δυνάμει ὄντα αὐτὰ ἔχουσα ὡς ἂν
 νοὺς ἔχοι. ἔχει δὲ νοὺς ὡς ἐν νοήσει, νοήσει δὲ οὐ τῇ ἐν
 διεξόδῳ· παραλέλειπται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα λόγοι, ἀλλ'
 30 ἔστιν εἰς οἶον λόγος, μέγας, τέλειος, πάντας περιέχων,
 ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων αὐτοῦ ἐπεξιῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀεὶ
 ἐπεξελθὼν, ὥστε μηδέποτε τὸ ἐπεξιέναι ἀληθὲς εἶναι.
 ὅλως γὰρ πανταχοῦ, ὅσα ἂν τις ἐκ λογισμοῦ λάβοι ἐν τῇ
 φύσει ὄντα, ταῦτα εὐρήσει ἐν νῷ ἄνευ λογισμοῦ ὄντα,
 ὥστε νομίζειν τὸ ὄν νοῦν λελογισμένον οὕτω ποιῆσαι,
 35 οἶον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν τὰ ζῶα ποιούντων· ὡς γὰρ
 ἂν ὁ ἀκριβέστατος λογισμὸς λογίσαιτο ὡς ἄριστα,
 οὕτως ἔχει πάντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πρὸ λογισμοῦ οὐσι. τί
 χρή προσδοκᾶν ἐν τοῖς <ἀνωτέρω>¹ πρὸ φύσεως καὶ
 τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ [ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω]² εἶναι; ἐν οἷς
 40 γὰρ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ νοὺς, καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτὸν οὔτε τὸ
 ὄν αὐτοῖς οὔτε ὁ νοὺς, ἀμογητὶ <πάν>¹ ἂν εἴῃ ἄριστα
 ἔχον, εἴπερ κατὰ νοῦν κείσεται, καὶ τοῦτο ὄν, ὃ θέλει
 νοὺς καὶ ἔστι· διὸ καὶ ἀληθινὸν καὶ πρῶτον· εἰ γὰρ παρ'
 ἄλλου, ἐκείνο νοὺς. σχημάτων δὴ πάντων ὀφθέντων ἐν

¹ Igal, H-S².

² del. H-S: ἐν τοῖς del. Müller.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

sameness, which is there as well, makes equality exist, and otherness, inequality, in quantity, number and magnitude, and from these derive circles and squares and figures with unequal sides, and like and unlike numbers, and odd and even. For since its life is intelligent and its activity without imperfection, it leaves out none of the things which we now find to be works of intelligence, possessing them as realities and in the manner proper to Intellect. Intellect possesses them as in thought, but not the discursive kind of thought; but nothing is left out of all the things of which there are intelligible forming principles, but Intellect is like one great complete intelligible principle embracing them all, and it goes through them starting from its own first principles, or rather it has always gone through them, so that it is never true that it is going through them. For in general everywhere, whatever one might apprehend by reasoning as being in nature one will find existing without reasoning in Intellect, so as to think that Intellect has made being as it is after reasoning—it is like the rational forming principles which make living beings: for as the most accurate reasoning would calculate was best, so are all things in the rational principles before reasoning. What, then, should one expect in the higher principles before nature and the principles in it? For in those of which the substance is nothing else than Intellect, and neither being nor intellect is brought to them from outside, there would be no trouble about everything being for the best, if it is disposed according to Intellect and is what Intellect wills and is; therefore it is true and primary: for if it came from another, that other would be Intellect. Now all figures have

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

45 τῷ ὄντι καὶ ποιότητος ἀπάσης—ἦν γὰρ οὐ τις· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ἦν εἶναι μίαν τῆς θατέρου φύσεως ἐνούσης, ἀλλὰ μία καὶ
 πολλαί· καὶ γὰρ ταυτότης ἦν· ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλά, καὶ ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ὥστε ἐν πᾶσιν εἶδеси τὸ ἐν καὶ
 πολλά· μεγέθη δὴ διάφορα καὶ σχήματα διάφορα καὶ
 ποιότητες διάφοροι· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέ θεμιτὸν ἦν
 50 παραλελείφθαι οὐδέν· τέλειον γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὸ πᾶν ἢ οὐκ ἂν
 ἦν πᾶν—καὶ ζωῆς ἐπιθεούσης, μᾶλλον δὲ συνούσης
 πανταχοῦ, πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῶα ἐγίνετο, καὶ ἦν καὶ
 σώματα ὕλης καὶ ποιότητος ὄντων. γενομένων δὲ
 πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ μενόντων· καὶ ἐν τῷ εἶναι αἰῶνι
 55 περιληφθέντων, χωρὶς μὲν ἕκαστον ὃ ἐστὶν ὄντων, ὁμοῦ
 δ' αὖ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντων, ἢ πάντων ἐν ἐνὶ ὄντων οἶον συμπλοκὴ
 καὶ σύνθεσις νοῦς ἐστι. καὶ ἔχων μὲν τὰ ὄντα ἐν αὐτῷ
 ζῶόν ἐστι παντελὲς καὶ ὃ ἐστι ζῶον, τῷ
 δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὄντι παρέχων ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶσθαι νοητὸν
 γενόμενος ἐκεῖ νῶ¹ δίδωσιν ὁρθῶς λέγεσθαι.

22. Καὶ ἡνιγμένως Πλάτωνι τὸ ἡπεροῦν νοῦς
 ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῷ παντελεῖ ζῶω οἷαί
 τε εἵνεσι καὶ ὅσαι καθορᾷ. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ
 μετὰ νοῦν, καθόσον ψυχὴ ἔχουσα ἐν αὐτῇ, ἐν τῷ πρὸ
 5 αὐτῆς βέλτιον καθορᾷ· καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν ἔχων ἐν τῷ πρὸ
 αὐτοῦ βέλτιον καθορᾷ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ καθορᾷ μόνον, ἐν

¹ Igal: ἐκείνῳ BxUC, H-S: ἐκείνων w.

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been seen in being and all quality—not a particular quality; for it could not be one since the nature of the other is there, but one and many; for sameness is there also: one and many, and being is like this from the beginning, so that the one and many is in all its specific forms; magnitudes are various and figures various and qualities various; for it was not possible or lawful for anything to be left out; for the intelligible All is complete, or it would not be the All—and since life is running over it, or rather everywhere accompanying it, all things necessarily become living beings, and there are bodies there also since there is matter and quality. Since all things eternally come into being and eternally abide, and are in eternity comprehended in being, each of them being what it is and all again being in one, the complex and construction, as we may put it, of all in one is Intellect. And since it has the real beings in itself it is a “complete” living being and “the absolute living being”¹; but by giving itself to that which comes from it to behold, by becoming intelligible, it allows the transcendent Intellect to be rightly so called.²

22. And Plato speaks riddlingly of “the way in which Intellect sees the Ideas in the complete living creature [observing] of what kind they are and how many they are”. For Soul too, which comes after Intellect, though in so far as it is Soul it has [the Forms] in itself, sees them better in that which is before it; and our intellect, though it has them, sees them better in that which is before it; for in itself it

¹ Plato *Timaeus* 31B1 and 39E7–9.

² I adopt here Igal's ἐκεῖ νῶ for ἐκεῖνῶ, a very small change which gives a clearer sense.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

- δὲ τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ καθορᾷ ὅτι καθορᾷ. ὁ δὲ νοὺς οὗτος, ὃν φάμεν καθορᾷν, οὐκ ἀπαλλαγείς τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὦν, ἅτε ὦν ἐξ ἑνὸς πολλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ θατέρου
- 10 φύσιν συνοῦσαν ἔχων, εἰς πολλὰ γίνεται. εἰς δὲ νοὺς καὶ πολλὰ ὦν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς νοὺς ποιεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῆς τοιαύτης. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ λαβεῖν καὶ ἄτομον· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν λάβῃς, εἶδος· ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο αἰνιττόμενος ὁ Πλάτων εἰς ἅπειρά φησι κατακερματίζεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν. ἔως μὲν
- 15 γὰρ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος, οἶον ἐκ γένους, οὐπω ἅπειρον· περατοῦται γὰρ τοῖς γεννηθείσιν εἶδεσι· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον εἶδος ὃ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς εἶδη, μᾶλλον ἅπειρον. καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τότε δὲ ἦδη εἰς τὸ ἅπειρον μεθέντα ἔαν χαίρειν. ἀλλ' ὅσον μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς,
- 20 ἅπειρα· τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ περιληφθέντα εἰς ἀριθμὸν ἔρχεται ἦδη. νοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἐν ἀριθμῷ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴν μέχρι τοῦ ἐσχάτου αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς ἦδη ἅπειρον παντάπασιν. καὶ ἔστι νοὺς μὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος μέρος, καίπερ τὰ πάντα ἔχων καὶ ὁ πᾶς,
- 25 †καὶ οἱ αὐτοῦ μέρη ἐνεργεῖα ὄντος αὐτοῦ ὄντες μέρος,† ψυχὴ δὲ μέρος μέρους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖα ἐξ αὐτοῦ. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖ, τὰ ἐνεργούμενα οἱ ἄλλοι νοῖ, ὅτε δὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ψυχὴ. ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνεργούσης ὡς γένους ἢ εἶδους αἱ ἄλλαι ψυχαὶ ὡς εἶδη. καὶ τούτων αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι
- 30 διτταί· ἡ μὲν πρὸς τὸ ἄνω νοὺς, ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ κάτω αἱ

¹ Plato *Parmenides* 144B4-C1.

² Plato *Philebus* 16E1-2.

³ No satisfactory sense can be extracted either from

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only sees, but in what is before it it also sees that it sees. Now this intellect of ours, which, we maintain, sees, is not separated from that before it, as it derives from it, and because it is many from one and has the nature of the other accompanying it, it becomes one-many. But the one Intellect, since it is also many, makes the many intellects as well by a necessity of this kind. But in general it is not possible to apprehend the numerical one and the individual; for whatever you apprehend is specific form; for it is without matter. So Plato makes this cryptic remark also, that "substance is cut up to infinity".¹ For as long as the division, of a genus for instance, arrives at another form, it is not yet infinite; for it is limited by the forms which have been generated; but the ultimate form which is not divided into forms is more infinite. This is the meaning of "at this point to let them go into the infinite and say goodbye to them".² But as far as they are on their own, they are infinite; but as soon as they are comprehended by the one they arrive at number. So then Intellect holds the soul which comes after it so that it is in number, and holds soul down to its last part, but its last part is altogether infinite. And an intellect of this kind is a part, although it contains all things, and the whole intellect . . . but soul is a part of a part, but like an activity proceeding from it.³ For when it is active in itself, the products of its activity are the other intellects, but when it acts outside itself, the product is Soul. And since Soul acts as genus or specific form, the other souls act as specific forms. And the activities of these are double: that which is directed above Kirchhoff's text or that printed by Henry and Schwyzer in their first edition.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 2.

ἄλλαι δυνάμεις κατὰ λόγον, ἡ δὲ ἐσχάτη ὕλης ἥδη
 ἐφαπτομένη καὶ μορφοῦσα. καὶ τὸ κάτω αὐτῆς τὸ ἄλλο
 πᾶν οὐ κωλύει εἶναι ἄνω. ἡ καὶ τὸ κάτω λεγόμενον
 αὐτῆς ἰνδαλμά ἐστιν αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀποτετμημένον δέ, ἀλλ'
 35 ὥς τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παρῇ
 ἔξω. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν, πῶς τὸ ἔξω. καὶ μέχρι τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ
 εἰδώλου ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος ἅπας τέλεος ἐκ πάντων
 νοητῶν, ὥσπερ ὅδε μίμημα ὦν ἐκείνου, καθόσον οἶόν τε
 ἀποσώζειν εἰκόνα ζῶου ζῶον αὐτό, ὥς τὸ γεγραμμένον
 40 ἡ τὸ ἐν ὕδατι φάντασμα τοῦ πρὸ ὕδατος καὶ γραφῆς
 δοκοῦντος εἶναι. τὸ δὲ μίμημα τὸ ἐν γραφῇ καὶ ὕδατι οὐ
 τοῦ συναμφοτέρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου τοῦ μορφωθέντος
 ὑπὸ θατέρου. νοητοῦ τοίνυν εἰκὼν ἔχουσα ἰνδάλματα
 οὐ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, ἀλλὰ τῶν περιεχομένων ἐν τῷ
 45 πεποιηκότι, ὧν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ζῶον· ζῶον
 δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, ἄλλως ἑκάτερον καὶ
 ἄμφω ἐν νοητῷ.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING II

is intellect, that which is directed below is the other powers in proportion and order; the last of them is already grasping and shaping matter. And its underpart does not prevent all the rest from being above. Or rather, what we call its underpart is an image of it, but not cut off, but like images in mirrors, [which last] while the archetype is present outside. But one must understand what "outside" means. And as far as that which is before the image [extends] the total intelligible universe, completed from all intelligibles, like this universe here below, which is an image of that one, as far as it is possible for an image of the Living Being to preserve the Living Being itself, as a drawing or a reflection in water is the ghostly image of that which appears to be there before the water and the drawing. But the image in the drawing and the water is not of the composite, but of the one formed by the other. So then the image of the intelligible is not of its maker but of the things contained in the maker, which include man and every other living being: this here is a living being and so is that which made it, each in a different sense and both in the intelligible.

VI. 3. (44) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ

1. Περὶ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ὅπη δοκεῖ, καὶ ὡς συμφώνως
ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαν, εἴρηται. δεῖ δὲ
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐτέρας φύσεως ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερα τὰ
αὐτὰ γένη θετέον, ἅπερ καὶ ἐθέμεθα, ἢ πλείω ἐνταῦθα
5 πρὸς ἐκείνοις ἄλλα τιθέντας ἢ ὅλως ἕτερα, ἢ τὰ μὲν ὡς
ἐκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄλλως. δεῖ μέντοι τὸ “ταῦτά” ἀναλογίᾳ καὶ
ὁμωνυμίᾳ λαμβάνειν· τοῦτο δὲ φανήσεται γνωσθέντων.
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἡμῖν ἦδε· ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὁ λόγος
ἡμῖν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ περιείληπται,
10 περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη [ζητεῖν διαιροῦντας]¹
τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐστι <ζητεῖν>¹ διαιροῦντας
κατὰ γένη θεῖναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν φωνὴν διηρούμεθα
ἀπὲρ οὐσαν εἰς ὠρισμένα ἀνάγοντες τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς
ταῦτόν εἰς ἓν, εἴτα πάλιν ἄλλο καὶ ἕτερον αὐτῷ, ἕως
εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα θέντες ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς
15 ἀτόμοις εἶδος λέγοντες, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι γένος. τὸ
μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ἕκαστον εἶδος καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα

¹ H-S².

VI. 3. ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

1. We have explained the way in which we think about substance and how it might accord with the thought of Plato. But we must also enquire about the other nature, whether we should posit the same genera which we posited in the intelligible, or more here below, adding others to those, or altogether different ones, or some as they were there but others otherwise. We must of course understand "the same" [genera] analogously and ambiguously: this will become obvious when we have got to know them. Our starting-point is this: since our discussion is about sense-objects and every sense-object is included in this universe of ours, it will be necessary in considering the universe to seek to divide its nature and distinguish its elements and arrange them by genera: as if we were to divide articulate sound,¹ which is unlimited, into limited sections by bringing back to one what is the same in many, and then to another one and again a different one, until we have brought each and every one of them into a definite number, calling the one under which individuals are classed a species, and the one under which species are classed a genus. Now in the case of articulate sound each and every species and all of them which

¹ This passage on the collection and division of sounds corresponds closely to Plato *Philebus* 17B-18C.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

τὰ φανέντα εἰς ἓν ἦν ἀνάγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν πάντων
στοιχείον ἢ φωνήν· ἐπὶ δὲ ὧν ζητοῦμεν οὐχ οἶόν
τε, ὡς δέδεικται. διὸ δεῖ πλείω γένη ζητεῖν, καὶ ἐν
20 τῷδε τῷ παντὶ ἕτερα ἐκείνων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἕτερον τοῦτο
ἐκείνου καὶ οὐ συνώνυμον, ὁμώνυμον δὲ καὶ εἰκόν.
ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν τῷ μίγματι καὶ ἐν τῇ
συνθέσει τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ψυχὴ—ζῶον γὰρ τὸ
πᾶν—ἢ δὲ ψυχῆς φύσις ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ νοητῷ καὶ
οὐδ' ἀρμόσει οὐδ' εἰς οὐσίας τῆς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένης
25 σύνταξιν, ἀφοριστέον, εἰ καὶ χαλεπῶς, ὅμως μὴν τῆς
ἐνταῦθα πραγματείας, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις βουλόμενος τοὺς
πολίτας συντάξαι πόλεώς τινος, οἶον κατὰ τιμήσεις ἢ
τέχνας, τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας ξένους παραλίποι χωρίς.
περὶ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων, ὅσα μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἢ
30 διὰ τὸ σῶμα περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαίνει, περὶ τούτων
ἐπισκεπτέον ὕστερον, ὅπως τακτέον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
ἐνταῦθα ζητῶμεν.

2. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας
θεωρητέον συγχωροῦντας τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα φύσιν
ὁμωνύμως ἢ οὐδὲ ὅλως οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐφαρμόττειν τὴν
ἐννοίαν ρεόντων, ἀλλὰ γένεσιν οἰκείως λέγεσθαι. εἴτα
5 τῆς γενέσεως τὰ μὲν τοιά, τὰ δὲ τοιά· καὶ τὰ μὲν
σώματα εἰς ἓν, τὰ τε ἀπλᾶ τὰ τε σύνθετα, τὰ δὲ
συμβεβηκότα ἢ παρακολουθοῦντα, διαιροῦντας ἀπ'

¹ In VI. 1. 6 and 25.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

have been discovered can be brought back to one, and we can predicate "letter" or "sound" of all; but in the case of the things we are investigating this is not possible, as has been shown.¹ Therefore we must look for more genera, and different ones in this All from those in the intelligible, since this All is different from that and it is not called the All in the same sense but in a different one, and is an image. But since here below also in the mixture and composition one element is body and the other soul—for the All is a living thing—and the nature of soul is in that intelligible All and will not fit into the classification of what is called substance here below, we must, even if it is difficult to do so, all the same leave soul out of the investigation in which we are at present occupied; just as if someone wishing to classify the citizens of a city, by their property assessments or skills for instance, left the resident foreigners out of account. But as regards the affections, which occur in soul with the body or because of the body, we must consider later how they are to be classed, when we are enquiring about things here below.

2. And first of all we should consider what is called substance, agreeing that the nature in the sphere of bodies can only be called substance ambiguously, or should not properly be called substance at all but coming into being, because it is adapted to the idea of things in flux. Then some of the things which belong to coming into being are of this kind, and some of that: there are bodies; these, both simple and composite, we put into one class; and then there are incidentals and consequentials, and these we should also distinguish from each

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ἀλλήλων καὶ ταῦτα. ἢ τὸ μὲν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐπ' αὐτῇ,
καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον ὡς γένος ἢ ὑφ' ἐν ἄμφω, ὡς οὐσίαν
10 ἐκάτερον ὁμωνύμως ἢ γένεσιν. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ
ὕλης καὶ εἶδους; πῶς δὲ γένος ἢ ὕλη καὶ τίνων; τίς γὰρ
διαφορὰ ὕλης; ἐν τίνι δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τακτέον; εἰ δὲ τὸ
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἴη αὐτὸ ἢ σωματικὴ οὐσία, ἐκείνων δὲ
ἐκάτερον οὐ σῶμα, πῶς ἂν ἐν ἐνὶ τάττοιτο καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ
μετὰ τοῦ συνθέτου; πῶς δ' ἂν τὰ στοιχεῖά τινος μετ'
15 αὐτοῦ; εἰ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἀρχοίμεθα, ἀρχοίμεθ' ἂν
ἀπὸ συλλαβῶν. διὰ τί δὲ οὐκ ἀνάλογον, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατὰ
ταῦτα ἢ διαίρεσις, λέγοιμεν ἂν ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος
ἐνταῦθα τὴν ὕλην, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖ κινήσεως ἐνταῦθα τὸ
εἶδος, οἷον ζωὴν τινα καὶ τελείωσιν τῆς ὕλης, τῆς δὲ
20 ὕλης τὴν οὐκ ἔκστασιν κατὰ τὴν στάσιν, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν
καὶ θάτερον οὔσης καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐτερότητας πολλῆς καὶ
ἀνομοιότητος μᾶλλον; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ὕλη οὐχ οὕτως
ἔχει καὶ λαμβάνει τὸ εἶδος ὡς ζωὴν αὐτῆς οὐδὲ
ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἔπεισιν ἀλλαχόθεν οὐκ ὄν τι
25 ἐκείνης. εἴτα ἐκεῖ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργεια καὶ κίνησις, ἐνταῦθα
δὲ ἢ κίνησις ἄλλο καὶ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ εἶδος στάσις
αὐτῆς μᾶλλον καὶ οἷον ἡσυχία· ὀρίζει γὰρ ἀόριστον
οὔσαν. τό τε ταῦτόν ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἐνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

other. Or there is one thing which is matter, and another which is the form upon it, and either each as a genus is separate or both fall under one genus, being each of them substance in the ambiguous sense or coming into being. But what is the common factor of matter and form? And how can matter be a genus, and a genus of what? For what essential differentiation is there belonging to matter? But in what genus is the product of both to be ranked? If the product of both is itself bodily substance, and each of them is not body, how could they be ranked in one and the same genus with the composite? And how could the elements¹ of a thing be ranked with the thing itself? But if we were to start with bodies, we should be starting with syllables. But why should we not say analogously, even if the division is not on the same lines, that instead of being in the intelligible there is matter here below, and instead of the intelligible movement there is form here below, a kind of life and perfection of matter, and that matter's not going out of itself corresponds to rest, and that there are sameness and otherness, since there is plenty of otherness, or rather unlikeness, here below? Now, first of all, matter does not hold or grasp form as its life or its activity, but form comes upon it from elsewhere and is not one of matter's possessions. Then, in the intelligible the form is activity and motion, but here below motion is something else and an incidental; but form is rather matter's rest and a kind of quietness: for it limits matter which is unlimited. And in the intelligible sameness and otherness belong to one thing, which

¹ Or "letters": cp. ch. 1, 18.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

καὶ ἑτέρου ὄντος, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἕτερον μεταλήψει, καὶ
30 πρὸς ἄλλο, καὶ τι ταῦτόν καὶ ἕτερον, οὐδ' ὥς ἐκεῖ εἴη ἄν
τι ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις τι ταῦτόν καὶ τι ἕτερον. στάσις δὲ
τῆς ὕλης πῶς ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλκομένης μεγέθη καὶ ἔξωθεν
τὰς μορφὰς καὶ οὐκ αὐτάρκους ἑαυτῇ μετὰ τούτων τὰ
ἄλλα γεννᾶν; ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀφετέον.

3. Πῶς δέ, λέγωμεν· ἔστι δὴ πρῶτον οὕτως, τὸ μὲν
ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ μικτόν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὰ δὲ περὶ
ταῦτα· τῶν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὰ μὲν κατηγορούμενα μόνον,
τὰ δὲ καὶ συμβεβηκότα· τῶν δὲ συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν
5 ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα
αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα. καὶ τὴν
μὲν ὕλην κοινὸν μὲν καὶ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς οὐσίαις, οὐ μὴν
γένος, ὅτι μηδὲ διαφορὰς ἔχει, εἰ μὴ τις τὰς διαφορὰς
κατὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν πυρίνην, τὴν δὲ τὴν ἀέρος μορφήν
10 ἔχειν. εἰ δέ τις ἀρκοῖτο τῷ κοινῷ τῷ ἐν πᾶσιν οἷς ἐστὶν
ὕλην εἶναι, ἢ ὥς ὅλον πρὸς μέρη, ἄλλως γένος ἂν εἴη·
καὶ στοιχείον δὲ ἐν τούτῳ δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ στοιχείου
γένους εἶναι. τὸ δὲ εἶδος προσκειμένου τοῦ “περὶ ὕλην”
ἢ “ἐν ὕλῃ” τῶν μὲν ἄλλων εἰδῶν χωρίζει, οὐ μὴν
15 περιλαμβάνει πᾶν εἶδος οὐσιῶδες. εἰ δὲ εἶδος λέγομεν τὸ

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is both same and other, but here below a thing is other by participation and in relation to something else, and the same and other is some particular same and other, not as it might be in the intelligible but a particular same and a particular other which is something among the things which come later. But how can there be a rest of matter when it is being pulled into all sizes and gets its shapes from outside and is not sufficient in itself to generate the other things with these shapes? We must therefore reject this division.

3. But let us explain how we should divide; this is the way to begin with: it is one thing to be matter, another to be form, another to be the composite of both, and another to be the peripheral characteristics; and of these peripheral characteristics, some are only predicated, some are also incidental; and of the incidentals some are in these three [, matter, form and composite], but in other cases these three are in the incidentals; others are their activities, others their passive affections, and others consequences. And matter is common and in all the substances, but is certainly not a genus, because it has no essential differences, unless one understood the differences as one part having a fiery shape and one the shape of air. But if one was satisfied with what is common, that there is matter in all existing things, or that it is like a whole in relation to parts, it would be a genus in another sense; and this would be one element, and an element can be a genus. But the form, with the addition "about matter" or "in matter", separates from the other forms, but does not include all substantial form. But if we mean by form that which makes substance, and by rational forma-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ποιητικὸν οὐσίας καὶ λόγον τὸν οὐσιώδη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, οὕτω τὴν οὐσίαν εἵπομεν πῶς δεῖ λαμβάνειν. τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν εἰ τοῦτο μόνον οὐσίαν, ἐκεῖνα οὐκ οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ κἀκεῖνα καὶ τοῦτο, τί τὸ κοινὸν σκεπτέον. τὰ δὲ
 20 κατηγορούμενα μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι ἂν εἴη, οἶον αἷτιον εἶναι, στοιχεῖον εἶναι. τῶν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκότων τὸ μὲν ποσὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν εἶναι, ἃ ἐν αὐτοῖς· τὰ δ' αὐτὰ ἐν ἐκείνοις ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργήματα αὐτῶν καὶ πάθη ὡς κινήσεις, τὰ δὲ παρακολουθήματα ὡς τόπος καὶ χρόνος, ὃ μὲν τῶν συνθέτων, ὃ δὲ τῆς
 25 κινήσεως ὁ χρόνος. καὶ τὰ μὲν τρία εἰς ἓν, <εἰ>¹ εὖροιμεν κοινόν τι τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὁμώνυμον οὐσίαν· εἰτα τὰ ἄλλα ἐφεξῆς, πρὸς τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, ἐν τόπῳ, ἐν χρόνῳ, κίνησις, τόπος, χρόνος. ἢ λειφθέντος² τόπου καὶ χρόνου περιττὸν τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ, ὥστε εἶναι
 30 πέντε, ὡς ἐν τῶν πρώτων τριῶν· εἰ δὲ μὴ εἰς ἓν τὰ τρία, ἔσται ὕλη, εἶδος, συναμφότερον, πρὸς τι, ποσόν, ποιόν, κίνησις. ἢ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ πρὸς τι· περιεκτικὸν γὰρ μάλλον.

4. Τί οὖν ταῦτὸν ἐν τοῖς τρισί, καὶ τί ἔσται, ὃ ταῦτα ποιεῖ οὐσίαν τὴν ἐν τούτοις; ἄρα ὑποβάθραν τινὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ὕλη ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἔδρα δοκεῖ τῷ

¹ Igal, H-S².

² coniecimus: ληφθέντος Enn.

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tive principle that which is substantial according to the form, we have not yet said how substance is to be understood. But, as for that composed of both [matter and form], if this alone is substance, matter and form are not substances; but if they are also this, we must investigate what they have in common. But the characteristics which are only predicated would come under relation, being a cause or being an element for instance. And the incidental characteristics in the three would be quantitative or qualitative, in so far as they are in them; as for the cases where the three are in the incidentals, this would be like place and time; their activities and passive affections would be like movements; their consequences like place and time, the place a consequence of the composites, the time, the time of the movement. But the three will go into one, if we can find something common, the ambiguous substance here below; then the others will follow in order, relation, quantity, quality, in place, in time, movement, place, time. Or, if one leaves out place and time, "in place" and "in time" are superfluous, so that there are five, on the assumption that the first three are one; but if the first three do not go into one, there will be matter, form, composite, relation, quantity, quality, movement. Or these last also could go into relation: for it is more inclusive.

4. What is it, then, which is the same in the three, and what will it be which makes them substance, the substance in things here below? Is it a kind of base for everything else? But matter is thought to be a base and "seat"¹ for form, so that the form will not

¹ Plato *Timaeus* 52B1.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

εἶδει εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἔσται ἐν οὐσίᾳ. τό τε
 5 σύνθετον ἄλλοις ὑποβάθρα καὶ ἔδρα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος
 μετὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑποβεβλήσεται τοῖς συνθέτοις ἢ πᾶσί γε
 τοῖς μετὰ τὸ σύνθετον, οἶον ποσῶ, ποιῶ, κινήσει. ἀλλ'
 ἄρα τὸ “μὴ ἑτέρου” ὃ λέγεται; λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ
 μέλαν ἄλλου τοῦ λελευκωμένου, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον δὲ
 10 ἑτέρου—λέγω δὲ οὐ τοῦ ἡμίσεος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ξύλον
 διπλάσιον—καὶ πατήρ ἄλλου ἢ πατήρ ἐστι, καὶ ἡ
 ἐπιστήμη δὲ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐν ᾧ, καὶ τόπος δὲ πέρας ἄλλου,
 καὶ χρόνος μέτρον ἄλλου. πῦρ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου, οὐδὲ ξύλον
 καθὼ ξύλον ἄλλου, οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπος ἄλλου, οὐδὲ
 Σωκράτης, οὐδ’ ὅλως ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία οὐδὲ τὸ
 15 κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶδος ἄλλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου πάθος ἦν.
 οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὕλης εἶδος, τοῦ δὲ συναμφοτέρου μέρος· τὸ
 δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ταυτόν· καὶ ἡ
 ὕλη μέρος ὅλου καὶ ἄλλου ὡς τοῦ ὅλου, οὐχ ὡς ἑτέρου
 ὄντος ἐκείνου, οὗ λέγεται· λευκὸν δὲ ὃ λέγεται εἶναι,
 20 ἑτέρου ἐστίν. ὃ οὖν ἄλλου ὃν ἐκείνου λέγεται, οὐκ οὐσία·
 οὐσία τοίνυν, ὃ ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ἢ μέρος ὃν
 τοιούτου συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι συνθέτου· ὄντος μὲν
 αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον μὲν ἢ ἐκάτερον αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὸ

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be included in substance. And the composite is a base and seat for other things, so that the form with the matter will be a base for the composites, or at least for all that come after the composites, quantity, quality, movement for instance. But then, is the same in the three what is called "not belonging to another"? For white and black belong to something else, that which has become white, and the double belongs to something else—I do not mean that it belongs to the half but I am speaking of a double-sized piece of wood—and a father is someone else's, in so far as he is a father; and knowledge belongs to another, in whom it is, and place is the boundary of another, and time the measure of another. But fire does not belong to something else, nor does a piece of wood in so far as it is a piece of wood, nor does man belong to something else, nor does Socrates, or "composite substance"¹ in general, or the substantive form belong to something else, because it is not an affection of something else. For form does not belong to matter, but is a part of the composite; and the form of man and man are the same thing; and matter is part of a whole, and belongs to another as belonging to the whole, and not in the sense that that of which it is said to be is another thing; but what is said to be white is the white of something else. That then which belongs to another and is said to be of that other is not substance: substance, that is, is what belongs to that which it is, or, if it is a part, is an essential completion of a composite of its own kind; for the composite is either or both parts of itself, but in relation to the composite each part is

¹ Aristotle *Metaphysics* H 3. 1043a30.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

σύνθετον ἄλλον τρόπον ἐκείνου λεγόμενον· ἢ εἰ μὲν
 25 μέρος, πρὸς ἄλλο λεγόμενον, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ φύσει ἐν τῷ
 εἶναι ὃ ἐστίν, οὐχ ἑτέρου λεγόμενον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ
 ὑποκείμενον ἐπὶ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τοῦ
 συναμφοτέρου· ἀλλὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἡ ὕλη τῷ εἶδει, ἄλλως
 δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τὸ συναμφοτέρον. ἢ οὔτε ἡ
 30 ὕλη ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἶδει—τελείωσις γὰρ τὸ εἶδος
 αὐτῆς καθόσον ὕλη καὶ καθόσον δυνάμει—οὐδ' αὖ τὸ
 εἶδος ἐν ταύτῃ· μεθ' οὗ γάρ τι ἀπαρτίζει ἓν τι, οὐκ ἔσται
 θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ, ἀλλ' ἄμφω ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοῦ
 ὑποκείμενα ἄλλω—οἶον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὶς ἄνθρωπος
 ὑπόκεινται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ προϋπάρχουσι τῶν
 35 ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν παρακολουθούντων—καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δὲ
 τὰ ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν τὰ ἄλλα καὶ περὶ ἣν¹ τὸ πάσχειν καὶ
 ἀφ' ἧς τὸ ποιεῖν.

5. Ἀκουστέον δὲ ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε οὐσίας
 λεγομένης· εἰ δέ πη ταῦτα καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνης συμβαίνει,
 ἴσως μὲν κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμωνύμως. καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 πρῶτον ὡς πρὸς τὰ μετ' αὐτὸ λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς
 5 πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔσχατα ἄλλα πρῶτα
 μετ' ἐκεῖνα. καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄλλως, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν εἰ
 ἐκεῖ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ εἰ κακεῖ, ἄλλο τὸ ἐκεῖ πάσχειν.
 καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι κατὰ
 πάσης οὐσίας, εἰ τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι δεῖ μὴ
 ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μηδ'

¹ Simplicius, Theiler: δ Enn., H-S.

¹ I adopt the *περὶ ἣν* of Simplicius and Theiler here rather than the reading of the MSS, *περὶ δ*.

² Aristotle *Categories* 5. 3a7-8.

³ Ibid. 2. 1a24-25.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

said to belong to it in another sense; or if it is a part, it is called so in relation to something else, but by itself its natural existence is said to be in being what it is, not in belonging to another. The substrate is also common to matter, form, and the composite; but the matter is substrate to the form in one sense, and the form [and the composite] to the affections in another. Or, alternatively, the matter is not substrate to the form—for the form is its perfection in so far as it is matter and in so far as it is potential—nor, again, is the form in it: for when something completes some one thing with something else, neither of them is in the other, but both the matter and the form together are substrates to something else—man and a particular man are substrates to the affections, and precede the activities and consequences—and [substance is] that from which the others come and through which the others exist and the subject which is affected¹ and the origin of doing and making.

5. This is to be understood as being said about what is called substance here below: if it applies in any way to that intelligible substance, it is perhaps analogously and ambiguously. Thus it is said to be the first in relation to what comes after it. For it is not the first in any unqualified sense, but substantial sensibles are last in relation to intelligibles but first after them. And "substrate" is used in a different sense, and it is disputed whether there is passive affection in the intelligible, and, if it is there, passivity there is something different. And the statement "not being in a substrate applies to all substance"² [is true] if that which is in a substrate must "not be there as a part of that in which it is",³ nor in such a

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

10 οὕτως, ὥστε μηδὲ συντελεῖν μετ' ἐκείνου εἰς ἓν τι μεθ'
 οὐ γὰρ συντελεῖ εἰς σύνθετον οὐσίαν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ὥς ἐν
 ὑποκειμένῳ οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε μήτε τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ
 εἶναι ὥς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μήτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐν τῷ
 Σωκράτει μέρος ὄντα Σωκράτους. ὁ οὖν μὴ ἐν
 ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐσία· εἰ δὲ λέγομεν μήτε ἐν
 15 ὑποκειμένῳ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου,
 προσθετέον “ὡς ἄλλου”, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος λεγόμενος
 κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου περιλαμβάνηται τῷ λόγῳ ἐν
 τῇ προσθήκῃ τῇ “μὴ κατ' ἄλλου”. ὅταν γὰρ τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον κατηγορῶ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὕτως λέγω, οὐχ
 20 ὥς τὸ ξύλον λευκόν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ λευκὸν λευκόν· τὸν γὰρ
 Σωκράτη λέγων ἄνθρωπον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω
 ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει ἀνθρώπου τὸν
 ἄνθρωπον· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτὸν τῷ τὸν Σωκράτη Σωκράτη
 λέγειν, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κατὰ ζώου λογικοῦ τοιοῦδε τὸ ζῶον
 κατηγορεῖν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι μὴ ἴδιον εἶναι τῆς
 25 οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι, τὴν γὰρ
 διαφορὰν μὴ δ' αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐν ὑπο-
 κειμένῳ, μέρος οὐσίας λαμβάνων τὸ δίπουν
 τοῦτο οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ φησὶν εἶναι· ἐπεὶ, εἰ μὴ
 τὸ δίπουν λαμβάνοι, ὃ ἔστι τοιάδε οὐσία, ἀλλὰ διποδίαν,
 μὴ οὐσίαν λέγων, ἀλλὰ ποιότητα, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔσται
 30 τὸ δίπουν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ χρόνος ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, οὐδ' ὁ
 τόπος. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὸ μέτρον λαμβάνεται

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

way as to contribute with it to the completeness of some one thing; for it could not be as in a substrate in that with which it contributes to a composite substance; so the form is not in the matter as in a substrate, nor is humanity in Socrates [in this way], since it is a part of Socrates. What is not in a substrate, therefore, is substance; but if we say that it is "not in a substrate nor predicated of a substrate",¹ we must add "as of something else", that the human also, predicated of a particular human being, may be included by the statement in the addition "not of something else". For when I predicate humanity of Socrates, I mean it not in the sense in which the wood is white, but in the sense that the white thing is white: for in saying that Socrates is human, I am saying that a particular human being is human, predicating humanity of the human in Socrates; but this is the same as calling Socrates Socrates, and again as predicating "living being" of this particular rational living being. But if someone says² that not being in a substrate is not a peculiarity of substance, for the essential differentiation is not itself one of the things in a substrate, it is by understanding [the differentiation] as "the two-footed" that he makes this assertion that it is not in a substrate: since, if he did not understand "the two-footed", which is a particular kind of substance, but "two-footedness", not meaning a substance but a quality, then the two-footed will be in a substrate. But time is not in a substrate either, nor is place. But if "the measure of movement" is understood as

¹ Ibid. 5. 2a12-15.

² Aristotle, in *Categories* 5. 3a21-28.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον, τὸ μέτρον ἐν τῇ
 κινήσει ὑπάρξει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, ἥ τε κινήσις ἐν τῷ
 κινουμένῳ· εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνεται, ἐν τῷ
 μετροῦντι ἔσται τὸ μέτρον. ὁ δὲ τόπος, πέρασ τοῦ
 35 περιέχοντος ὧν, ἐν ἐκείνῳ. καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν
 οὐσίαν, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος; γίνεται ἐναντίως ἢ κατὰ ἐν
 τούτων ἢ κατὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα
 λαμβάνεσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐφαρμοττόντων
 καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ τῶν
 εἰρημένων.

6. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὡς ταῦτα μὲν ἔστω τεθεωρημένα
 περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὃ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ εἴρηται, αἰτεῖ ἔτι ἴσως
 αἰσθητὸν ἰδεῖν τοῦτο· τὸ δ' "ἔστι" τοῦτο καὶ τὸ "εἶναι"
 οὐκ ἂν ὁρῶτο. τί οὖν; τὸ πῦρ οὐκ οὐσία καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ;
 5 οὐσία οὖν ἐκάτερον, ὅτι ὁράται; οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὕλῃ ἔχειν;
 οὔ. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶδος; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῷ
 συναμφοτέρῳ. ἀλλὰ τίνι δῆ; τῷ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
 ποσὸν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ποιὸν ἔστιν. ἡμεῖς δὴ φήσομεν ἄρα,
 ὅτι ὁμωνύμως. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ <"ἔστιν">¹ ἐπὶ πυρὸς καὶ
 γῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων [τὸ ἔστι]² καὶ τίς ἡ διαφορὰ
 10 τούτου τοῦ "ἔστι" καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ ὅτι τὸ μὲν
 ἀπλῶς εἶναι λέγει καὶ ἀπλῶς ὄν, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν εἶναι. τί
 οὖν; τὸ εἶναι τὸ προσκείμενον τῷ λευκῷ ταῦτὸν τῷ ἄνευ
 προσθήκης; οὐχί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρώτως ὄν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ
 μετάληψιν καὶ δευτέρως. τό τε γὰρ λευκὸν προστεθὲν
 15 πεποιήκε τὸ ὄν λευκόν, τό τε ὄν τῷ "λευκόν" προστεθὲν
 πεποιήκε <τὸ>³ λευκὸν ὄν, ὥστε ἐκατέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὄντι

¹ Theiler.

² del. Kirchhoff, Müller, Theiler.

³ Creuzer.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

applying to what is measured, the measure will exist in the movement as in a substrate, and the movement in what is moved; but if it is taken as referring to the measurer, then the measure will be in the measurer. And place, being the "boundary of the surroundings", is in those surroundings. But what is to be said about this substance here which we are discussing? It comes about that this substance can be understood in contrary ways according to one or more or all of these statements, since the statements fit both matter and form and the composite as well.

6. But if anyone should say that, granted that these are observations about substance, what it is has not been said, he is perhaps still requiring to see this with his bodily eyes; but this "is" and this "being" could not be seen [in this way]. Well then, is not fire substance, and water? Is each of them substance because it is seen? No. But by having matter? No. But by having form? Not this either. And not by being a composite either. But by what, then? By being. But the quantum is, and the quale is. But, we shall insist, only in an ambiguous sense. But what is this "is" which applies to fire and earth and such-like things, and what is the difference between this "is" and the "is" which applies to the others? It is that one means simply to be and simply existing, but the other means to be white. Well then, is the "is" which is added to the "white" the same as the "is" without addition? No, but one means primary being, the other being by participation and secondarily. For the "white" added to "being" makes the being white, and the "being" added to the "white" makes the white being, so that in both cases [there is something incidental], the "white" incidental to the

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν, τῷ δὲ λευκῷ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὄν.
 καὶ οὐχ οὕτως λέγομεν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις τὸν Σωκράτη
 λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτη· ἐν γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις ὁ
 20 Σωκράτης ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν οὐ ταυτόν· ἐπὶ
 γὰρ τοῦ “τὸ λευκὸν Σωκράτης” ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ
 Σωκράτης τῷ λευκῷ, ἐν δὲ τῷ “Σωκράτης λευκός”
 καθαρῶς συμβεβηκὸς τὸ λευκόν. καὶ ἐνταῦθα “τὸ ὄν
 λευκόν” συμβεβηκὸς ἔχει τὸ λευκόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ “τὸ
 25 λευκὸν ὄν” τὸ λευκὸν συνειλημμένον τὸ ὄν. καὶ ὅλως τὸ
 μὲν λευκὸν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ ἐν ὄντι· παρ'
 ἐκείνου οὖν τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ὄν παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ
 τοῦ λευκοῦ τὸ λευκόν, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι τὸ λευκὸν ἐν αὐτῷ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὄν τὸ ἐν
 τῷ αἰσθητῷ οὐ παρ' αὐτοῦ ὄν, λεκτέον, ὅτι παρὰ τοῦ
 30 ὄντως ὄντος ἔχει τὸ ὄν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ ὄντως λευκοῦ ἔχει
 τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ λευκὸν ἔχοντος κατὰ
 μετάληψιν τοῦ ἐκεῖ ὄντος ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι.

7. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι παρὰ τῆς ὕλης ἔχειν τὰ τῇδε ὅσα
 ἐπ' αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι, πόθεν ἔξει ἡ ὕλη τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ὄν
 ἀπαιτήσομεν. ὅτι δὲ μὴ πρῶτον ἡ ὕλη, εἴρηται ἐν
 ἄλλοις. εἰ δέ, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ ἐπὶ τῆς
 5 ὕλης, τὰ αἰσθητὰ φήσομεν. πρὸ τούτων δὲ οὖσαν
 ὕστερον πολλῶν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ πάντων οὐδὲν
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"being" and the "being" incidental to the "white". And we do not mean this in the sense in which one might say that Socrates is white and the white thing is Socrates; for in both these cases Socrates is the same, but perhaps the white is not the same; for in the statement "the white thing is Socrates", Socrates is included in "the white", but in the statement "Socrates is white" the white is simply and solely incidental. And here [in the case we are discussing] "being is white" has "white" as incidental, but in the statement "the white is being", "the white" has being included in it. And in general the white has being because it is about being and in being; it derives its existence therefore from being; but being has being from itself and white from the white, not because it is in the white, but because the white is in it. But, since this being in the sense-world does not exist of itself, it must be said that it has its being from the real being and has its being white from the real white; that also which has the white has its being by participation in the being of that other intelligible world.

7. But if anyone should say that the things here which are based on matter have their being from it we shall demand where matter gets being and the existent from. We have explained elsewhere that matter is not primary.¹ But if one says that the other things could not come into existence except on the basis of matter, we shall agree as far as sense-objects are concerned. But even if matter is prior to these, nothing prevents it from being posterior to many things and to all the things there in the intelligible,

¹ In VI. 1. 25-28 (the critique of Stoic corporealism).

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

κωλύει ἀμυδρὸν τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν καὶ ἡττον ἢ τὰ ἐφ'
 αὐτῆς, ὅσῳ τὰ μὲν λόγοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δ'
 ἄλογος παντελῶς, σκιὰ λόγου καὶ ἔκπτωσις λόγου· εἰ δέ
 τις λέγοι, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι αὕτη δίδωσι τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῆς,
 10 ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης τῷ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ λευκῷ, λεκτέον, ὅτι
 τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον ὃν δοίη ἂν τῷ ἡττον ὄντι τὸ [ἡττον]¹
 εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἡττον ὃν οὐκ ἂν δοίη τῷ μᾶλλον ὄντι. ἀλλ' εἰ
 μᾶλλον ὃν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης, οὐκέτι κοινόν τι τὸ ὃν κατ'
 ἀμφοῖν, οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία γένος ἔχον τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ
 15 συναμφοτέρον, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ μὲν πολλὰ αὐτοῖς ἔσται,
 ἅπερ λέγομεν, διάφορον δ' ὅμως τὸ εἶναι. περὶ γὰρ
 ἐλαττόνως ὃν μᾶλλον ὃν προσελθὸν τάξει μὲν πρῶτον ἂν
 εἴη, οὐσία δὲ ὕστερον· ὥστε, εἰ μὴ ἐπίσης τὸ εἶναι τῇ
 ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ
 20 ἂν ἔτι εἴη ἡ οὐσία ὡς γένος. ἄλλως μέντοι ἔξει πρὸς τὰ
 μετὰ ταῦτα, ὡς κοινόν τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἔχουσα τῷ αὐτῶν
 εἶναι, ὡς ζωῆς ἡ μὲν τις ἀμυδρά, ἡ δὲ ἐναργεστέρα,² καὶ
 εἰκόνων ἡ μὲν τις ὑποτύπωσις, ἡ δὲ ἐξεργασία μᾶλλον.
 εἰ δὲ τῷ ἀμυδρῷ τοῦ εἶναι μετροῖ τις τὸ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν
 25 τοῖς ἄλλοις πλέον ἐώη, τούτῳ πάλιν αὖ κοινὸν ἔσται τὸ
 εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μήποτε οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἄλλο γὰρ
 ἕκαστον ὅλον, ἀλλ' οὐ κοινόν τι τὸ ἀμυδρόν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ
 τῆς ζωῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι ἐπὶ θρεπτικῆς καὶ
 αἰσθητικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς. καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο

¹ del. Kirchhoff.

² Perna^{mg}, Crœuzer: ἐνεργ- Enn.

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since the being it has is dim and less than the things based upon it, in so far as they are rational principles and derive more from the existent but matter is utterly irrational, a shadow of rational form and a falling away from rational form; but if one says that this matter gives being to the things based on it as Socrates does to the whiteness based upon him, we must say that what is more existent might give being to what is less existent, but the less existent could not give being to the more existent. But if the form is more existent than the matter, existence is no more something common to both, nor is substance a genus containing matter, form and the composite, but they have many things, those we are speaking of, in common, but their being is different. For when something which is more existent arrives about something which is less existent, [the latter] would be first in order, but posterior in substance; so that, if being is not equal for matter, form and the composite, substance would not still be common as a genus. It will, certainly, be otherwise disposed to the things which come after it, as having something common in relation to them by the fact of their being, as there is a dimmer and a clearer life, and one picture is a sketch and another a more finished work. But if one were to measure being by the dimness of being and let go what is more of it in the others, in this way again being will be common. But one should not perhaps proceed like this. For each [of the three, matter, form and composite] is different as a whole, and the dimness is not something common, just as in the case of life there would be nothing in common between nutritive, perceptive and intelligent life. So here also being is different in

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, καὶ συνάμφω ἀφ' ἐνὸς ἄλλως
 30 καὶ ἄλλως ῥνέντος. οὐ γὰρ μόνον δεῖ, εἰ τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ
 τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἀπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου, τὸ μὲν
 μάλλον, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς χεῖρον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ
 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄμφω, ἥ δὲ τὸ μὲν μάλλον μετασχὼν πυρός,
 οἶον κέραμος, τὸ δὲ ἦττον, ὥστε μὴ κέραμος γενέσθαι.
 35 τάχα δὲ οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος·
 διάφορα¹ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις.

8. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸ μὲν διαιρεῖν εἰς στοιχεῖα ἐὰν δεῖ, καὶ
 μάλιστα περὶ τῆς αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας λέγοντα, ἣν δεῖ
 αἰσθῆσαι μάλλον ἢ λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ὧν
 σύγκειται μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι—οὐ γὰρ οὐσίαι ἐκείνα,
 5 ἢ οὐκ ἂν αἰσθηταὶ γε οὐσίαι—ἐνὶ δὲ γένει περι-
 λαμβάνοντα τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ λίθου καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος
 καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων φυτῶν, ἢ αἰσθητά, καὶ ζώων
 ὡσαύτως; οὐ γὰρ παραλελείφεται ἡ ὕλη οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος· ἡ
 γὰρ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἔχει ταῦτα· ὕλη γὰρ καὶ εἶδος πῦρ
 καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα ἤδη πολλαὶ οὐσίαι
 εἰς ἓν. καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι τούτοις, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
 10 κεχώρισται· ὑποκείμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ
 ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλου· καὶ ὅσα εἴρηται, ὑπάρχει
 ταύτῃ. ἀλλ' εἰ ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία οὐκ ἄνευ μεγέθους οὐδ'
 ἄνευ ποιότητος, πῶς ἔτι τὰ συμβεβηκότα χωριούμεν;
 χωρίζοντες γὰρ ταῦτα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ σχῆμα, τὸ
 15 χρῶμα, ξηρότητα, ὑγρότητα, τί τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν

¹ Igal, H-S²: διαφορά Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

matter and in form, and both together come from one which flows in all sorts of different ways. For it is not only necessary for one to exist more and the other worse and less if the second comes from the first and the third from the second, but even if both come from the same, in that one has a larger share in fire, like a pot, and the other less, so as not to become a pot. But perhaps matter and form do not even come from the same: for there are different things also in the intelligible world.

8. But ought one then to drop division into elements, especially when one is speaking about sensible substance, which one must grasp by sense rather than reason, and not to take into consideration the parts of which they are composed—for those parts are not substances, or at least not sensible substances—and include in one genus what is common to stone and earth and water and the plants which arise from these, in so far as they are sense-objects, and the animals likewise? For [if one does this] matter and form will not have been left out; for sensible substance has these; for fire and earth and the elements between are matter and form, and the composites are already many substances coming together into one. And what is common to all these is how they are separated from the other things; for these are substrates to the others and not in a substrate nor belonging to another; and everything else which has been said applies here. But if sensible substance does not exist without size or without quality, how shall we still be able to separate what is incidental? For when we separate off this, size, shape, colour, dryness, moistness, what are we going to establish as substance itself? For these [sensible]

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

θησόμεθα; ποιαὶ γὰρ οὐσίαι αὗται. ἀλλὰ τί ἐστι, περὶ ὃ
 συμβαίνει τὰ ποιοῦντα ἐκ τοῦ μόνον οὐσίαν εἶναι ποιὰν
 οὐσίαν εἶναι; καὶ ἔσται τὸ πῦρ οὐχ ὅλον οὐσία, ἀλλὰ τι
 αὐτοῦ, οἶον μέρος; τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη; ἢ ὕλη. ἀλλὰ ἄρά
 20 γε ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία συμφόρησίς τις ποιότητων καὶ
 ὕλης, καὶ ὁμοῦ μὲν πάντα ταῦτα συμπαγέντα ἐπὶ ὕλης
 μιᾶς οὐσία, χωρὶς δὲ ἕκαστον λαμβανόμενον τὸ μὲν
 ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται, ἢ ποιὰ πολλά; καὶ ὃ μὲν
 ἂν ἐλλείπον μήπω ἀπηρτισμένην ἐᾷ γίνεσθαι τὴν
 ὑπόστασιν, μέρος τῆσδε τῆς οὐσίας, ὃ δ' ἂν γενομένη
 25 τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐπισυμβῇ, τὴν οἰκείαν ἔχει τάξιν οὐ
 κρυπτόμενον ἐν τῷ μίγματι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὴν λεγομένην
 οὐσίαν; καὶ οὐ τοῦτό φημι, ὥς ἐκεῖ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὄν
 ἐστὶν οὐσία, συμπληροῦν ἓνα ὄγκον τοσόνδε καὶ
 τοιόνδε, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ μὴ συμπληροῦν ποιόν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ
 30 ἐκεῖ ἕκαστον οὐσίαν, τὸ δ' ὅλον τὸ ἐκ πάντων οὐσίαν.
 καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, εἰ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐξ οὐκ
 οὐσιῶν ποιούμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀληθὴς οὐσία, ἀλλὰ
 μιμούμενον τὴν ἀληθῆ, ἥτις ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ
 αὐτὴν ἔχει τὸ ὄν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξ αὐτῆς γινομένων, ὅτι
 35 ἀληθῶς ἦν· ὡδὲ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑποβεβλημένον ἄγονον καὶ
 οὐχ ἱκανὸν εἶναι ὄν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἄλλα, σκιά δὲ
 καὶ ἐπὶ σκιᾷ αὐτῇ οὕση ζωγραφία καὶ τὸ φαίνεσθαι.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

substances are qualified substances. But is there something around which occur what make being simply substance into being qualified substance? And will fire be not as a whole substance, but something belonging to it, like a part? And what could this be? Just matter. But then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter, and are all these compounded together on one matter substance, but when each is taken separately will one be a quale and one a quantum, or will they be many qualia¹? And will that which, if it is lacking, does not allow a completed coming into existence to take place be a part of this substance, but that which, when a substance has come to be, comes to it as an addition, have its own position and not be hidden in the mixture which makes up what is called substance? I do not mean this in the sense that when it is there with the others it is substance, completing one mass of a particular size and quality, but elsewhere when it is not contributing to completion it is a quality, but that even in the former case each particular one is not a substance, but the whole made up from them all is substance. And there is no need to object if we make sensible substance out of non-substances; for even the whole is not true substance but imitates the true substance, which has its being without the others which attend on it, and the others come into being from it, because it truly is; but here what underlies is sterile and inadequate to be being, because the others do not come from it, but it is a shadow, and upon what is itself a shadow, a picture and a seeming.

¹ Cp. ch. 15, 24-38 and II. 7.3.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

9. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς λεγομένης οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς καὶ γένους ἑνὸς ταύτη. εἶδη δ' αὐτοῦ τίνα ἂν τις θεῖτο καὶ πῶς διέλοι; σῶμα μὲν οὖν τὸ σύμπαν θετέον εἶναι, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὑλικώτερα, τὰ δὲ ὀργανικά·
 5 ὑλικώτερα μὲν πῦρ, γῆ, ὕδωρ, ἀήρ· ὀργανικά δὲ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν ζώων σώματα κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς τὰς παραλλαγὰς σχόντα. εἶτα εἶδη γῆς λαμβάνειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὰ τε φυτὰ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς διαιροῦντα καὶ τὰ τῶν
 10 ζώων σώματα· ἢ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἐπίγεια καὶ ἔγγεια, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον στοιχείον τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· ἢ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν κοῦφα, τὰ δὲ βαρέα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι ἐν μέσῳ, τὰ δὲ περιέχειν ἄνωθεν, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ· καὶ ἐν τούτων ἐκάστῳ σώματα ἤδη σχήμασι διελημμένα, ὥς εἶναι σώματα τὰ μὲν ζώων οὐρανίων, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἄλλα
 15 στοιχεῖα· ἢ κατ' εἶδη διαστησάμενον τὰ τέσσαρα τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλον τρόπον ἤδη συμπλέκειν καταμιγνύντα¹ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν κατὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τὰς μίξεις, οἷον πύρινα ἢ γήινα τῷ πλείονι καὶ ἐπικρατοῦντι λεγόμενα. τὸ δὲ π ρ ὡ τ α ς καὶ δ ε υ τ έ ρ α ς λέγειν—“τόδε τὸ πῦρ” καὶ “πῦρ”—
 20 ἄλλως μὲν ἔχειν διαφοράν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν καθέκαστον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου, οὐ μέντοι οὐσίας διαφοράν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ποιῶ “τὶ λευκὸν” καὶ “λευκὸν” καὶ “τὶς γραμματικὴ”

¹ Igal, H-S²: καὶ μιγνύντα Enn.

¹ The bodies of celestial living beings are, of course, spherical.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

9. So much for what is called sensible substance and the one genus. But what species of it should one posit, and how should one divide them? Now the whole must be classed as body, and of bodies some are matterish and some organic; the matterish are fire, earth, water, air; the organic the bodies of plants and animals, which have their differences according to their shapes. Then one should take the species of earth and of the other elements, and in the case of organic bodies one should divide the plants, and the bodies of animals, according to their shapes; or by the fact that some are on and in the earth, and, element by element, [one should class separately] the bodies in each; or [one could class them on the ground that] some are light, some are heavy, and some in between, and that some stand in the middle, some surround them above, and some are in between; and in each of these the bodies are already differentiated by their outlines, so as to be some of them bodies of celestial living beings¹ and others appropriate to the other elements; or one should divide the four according to their species and afterwards proceed in another way to weave them together by blending their differences according to places and shapes and mixtures, classing them as fiery or earthly, called so according to the largest and predominant element [in the mixture]. But as for calling them "first" and "second"²—"this fire" and "fire"—these have a difference in another way, because one is individual and one universal, but not a difference of substance; under quality, also, there is "something white" and "white" and "a particular

² Aristotle *Categories* 5. 2a11–19.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

καὶ “γραμματική”. ἔπειτα τί ἔλαττον ἔχει ἡ γραμματική πρὸς τινὰ γραμματικὴν καὶ ὅλως ἐπιστήμη
 25 πρὸς τινὰ ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γὰρ ἡ γραμματικὴ ὕστερον τῆς
 τινος γραμματικῆς, ἀλλὰ μάλλον οὕσης γραμματικῆς
 καὶ ἡ ἐν σοί· ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐν σοί τίς ἐστι τῷ ἐν σοί, αὐτὴ δὲ
 ταῦτόν τῇ καθόλου. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ αὐτὸς ἔδωκε
 τῷ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ
 30 Σωκράτει· μεταλήψει γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος.
 ἔπειτα ὁ Σωκράτης τί ἂν εἴη ἡ ἄνθρωπος τοιόσδε, τὸ δὲ
 “τοιόσδε” τί ἂν ἐργάζοιτο πρὸς τὸ μάλλον οὐσίαν εἶναι;
 εἰ δ’ ὅτι τὸ μὲν “εἶδος μόνον ὁ ἄνθρωπος”, τὸ δὲ “εἶδος
 ἐν ὕλῃ”, ἦττον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἴη· ἐν ὕλῃ γὰρ
 ὁ λόγος χεῖρων. εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ καθ’ αὐτὸ
 35 εἶδος, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὕλῃ, τί ἔλαττον ἔξει τοῦ ἐν ὕλῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς
 λόγος τοῦ ἐν τινι ὕλῃ; ἔτι πρότερον τῇ φύσει τὸ
 γενικώτερον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀτόμου· τὸ δὲ
 πρότερον τῇ φύσει καὶ ἀπλῶς πρότερον· πῶς ἂν οὖν
 ἦττον εἴη; ἀλλὰ τὸ καθέκαστον πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 γνωριμώτερον ὢν πρότερον· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
 40 πράγμασι τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει. ἔπειτα οὕτως οὐχ εἰς
 λόγος τῆς οὐσίας· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τοῦ πρώτως καὶ
 δευτέρως, οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἐν γένος.

10. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως διαιρεῖν, θερμῷ καὶ ξηρῷ,
 καὶ ξηρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, καὶ ὑγρῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ, ἢ ὅπως
 βούλεται τὸν συνδυασμὸν εἶναι, εἴτα ἐκ τούτων σύνθεσιν

¹ Aristotle. The reference is probably to *De Gen. et Corr.* B 2-3. 330a24-35.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

literary skill" and "literary skill". For what less does "literary skill" have in comparison with "a particular literary skill" and in general "body of knowledge" in comparison with "a particular body of knowledge"? For literary skill is not posterior to the particular literary skill but rather it is because literary skill exists that that in you exists; since that in you is particular by being in you, but in itself is the same as the universal. And Socrates did not in his own person give being human to the non-human but humanity gave being human to Socrates: the particular human is so by participation in humanity. Since what could Socrates be except "a man of a particular kind" and what could the "of a particular kind" do towards being more of a substance? But if it is because "humanity is only a form" but Socrates is "form in matter", he would be less human in this respect: for the rational form is worse in matter. But if humanity is not in itself form, but in matter, what less will it have than the particular human in matter, when it is itself the rational form of something in a kind of matter? Again, the more general is prior by nature, as the species is prior to the individual; but the prior by nature is also simply prior: how then could it be less? But the individual is prior in relation to us because it is more knowable; but this does not make a difference in actual fact. Then, if it were so, there would not be one definition of substance: for the definition of what is primarily and what is secondarily is not the same, nor do they come under one genus.

10. It is also possible to divide like this, by hot and dry, and dry and cold, and moist and cold, or whatever kind of coupling he¹ wants, and then a compo-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

καὶ μίξιν· καὶ ἡ μένειν ἐνταῦθα στάντα ἐπὶ τοῦ
5 συνθέτου, ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἔγγειον καὶ ἐπίγειον, ἡ κατὰ τὰς
μορφὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ζώων διαφοράς, οὐ τὰ ζῶα
διαيروῦντα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ὥσπερ
ὄργανα διαيروῦντα. οὐκ ἄτοπος δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὰς μορφὰς
διαφορά, εἴπερ οὐδ' ἡ κατὰ τὰς ποιότητος αὐτῶν
διαίρεσις, θερμότης, ψυχρότης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰ δέ τις
10 λέγοι “ἀλλὰ κατὰ ταύτας ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα”, καὶ κατὰ
τὰς μίξεις φήσομεν ποιεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ
σχήματα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ περὶ αἰσθητῆς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος, οὐκ
ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη, διαφοραῖς εἰ λαμβάνοιτο ταῖς πρὸς τὴν
αἴσθησιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὃν ἀπλῶς αὕτη, ἀλλ' αἰσθητὸν ὃν
15 τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν αὐτῆς
σύνοδον τῶν πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἔφαμεν εἶναι καὶ ἡ πίστις
τοῦ εἶναι παρὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ ἄπειρος ἡ
σύνθεσις, κατ' εἶδη τῶν ζώων διαιρεῖν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου
εἶδος τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ποιότης γὰρ αὕτη σώματος,
20 τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος, ποιότησι δ' οὐκ ἄτοπον διαιρεῖν.
εἰ δ' ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀπλᾶ, τὰ δὲ σύνθετα εἴπομεν, ἀντι-
διαيروῦντες τὸ σύνθετον τῷ ἀπλῷ, ὑλικώτερα εἴπομεν
καὶ ὀργανικὰ οὐ προσποιούμενοι τὸ σύνθετον. ἔστι δ'
οὐκ ἀντιδιαίρεσις τὸ σύνθετον πρὸς τὸ ἀπλοῦν εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρώτην διαίρεσιν τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων
25 θέντα μίξαντα αὐτὰ ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ὑποβεβηκυίας¹

¹ Sleeman, H-S: -βεβλη- Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

sition and mixture of these; and either to stop there, coming to a halt at the composite, or [to go on dividing] according to whether things are in or on the earth, or according to the shapes and according to the differences of animals, not dividing the animals but dividing according to their bodies, which are like their tools. The division according to their shapes is not out of place, since the division according to their qualities is not either, hotness, coldness and such like. But if someone were to say "but bodies act by these", we shall reply that they also act according to the mixtures and the colours and the outlines. For since our discussion is about sensible substance the division would not be out of place if it was taken to be made by the differences which present themselves to sense-perception; for this sensible substance is not simply being, but is perceived by sense, being this whole world of ours; since we maintained that its apparent existence was a congress of perceptibles, and the guarantee of their being comes from sense-perception. But if the composition has no limits, one should divide according to the species-forms of living things, the bodily species of man, for instance. For this, a species-form of this kind, is a quality of body, and it is not out of place to divide by qualities. But if we said that some bodies are simple and some are composite, opposing the composite to the simple in our division, we were speaking of matterish and organic bodies, not taking the composite seriously into account. It is not a division by opposition which sets the composite against the simple, but, when one had placed the simple bodies by the first division, one mixed them and differentiated the composites starting from an-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

διαφορὰν συνθέτων ἢ τόποις ἢ μορφαῖς ποιεῖσθαι, οἶον τὰ μὲν οὐράνια, τὰ δὲ γήινα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐσίας ἢ γενέσεως ταῦτα.

11. Περὶ δὲ ποσοῦ καὶ ποσότητος, ὡς ἐν ἀριθμῷ δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ μεγέθει, καθόσον τοσοῦτον ἕκαστον, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐν ἀριθμῷ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ διαστήματι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου—οὐ γὰρ περὶ χωριστοῦ ποσοῦ ὁ λόγος,
 5 ἀλλ' ὃ ποιεῖ τρίπηχυν εἶναι τὸ ξύλον, καὶ ἡ πεμπὰς ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἵπποις—εἴρηται πολλάκις, ὅτι ταῦτα ποσὰ μόνον λεκτέον, τόπον δὲ καὶ χρόνον μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν νενοῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν χρόνον τῷ μέτρον κινῆσεως εἶναι καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι δοτέον αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ τόπον σώματος περιεκτικόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτον ἐν σχέσει
 10 καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι κεῖσθαι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ κίνησις συνεχῆς καὶ οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ ἐτέθη. μέγα δὲ καὶ μικρὸν διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν ποσῷ; ποσότητι γάρ τινι μέγα τὸ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος δὲ οὐ τῶν πρὸς τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον τῶν πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον. διὰ
 15 τί οὖν ὁ ρος μί κρόν, κέ γ χ ρ ος δὲ με γά λ η; ἡ πρῶτον μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ “μικρότερον” λέγεται. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ὁμογενῆ ὁμολογεῖται καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν εἰρῆσθαι, ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι ἀντὶ τοῦ “μικρότερον” λέγεται. καὶ μεγάλη κέ γ χ ρ ος οὐχ ἀπλῶς λεγομένη “μεγάλη”, ἀλλὰ “κέ γ χ ρ ος μεγάλη”; τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν “τῶν ὁμογενῶν”,

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other subordinate principle, either by positions or shapes, some celestial and others earthly, for instance. And so much for substance or coming-to-be in the things perceived by sense.

11. But about the quantum and quantity, it has often been said how one should locate it in number and size, in so far as each individual thing which is in the number of things in matter and the extension of the substrate is of a certain size—for the discussion is not about separate quantity but about the quantity which makes the wood three cubits long and the five which applies to the horses—and that only these things should be called quanta, but that place and time should not be considered under quantity, but that time because it is the “measure of motion” should in its own nature also be given to the relative, and that place is what surrounds body, so that this too is put in relation and the relative; further, movement is continuous and so was not put in the class of quantity. But why are large and small not in quantity? For the large is large by some kind of quantity and size is not something relative, but larger and smaller belong to the relative; for they are so in regard to another, like the double. Why then is “the mountain small, but the millet-seed large”¹? Now, first of all, this is said instead of “smaller”. For if it is agreed that it is called small in regard to and from [comparison with] things of the same kind, it is agreed that it is said instead of “smaller”. And a large millet-seed is not simply called “large” but “large millet-seed” and this is the same as “of things of the same kind”, and it can

¹ Aristotle *Categories* 6. 5b18–19.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

- 20 τῶν δὲ ὁμογενῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἂν λέγοιτο μείζων. ἔπειτα
διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ καλὸν λέγοιτο ἂν τῶν πρὸς τι; ἀλλὰ
φαμεν καλὸν μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸ καὶ ποιόν, κάλλιον δὲ τῶν
πρὸς τι· καίτοι καὶ καλὸν λεγόμενον φανείη ἂν πρὸς
ἄλλο αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου κάλλος πρὸς θεόν·
25 πιθήκων, φησίν, ὁ κάλλιστος αἰσχρός
συμβάλλειν ἐτέρῳ γένει· ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ
μὲν καλόν, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἢ κάλλιον ἢ τούναντίον. καὶ
ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ μὲν μέγα μετὰ μεγέθους,
πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτον. ἢ ἀναιρετέον τὸ καλόν, ὅτι
ἄλλο κάλλιον αὐτοῦ· οὕτω τοίνυν οὐδ' ἀναιρετέον τὸ
30 μέγα, ὅτι ἔστι τι μείζον αὐτοῦ· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ μείζον ὅλως
ἂν εἴη μὴ μεγάλου ὄντος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κάλλιον μὴ
καλοῦ.

12. Ἀπολειπτέον τοίνυν καὶ ἐναντιότητα εἶναι περὶ
τὸ ποσόν· αἱ γὰρ ἔννοιαι τὴν ἐναντιότητα συγχωροῦσιν,
ὅταν “μέγα” λέγωμεν καὶ ὅταν “μικρόν”, ἐναντίας τὰς
φαντασίας ποιοῦσαι, ὥσπερ ὅταν “πολλὰ” καὶ
5 “ὀλίγα”· καὶ γὰρ τὰ παραπλήσια περὶ τοῦ “ὀλίγα” καὶ
“πολλὰ” λεκτέον. “πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ” ἀντὶ τοῦ
“πλείους”· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο· καὶ “ὀλίγοι ἐν τῷ
θεάτρῳ” ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἐλάττους”. καὶ δεῖ ὅλως τὰ πολλὰ
πολὺ λέγειν πλήθος ἐν ἀριθμῷ—πλήθος δὲ πῶς τῶν
10 πρὸς τι;—τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν τῳ “ἐπέκτασις ἀριθμοῦ” τὸ

¹ Heraclitus fr. B 82 DK, as quoted by Plato *Hippias Major* 289A3-4.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

naturally be called larger than things of the same kind. Next, why is "beautiful" not said to be one of the relatives? But we call something beautiful in itself; it has the quality of beauty, but "more beautiful" is one of the relative terms; and then what is called beautiful might appear ugly in relation to something else, like the beauty of a man compared to a god; "the most beautiful of monkeys", he¹ says, "is ugly in comparison with another kind"; but it is beautiful by itself, but in relation to something else it is more beautiful or the opposite. And in the case of size, then, a thing is large in itself by possession of size, but in relation to something else it is not so. Otherwise one would have to deny the "beautiful" because something else was more beautiful; so here one must not deny the "large" because there is something larger than it: since it could not be larger at all if it was not large, just as a thing could not be more beautiful if it was not beautiful.

12. We must allow then that there is opposition in the quantitative; for our notions admit the opposition, when we say "large" and when we say "small", and make our mental images opposite, just as when we say "many" and "few": for we ought to say much the same about "few" and "many". For "there are many people in the house" is instead of "more people"; but this is in relation to something else; and we say "few people in the theatre" instead of "fewer".² And one ought in general to call the many "many" as a multiplicity in number—and how can multiplicity be one of the relatives?—but this is the same as saying "an expansion of number" and

² Aristotle *Categories* 6. 5b24–25.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

δὲ ἐναντίον “συστολή”. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συνεχοῦς
 τῆς ἐννοίας τὸ συνεχὲς προαγούσης εἰς τὸ πόρρω. ποσὸν
 μὲν οὖν, ὅταν τὸ ἐν προέλθῃ καὶ τὸ σημείον. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν μὲν
 ταχὺ στῇ ἐκάτερον, τὸ μὲν ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ μικρόν· ἐὰν δ’ ἡ
 15 πρόοδος προϊούσα μὴ παύσῃται ταχύ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ, τὸ
 δὲ μέγα. τίς οὖν ὄρος; τίς δὲ καλοῦ; θερμοῦ δέ; καὶ ἐνι
 θερμότερον καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἀλλὰ λέγεται τὸ μὲν
 θερμότερον πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἀπλῶς ποιόν. ὅλως δὲ
 λόγον τινά, ὥσπερ καλοῦ, οὕτω καὶ μεγάλου εἶναι, ὅς
 μεταληφθεὶς μέγα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ καλὸν ὁ τοῦ καλοῦ.
 20 ἐναντιότης τοίνυν κατὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ποσόν· κατὰ γὰρ
 τὸν τόπον οὐκέτι, ὅτι μὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐπεὶ καί, εἰ τοῦ
 ποσοῦ ἦν ὁ τόπος, οὐκ ἦν ἐναντίον τὸ ἄνω τινὶ μὴ ὄντος
 τοῦ κάτω ἐν τῷ παντί. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ
 κάτω λεγόμενον ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἂν σημαίνοι ἢ ἀνωτέρω καὶ
 25 κατωτέρω καὶ ὅμοιον τῷ “δεξιὸν” καὶ “ἀριστερόν”.
 ταῦτα δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι. συλλαβῇ δὲ καὶ λόγῳ συμβαίνει
 ποσοῖς εἶναι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ποσῷ· φωνῇ γὰρ ποσῇ·
 αὐτῇ¹ δὲ κίνησίς τις· εἰς κίνησιν οὖν ὅλως ἀνακτέον,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

13. Τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς ἀπὸ τοῦ διωρισμένου
 κεχωρίσθαι καλῶς τῷ κοινῷ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ ὄρω εἴρηται·

¹ Ficinus (*ipsa*): αὕτη Enn., H-S¹.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

the opposite "contraction". And the same applies to the continuous, in that our notion of it prolongs the continuous into the distance. So there is a quantum when the unit moves forward, and also when the point does. But if either of them comes to a stop quickly, one is few and the other small; but if the advance does not halt quickly in its progress, one is many and the other large. What then is the defining limit? What is it of the beautiful? Or the hot? And it is possible here also to be hotter. But "the hotter" is said in relation to something, but "the hot" is simply a quale. But in general there must be a rational form of the large just as there is of the beautiful, which when it is participated makes a thing large, as the form of the beautiful makes a thing beautiful. In these respects, then, there is an opposition in the quantitative; for there is no longer one in place, because place does not belong to the quantitative; since, even if place did belong to the quantitative, "up" would not be opposite to anything, since there is no "down" in the All. But when "up" and "down" are spoken of in the parts, they could not mean anything else but "higher up" and "lower down" and are like "right" and "left"; and these belong to the relatives. But "syllable" and "word" have a quantitative character and come under the quantitative; for they are a sound of a certain length¹; but sound itself is a movement; so it must be generally referred to movement, as action is.

13. It has been well said² that the continuous is distinguished from the discrete by the common and

¹ On sound as quantitative cp. VI. 1. 5.

² By Aristotle; *Categories* 6. 4b.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

τὸ δ' ἐντεύθεν ἦδη ἐπὶ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ περιττῷ, ἀρτίῳ.
 καὶ πάλιν, εἴ τινες διαφοραὶ τούτων ἐκατέρου, ἢ
 5 παραλειπτέον τοῖς περὶ ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσιν ἦδη, ἢ δεῖ
 ταύτας μὲν διαφορὰς τῶν μοναδικῶν ἀριθμῶν τίθεσθαι,
 τῶν δ' ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐκέτι. εἰ δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς
 αἰσθητοῖς ἀριθμοὺς χωρίζει ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ
 τούτων τὰς αὐτὰς νοεῖν διαφοράς. τὸ δὲ συνεχές πῶς,
 10 εἰ τὸ μὲν γραμμῇ, τὸ δ' ἐπίπεδον, τὸ δὲ στερεόν; ἢ τὸ
 μὲν ἐφ' ἓν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ δύο, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τρία, οὐκ
 εἰς εἶδη διαιρουμένου δόξει, ἀλλὰ καταρίθμησιν
 μόνον ποιουμένου. εἰ¹ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς οὕτω
 λαμβανομένοις κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον κοινόν
 τι ἐπ' αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔστι γένος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ πρώτης καὶ
 15 δευτέρας καὶ τρίτης αὔξης κοινόν τι ἔσται. ἀλλὰ ἴσως
 καθόσον ποσὸν τὸ ἴσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν μάλλον
 ποσά, τὰ δὲ ἥττον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ πλείω τὰς διαστάσεις
 ἔχῃ, τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἑλάττω. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τοίνυν,
 καθόσον πάντες ἀριθμοί, τὸ κοινὸν αὖ εἴη· ἴσως γὰρ οὐχ
 20 ἢ μονὰς τὴν δυάδα, οὐδ' ἢ δυὰς τὴν τριάδα, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 αὐτὸ πάντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἡμεῖς δ'
 ἐπινοοῦμεν γινόμενα, ἔστω ὁ μὲν ἐλάττω προτέρος, ὁ
 δὲ ὕστερος ὁ μείζων· ἀλλὰ καθόσον ἀριθμοὶ πάντες, ὅφ'
 ἓν. καὶ ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν τοίνυν τὸ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν μετενεκτέον·
 χωριοῦμεν δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων γραμμὴν, ἐπίπεδον,

¹ Westerink, H-S²: ἀεὶ Enn.: ἐπεὶ Theiler, H-S¹.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

the particular limit; and further, in the case of number, that it is distinguished by odd and even. And again, if there are distinctions in each of these [divisions] they should be left to those whose business is number, or we should posit that these are distinctions of the monodic [ideal] numbers, but no longer of those in sense-objects. But if logic separates the numbers in sense-objects [from the objects], nothing prevents us from making in thought the same distinctions of these. But how do we make distinctions in the continuous, if one kind is line, one plane and one solid? Now the distinctions one-dimensional, two-dimensional and three-dimensional do not seem to be proper to one who is dividing into species, but rather to one who is simply making a count. For if in numbers also when they are taken like this according to the before and after, there is no genus common to them, there will be nothing common either to the first, second and third dimensions. But perhaps it is in so far as they are quantitative that they are one and the same, and some of them are not more quantitative and some less, even if some have wider extensions and some narrower. And numbers then would have what is in common to them in so far as they are all numbers; for perhaps the number one does not produce the number two or the number two the number three, but the same produces all. But if the number-series does not come into being, but is, but we think it as having come into being, let the lesser number be earlier and the greater later; but in so far as they are all numbers they are classed under one head. And now we must transfer what applied to numbers to magnitudes: we shall separate from each other line, sur-

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

25 στερεόν, ὃ δὴ κέκληκε σῶμα, τῷ διάφορα τῷ εἶδει
 μεγέθη ὄντα εἶναι. εἰ δὲ δεῖ ἕκαστον τούτων διαιρεῖν,
 γραμμὴν μὲν εἰς εὐθύ, περιφερές, ἑλικοειδές, ἐπίπεδον
 δὲ <εἰς>¹ εὐθύγραμμον καὶ περιφερές σχῆμα, στερεὸν
 δὲ εἰς στερεὰ σχήματα, σφαῖραν, [εἰς]² εὐθυγράμμους
 30 πλευράς, καὶ ταῦτα πάλιν, οἷα οἱ γεωμέτραι ποιούσι
 τρίγωνα, τετράπλευρα, καὶ πάλιν ταῦτα εἰς ἄλλα,
 ἐπισκεπτέον.

14. Τί γὰρ ἂν φαίμεν εὐθείαν; οὐ μέγεθος εἶναι; ἢ
 ποιὸν μέγεθος τὸ εὐθὺ φαίη τις ἂν. τί οὖν κωλύει
 διαφορὰν εἶναι ἢ γραμμῇ;—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλου τινὸς τὸ εὐθὺ
 ἢ γραμμῆς—ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐσίας διαφορὰς κομίζομεν παρὰ
 5 τοῦ ποιού. εἰ οὖν γραμμῇ εὐθεία, ποσὸν μετὰ διαφορᾶς,
 καὶ οὐ σύνθετον διὰ τοῦτο ἢ εὐθεία ἐξ εὐθύτητος καὶ
 γραμμῆς· εἰ δὲ σύνθετον, ὥς μετὰ οἰκείας διαφορᾶς. τὸ
 δ' ἐκ τριῶν γραμμῶν—τὸ τρίγωνον—διὰ τί οὐκ ἐν τῷ
 ποσῷ; ἢ οὐχ ἁπλῶς τρεῖς γραμμαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀλλὰ
 10 οὕτωςι ἔχουσῶν, καὶ τὸ τετράπλευρον τέσσαρες
 οὕτωςι· καὶ γὰρ ἢ γραμμῇ ἢ εὐθείᾳ οὕτωςι καὶ ποσόν.
 εἰ γὰρ τὴν εὐθείαν οὐ ποσὸν μόνον, τί κωλύει καὶ τὴν
 πεπερασμένην μὴ ποσὸν μόνον λέγειν; ἀλλὰ τὸ πέρας τῆς
 γραμμῆς στιγμή καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ. καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον
 15 τοίνυν ἐπίπεδον ποσόν, ἐπεὶ περ γραμμαὶ περατοῦσιν, αἱ
 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. εἰ οὖν τὸ πεπερασμένον
 ἐπίπεδον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, τοῦτο δὲ ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ

¹ Kirchhoff.

² delevimus: καὶ F^{3s} (= Ficinus), Müller.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

face and solid (which Aristotle calls body) by their all being magnitudes specifically different. But we must investigate whether we should divide each of them, line into straight, circular and spiral, plane into rectangular and circular form, solid into solid forms, sphere and those bounded by straight-line sides, and these again, as the geometers do, into those with triangular and those with quadrilateral sides, and these again into others.

14. What, then, are we to say that a straight line is? Is it not that it is a magnitude? Now one could say that the straight is a magnitude of a certain quality. What then prevents it from being a specific differentiation of the line as line?—for the straight does not belong to anything else but a line—since we get our specific differentiations of substance also from the qualitative. If a line, then, is straight, it is a quantum with a specific difference, and the straight line is not for this reason a composite of straight and line; but if it is a composite, it is as with its specific difference. But the figure made of three lines—the triangle—why is it not in the quantitative? Now the triangle is not just three lines, but three lines in this particular disposition, and the quadrilateral four lines in this particular disposition; and indeed the straight line is both disposed in a particular way and quantitative. If then we say that the straight line is not only quantitative, what prevents us from saying that the limited straight line is not only quantitative? But the limit of the line is a point, and not in anything else. And so the limited surface is quantitative, since lines limit it, which are much more in the quantitative. If then the limited surface is in the quantitative, and this is either a quadrilateral or a

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

- πολύπλευρον ἢ ἐξάπλευρον, καὶ τὰ σχήματα πάντα ἐν τῷ ποσῷ. εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον λέγομεν ποιὸν καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον, ἐν ποιῷ θησόμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν 20 πλείοσι κατηγορίαις θέσθαι τὸ αὐτό· καθὸ μὲν μέγεθος καὶ τοσόνδε¹ μέγεθος, ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, καθὸ δὲ τοιάνδε μορφὴν παρέχεται, ἐν ποιῷ. ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ² τοιάδε μορφὴ τὸ τρίγωνον. τί οὖν κωλύει καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν ποιὸν λέγειν; εἰ οὖν τις ὁμόσε χωροῖ, τὴν γεωμετρίαν τοῖνυν 25 οὐ περὶ μεγέθη, ἀλλὰ περὶ ποιότητα καταγίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἡ πραγματεία αὕτη περὶ μεγέθη. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῶν μεγεθῶν οὐκ ἀναιροῦσι τὸ μεγέθη αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐκ οὐσίας τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι. ἔτι πᾶν ἐπίπεδον πεπερασμένον, οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄπειρον εἶναι τι ἐπίπεδον. 30 ἔτι ὥσπερ, ὅταν περὶ οὐσίαν ποιότητα λαμβάνω, οὐσιώδη ποιότητα λέγω, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅταν τὰ σχήματα λαμβάνω, ποσότητος διαφορὰς λαμβάνω. ἔπειτα, εἰ μὴ ταύτας διαφορὰς μεγεθῶν ληψόμεθα, τίνων θησόμεθα; εἰ δὲ μεγεθῶν εἰσι διαφοραί, τὰ 35 γενόμενα ἐκ τῶν διαφορῶν μεγέθη διάφορα ἐν εἵδεσιν αὐτῶν τακτέον.

15. Ἄλλὰ πῶς ἴδιον τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον; ὅμοια γὰρ τρίγωνα λέγεται. ἢ καὶ ὅμοια λέγεται μεγέθη, καὶ ἡ ὁμοιότης λεγομένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ποιῷ· ἴσως γὰρ

¹ Igal, H-S²: τοιόνδε Enn.

² ἢ καθ' αὐτὸ Igal, H-S²: ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ BUC: ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ wx, Perna.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

polygon or a hexagon, then all figures are in the quantitative. But if, because we say that the triangle is a quale and the quadrilateral also, we are going to put them in the qualified, there is no objection to putting the same thing in several categories: in so far as it is a magnitude, and a magnitude of a certain size, it is in the quantitative, but in so far as it presents a shape of a certain quality, it is in the qualitative. Now the triangle is in itself a shape of a certain quality: what then prevents us from calling the sphere a quale? If then one comes to the real point at issue, geometry will not be concerned with magnitudes but with quality. But this does not appear to be so, but this activity is concerned with magnitudes. But the specific differences of magnitudes do not take away their being magnitudes, just as those of substances do not make them non-substances. Further, every surface is limited, for it is not possible for any surface to be unlimited. And further, just as when I grasp a quality of a substance, I call it a substantial quality, so, and much more, when I grasp figures, I grasp specific differences of quantity. Then, if we are not going to take these as specific differences of magnitudes, of what are we going to posit that they are differences? But if they are specific differences of magnitudes, the different magnitudes arising from the differences must be arranged in species of magnitudes.

15. But how do the "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative"? For triangles are spoken of as like. Now, magnitudes are also spoken of as "like" and the likeness which is spoken of does not abolish the fact that the like and the unlike are in the qualitative; for perhaps here in magnitudes

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

- 5 ἐνταῦθα ἐν τοῖς μεγέθεσι τὸ ὅμοιον ἄλλως καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν
 τῷ ποιῷ. ἔπειτα οὐκ, εἰ ἴδιον εἶπε τὸ ἴσον καὶ
 ἄνισον, ἀνείλε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον κατηγορεῖν τινων· ἀλλ’
 εἰ εἶπε τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῦ ποιοῦ,
 ἄλλως λεκτέον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ. εἰ δὲ
 ταυτὸν τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων, ἐπισκέψασθαι δεῖ
 10 ιδιότητος ἄλλας ἐκατέρου τοῦ γένους, τοῦ τε ποσοῦ καὶ
 τοῦ ποιοῦ. ἢ λεκτέον, τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ
 λέγεσθαι, καθόσον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, καθόλου δέ, ὅτι
 συντάττειν δεῖ τὰς συμπληρούσας διαφορὰς τῷ¹ οὐ
 διαφοραί, καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν μόνου ἐκείνου ἢ διαφορὰ ἢ
 15 διαφορά. εἰ δ’ ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐν
 ἄλλῳ δὲ μή, οὐ μὲν συμπληροῖ, συντακτέον, οὐ δὲ μή
 συμπληροῖ, μόνον ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ληπτέον· συμπληροῦν δὲ
 λέγω τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ τὴν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοιάνδε, τοῦ
 “τοιάνδε” προσθήκην οὐκ οὐσιώδη δεχομένου. κακεῖνο
 20 δὲ ἐπισημαντέον, ὅτι ἴσα μὲν λέγομεν καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
 τετράγωνα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων σχημάτων, ἐπιπέδων τε
 καὶ στερεῶν· ὥστε ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον κείσθω ἐπὶ
 ποσοῦ ἴδιον. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοιον, εἰ ἐπὶ ποιοῦ,
 ἐπισκεπτέον.

¹ F^{pc}, Kirchhoff: τοῦ Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

"like" is used differently, and not as in the qualitative. Then, if he¹ said that "equal and unequal properly belong to the quantitative", he did not abolish the possibility of predicating likeness of some magnitudes; but if he said that "the like and unlike belong to the qualitative", then, as we asserted, likeness in the quantitative must be understood in a different way. But if "the like" is understood in the same way also in magnitudes, we must investigate other characteristics proper to each genus, the quantitative and the qualitative. Now we must say that the term "like" can be used also of the quantitative, in so far as the specific differences are present in it, and in general that one ought to class the differences which help to complete the essence under that of which they are the differences, and especially when the specific difference as specific difference belongs to that alone. But if in one it contributes to the completion of the essence, but in the other not, it must be classed where it contributes, but where it does not contribute, simply taken by itself: I mean that it contributes to the completion not simply of the essence, but of the essence of such a kind, since "of such a kind" allows a non-substantial addition. And we must note this as well, that we call both triangles and quadrilaterals "equal" and apply the term to all figures, plane and solid. So let it be established that "equal" and "unequal" properly belong to the quantitative. But we must investigate whether "like" and "unlike" belong to the qualitative.

¹ Aristotle. The statements about equality and inequality and likeness and unlikeness discussed here are *Categories* 6. 6a26 and 8. 11a18-19.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦ ἐλέχθη, ὥς σὺν ἄλλοις μὲν ὕλη καὶ
 25 ποσῷ συμμιχθὲν συμπλήρωσιν ἐργάζεται αἰσθητῆς
 οὐσίας, καὶ ὅτι κινδυνεύει ἡ λεγομένη αὕτη οὐσία εἶναι
 τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν, οὐ τί ἄλλὰ ποιὸν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὁ μὲν
 λόγος εἶναι οἶον πυρὸς τὸ “τί” σημαίνων μᾶλλον, ἣν δὲ
 μορφήν ἐργάζεται, ποιὸν μᾶλλον· καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ
 30 ἀνθρώπου τὸ “τί” εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἀποτελεσθὲν ἐν σώματος
 φύσει εἶδωλον ὃν τοῦ λόγου ποιόν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι. οἶον
 εἰ ἀνθρώπου ὄντος τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ ὀρωμένου ἡ
 εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐν γραφῇ χρώματα καὶ φάρμακα ὄντα
 Σωκράτης λέγοιτο· οὕτως οὖν καὶ λόγου ὄντος, καθ’ ὃν
 35 Σωκράτης, τὸν αἰσθητὸν Σωκράτη <ὀρθῶς λεκτέον οὐ
 Σωκράτη>,¹ ἀλλὰ² χρώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐκείνων τῶν
 ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μιμήματα εἶναι· καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ τοῦτον
 πρὸς τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἤδη λόγον τὸν ἀνθρώπου τὸ αὐτὸ
 πεπονθότα εἶναι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτως.

16. Ἐκαστον δὲ λαμβανόμενον χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 περὶ τὴν λεγομένην οὐσίαν ποιότητα τὴν ἐν τούτοις
 εἶναι, οὐ τὸ “τί” οὐδὲ τὸ “ποσόν” οὐδὲ “κίνησιν”
 σημαίνοντα, χαρακτηῖρα δὲ καὶ τὸ “τοιόνδε” [καὶ τὸ
 5 οἶον]³ καὶ τὸ “ὅποιον”⁴ δηλοῦντα, <οἶον>³ καλὸν
 αἰσχροὺν τὸ ἐπὶ σώματι· ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ καλὸν τὸ τῇδε
 κάκει, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν
 ἄλλα. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ
 πότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ὁμώνυμον τῷ φαινομένῳ; καὶ τοῖς ἐκεί

¹ Igal, H-S²: <λέγομεν> Müller: <λέγομεν Σωκράτη> H-S¹.

² Enn.: lac. † ἀλλὰ Kirchhoff: ἄλλα Harder, Cilento, Theiler.

³ Müller.

⁴ Enn.: ποιὸν Volkmann.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

It was said about the qualitative that, mixed together with others, matter and the quantitative, it effects the completion of sensible substance, and that this so-called substance is this compound of many, and is not a "something" but a "something like"; and the rational form, of fire for instance, indicates rather the "something", but the shape it produces is rather a quale. And the rational form of man is the being a "something", but its product in the nature of body, being an image of the form, is rather a sort of "something like". It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted picture, being colours and painter's stuff, was called Socrates; in the same way, therefore, since there is a rational form according to which Socrates is, the perceptible Socrates should not rightly be said to be Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations of those in the form; and this rational form in relation to the truest form of man is affected in the same way. And so much for that.

16. But when each of the categories which have to do with so-called substance is taken separately, quality [must be said] to be in sense-objects, not the terms signifying "something" or "how much" or "movement" but those indicating the distinctive characteristic and the "of such a kind" and "of what kind", for instance beautiful and ugly applied to the body; for there is only a verbal identity between the beautiful here and there in the intelligible, as there is also between the qualitative here and there; since black and white also are different here and there. But is the qualitative in the seed, that is in the rational principle of a particular kind, the same or only verbally identical with that which appears?

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

10 προσνεμητέον ἢ τοῖς τῇδε; καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν τὸ περὶ τὴν
ψυχὴν; τὸ μὲν γὰρ καλὸν ὅτι ἄλλο, ἤδη δῆλον. ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν
τούτῳ τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, εἰ ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς. ἢ
τὰς μὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ποιοῖς, τὰς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐκεῖ. ἐπεὶ καὶ
τὰς τέχνας λόγους οὖσας ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις εἰ ἐν τοῖς τῇδε·
καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἐν ὕλῃ λόγοι, ἀλλὰ ὕλῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ. ἀλλ'
15 ὅταν καὶ μετὰ ὕλης, πῶς ἐνταῦθα; οἷον κιθαρωδία· καὶ
γὰρ περὶ χορδὰς καὶ μέρος πως τῆς τέχνης ἡ ὥδή, φωνὴ
αἰσθητή, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἐνεργείας ταύτας τις, ἀλλ' οὐ μέρη,
θεῖτο. ἀλλ' οὖν ἐνεργεῖαι αἰσθηταί· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ καλὸν τὸ
ἐν σώματι ἀσώματον· ἀλλ' ἀπέδομεν αὐτὸ αἰσθητὸν ὃν
20 τοῖς περὶ σῶμα καὶ σώματος. γεωμετρίαν δὲ καὶ
ἀριθμητικὴν διττὴν θεμένους τὰς μὲν ὡδὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ
ποιῶ τακτέον, τὰς δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς πραγματείας
πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖ τακτέον. καὶ δὴ καὶ μουσικὴν φησιν
ὁ Πλάτων καὶ ἀστρονομίαν ὡσαύτως. τὰς τοίνυν τέχνας
25 περὶ σῶματα ἐχούσας καὶ ὀργάνοις αἰσθητοῖς καὶ
αἰσθήσει χρωμένας, εἰ καὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι διαθέσεις, ἐπειδὴ
κάτω νευούσης εἰσὶν, ἐν τῷδε τῷ ποιῶ τακτέον. καὶ δὴ
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And is it to be assigned to the intelligibles there or the sense-objects here? And what about ugliness in the soul? For that beauty in the soul is something different [from bodily beauty] is already clear. But if [ugliness or vice in the soul] is in this qualitative here, the question arises if virtue is among the qualitatives here. Perhaps some virtues are among the qualitatives here, and some among those there. Since one might be in some difficulty whether the arts, which are rational forms, belong among those here¹: for even if they are rational forms in matter, their matter is the soul. But when they are also with [bodily] matter, how are they here? Take lyre-playing for instance; for it has to do with the strings, and the tune, sensible sound, is in some way part of the art, unless perhaps one were to suppose that these are activities, not parts. But even so they are sense-perceived activities; since the beauty also which is in body is bodiless; but since it is perceived by the senses we allotted it to what has to do with body and belongs to body. But we suppose that geometry and arithmetic are double, and should rank one kind of them here in this qualitative, but the works of the soul itself directed to the intelligible should be ranked there. And indeed Plato says the same about music and astronomy. So then the arts which are concerned with body and use perceptible tools and sense-perception, even if they are dispositions of the soul, since they are dispositions of the soul inclining downwards are to be ranked in this qualitative here. And indeed there is nothing to

¹ On the status of the arts in the intelligible and sensible worlds see also, V. 9.11–12.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

καὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐνταῦθα τὰς
οὕτω πραττούσας ὡς πολιτικῶς τὸ πράττειν ἔχειν,
30 ὅσαι μὴ χωρίζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄγουσαι,
ἀλλ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ καλῶς ἐνεργοῦσι προηγούμενον τοῦτο,
ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον τιθέμεναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ
σπέρματι τοίνυν καλὸν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὸ μέλαν καὶ τὸ
λευκὸν ἐν τούτοις. τί οὖν; καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην,
ἐν ᾗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι, ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ τῇδε τάξομεν; ἢ οὐδὲ
35 ταῦτα σώματα εἶπομεν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ
σωμάτων ποιήσεις οἱ λόγοι, ἐν ποιότητι ἐθέμεθα τῇ
τῇδε· οὐσίαν δὲ αἰσθητὴν τὸ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
θέμενοι οὐδαμῶς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐν αὐτῇ τάξομεν.
ποιότητος δὲ ἀσωμάτους ἀπάσας λέγοντες ἐν αὐτῇ
40 πάθη ὄντα νενευκότα τῇδε ἐνηριθμήσαμεν καὶ λόγους
ψυχῆς τίνος· τὸ γὰρ πάθος μεμερισμένον εἰς δύο, εἷς τε
τὸ περὶ ὃ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ, τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐδίδομεν ποιότητι
οὐ σωματικῇ οὔσῃ, περὶ σῶμα δὲ οὔσῃ· οὐκέτι δὲ τὴν
ψυχὴν τῇδε τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ὅτι τὸ πρὸς σῶμα αὐτῆς πάθος
ἤδη δεδωκότες ἡμεν ποιῶ· ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ
45 λόγου νοουμένην τῷ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ἀποδεδώκαμεν οὐδεμίαν
οὐσίαν ὅπως οὖν νοητὴν ἐνταῦθα καταλιπόντες.

17. Εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω δοκεῖ, διαιρετέον τὰς μὲν
ψυχικὰς, τὰς δὲ σωματικὰς, ὡς σώματος οὔσας
ποιότητος. εἰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπάσας ἐκεῖ τις βούλεται,

¹ The terminology here is Stoic: cp. SVF III 280.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

prevent us from ranking the practical virtues here below, those which act in such a way that their action is of a civic [or social] kind, all those which do not separate the soul and lead it to the things there above, but work the good life here below, regarding this as preferable but not as necessary.¹ Then the beautiful in the seed and still more the black and the white belong among these here below. Well then, shall we rank the soul of this particular kind, in which these rational forms are, with the substance here below? Now we did not say that these were bodies, but since the rational forms were concerned with bodies and bodies' doings, we put them in the quality here below; but when we take sensible substance to be that which is composed of all that we have mentioned, we shall certainly not rank an incorporeal substance in it. But, though we said that all the qualities were incorporeal, we counted them in the sensible since they are affections inclining to this world and forms belonging to a particular soul; for since the affection is divided into two, into that with which it is concerned and that in which it is, we allotted it to the quality which is not corporeal but in the sphere of body; but we do not go on to allot the soul to the substance here below because we had already allotted its body-directed affection to the qualitative; but when it was thought of without the affection and the rational form [we have been discussing] we have assigned it to the region from which it came and have left no substance in any way intelligible here below.

17. If we think this is so, we should divide qualities into soul-qualities and (as belonging to body) body-qualities. But if one wishes all souls to be in the

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὰς τῇδε ποιότητας ἔστι διαιρεῖν, τὰς μὲν
 5 δι' ὀμμάτων, τὰς δὲ δι' ὠτων, τὰς δὲ δι' ἀφῆς, γεύσεως,
 ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τούτων εἴ τινες διαφοραί, ὅψεσι μὲν
 χρώματα, ἀκοαῖς δὲ φωνάς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι·
 φωνάς δέ, ἥ ποιαί, ἡδύ, τραχύ, λεῖον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς
 διαφορὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότησι διαιρούμεθα καὶ
 10 τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς πράξεις καλὰς ἢ αἰσχροὺς καὶ
 ὅλως τοιάσδε—τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν ἢ ὀλιγάκις εἰς τὰς
 διαφορὰς τὰς εἶδη ποιούσας ἢ οὐδαμοῦ—καὶ τὸ ποσὸν
 δὲ ποιότησι ταῖς αὐτῶν οἰκείαις, πῶς ἂν τις καὶ τὸ
 ποιὸν διέλοι κατ' εἶδη, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, ποίαις
 χρώμενος διαφοραῖς καὶ ἐκ ποίου γένους. ἄτοπον γὰρ
 15 ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὁμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις διαφορὰς οὐσίας
 οὐσίας πάλιν αὖ λέγοι. τίνοι οὖν τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν;
 τίνοι δὲ τὰ χρώματα ὅλως; ἀπὸ χυμῶν καὶ τῶν ἀπτικῶν
 ποιότητων; εἰ δὲ τοῖς διαφόροις αἰσθητηρίοις ταῦτα,
 οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἢ διαφορά. ἀλλὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν
 20 αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν πῶς; εἰ δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν συγκριτικόν, τὸ δὲ
 διακριτικὸν ὀμμάτων, τὸ δὲ διακριτικὸν γλῶττης καὶ
 συγκριτικόν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ περὶ
 αὐτῶν τῶν παθῶν, εἰ διακρίσεις τινὲς καὶ συγκρίσεις
 ταῦτα· ἔπειτα οὐκ αὐτὰ οἷς διαφέρει εἴρηκεν. εἰ δέ τις
 25 λέγοι οἷς δύνανται—καὶ οὐκ ἄλογον δὲ οἷς δύνανται—

¹ This way of explaining the differences of sense-perceived qualities seems to go back to the Atomists: cp. Democritus A 120 DK. It was adopted by Plato (*Timaeus* 67E5–6) and Aristotle (*Metaphysics* I 7. 1057b8–9, *Topica* H 3. 153a38–b1), who is criticised here.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

intelligible one can divide the qualities here below by the senses, some [perceived] through the eyes, some through the ears, some through touch, taste, smell; and if there are any differentiations of these, [they are to be distinguished,] colours by sight, sounds by hearing and [others] by the other senses: sounds, in so far as they are qualified, are sweet, harsh, soft. But, since we distinguish the differentiations of substances by qualities, and activities and actions as fine or ugly and in general of some kind—for the quantitative comes into the differentiations which make species seldom or nowhere—and the quantitative by the qualities peculiar to quanta, one might be in some difficulty about how one should divide the qualitative by species, what kind of differentiations one should use and from what kind of genus one should take them. For it is absurd to divide it by its identical self, as if one said that differentiations of substances were again substances. By what then does one differentiate white and black? And by what colours in general? From tastes and tangible qualities? But if these differentiations are by different sense-organs, the distinction is not in its subjects. But how does one distinguish qualia perceived by the same sense? If it is because one concentrates and one diffuses the eyes, and one diffuses and one concentrates the tongue, first there is a dispute about the experiences themselves, whether these are diffusions and concentrations; and then Aristotle has not stated by what the experiences themselves are differentiated.¹ But if one says "by their powers"²—and "by their powers" is

² Aristotle *Categories* 8. 9a14–16.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ἐκεῖνο ἴσως λεκτέον, ὥς οἷς δύνανται διαιρετέον τὰ μὴ
 ὁρώμενα, οἷον τὰς ἐπιστήμας· αἰσθητὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὄντα
 διὰ τί ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖ; καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις δὲ διαιροῦντες
 οἷς δύνανται, καὶ ὅλως ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσι
 30 διαστησάμενοι ὥς ἕτεραι ἐξ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, ἔχομεν λόγῳ
 διαφορὰς αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν, οὐ μόνον περὶ αᾶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 λόγους αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες. ἢ τὰς μὲν τέχνας ἔξομεν τοῖς
 λόγοις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς θεωρήμασι, τὰς δὲ ἐπὶ σώμασι
 ποιότητος πῶς; ἢ κακεῖ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν διαφόρων
 πῶς ἕτεροι, ζητήσκειν ἂν τις. καὶ γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ
 35 λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος διαφέρειν· ἀλλὰ τίνι, ζητοῦμεν.

18. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἅπαντα τὰ ἀπορηθέντα
 δεικνύει ὥς τῶν ἄλλων δεῖ διαφορὰς ζητεῖν, αἷς
 χωριοῦμεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἕκαστα, τῶν δὲ διαφορῶν
 διαφορὰς καὶ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἄλογον· οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίας
 5 οὐσιῶν οὔτε ποσοῦ ποσότητος οὔτε ποιότητος
 ποιότητων οὔτε διαφορὰς διαφορῶν οἷόν τε. ἀλλ'
 ἀνάγκη, οὐ ἐγχωρεῖ, τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἢ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς ἢ
 τοῖς τοιούτοις· οὐ δὲ μηδὲ ταῦτα, οἷον πράσιον ὠχροῦ,
 ἐπειδὴ¹ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος λέγουσι, τί ἂν τις εἴποι;

¹ Vitringæ: ἐπεὶ δὲ Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

not unreasonable—one should perhaps reply that invisible things are to be distinguished by their powers, branches of knowledge for instance; but why should these, which are perceptible, be distinguished by what they do? And when in the case of branches of knowledge we are distinguishing them by their powers, and in general with the powers of soul separating them as different by what they do, we are able to grasp their differentiations rationally, since we see not only what they are concerned with, but their rational forms. We shall be able to divide the arts by their rational forms and their theories, but how shall we divide the qualities in bodies? Now even in that case one might enquire how the differing rational forms are different. And white certainly does appear to differ from black: but by what, we are still enquiring.

18. But all these points of difficulty show that one should look for differentiations of other things, by which we separate them from each other, but to look for differentiations of differentiations is impossible and irrational: for it is not possible to look for substances of substances or quantities of quantity or qualities of qualities or differentiations of differentiations. But it is necessary, where the circumstances admit, [to distinguish them] by their powers to make or something of the sort; but where even these are not present, as [when distinguishing] leek-green from greenish-yellow (since they say¹ that these belong to white and black), what is one going to say? But the truth is that it is either sense-

¹ The Peripatetics: cp. Aristotle *De Sensu* 4. 442a24–25; *Categories* 10. 12a18.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὅτι ἕτερα, ἢ αἰσθησις ἢ ὁ νοῦς ἐρεῖ, καὶ οὐ
10 δώσουσι λόγον, ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις, ὅτι μηδ' αὐτῆς ὁ λόγος,
ἀλλὰ μόνον μηνύσεις διαφόρους ποιήσασθαι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς
ἐν ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἐπιβολαῖς ἀπλαῖς καὶ οὐ λόγοις χρήται
πανταχοῦ, ὥς λέγειν ἕκαστον τόδε τόδε, τόδε τόδε· καὶ
ἔστιν ἑτερότης ἐν ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὐτοῦ διαιρούσα
15 θάτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου οὐχ ἑτερότητος αὐτῇ δεομένη. αἱ
τοῖνυν ποιότητες πότερα διαφοραὶ πᾶσαι γένοιτο ἂν ἢ
οὔ; λευκότης μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὅλως αἱ χροαὶ καὶ <αἱ>¹ περὶ
ἀφὴν καὶ χυμοὺς γένοιτο ἂν διαφοραὶ ἐτέρων καὶ εἶδη
ὄντα, γραμματικὴ δὲ καὶ μουσικὴ πῶς; ἢ τῷ τὴν μὲν
20 γραμματικὴν ψυχὴν, τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν, καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ
φύσει εἶεν, ὥστε καὶ εἰδοποιοὺς διαφορὰς γίνεσθαι. καὶ
εἰ εἴη τις οὖν διαφορά, ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γένους ἢ καὶ ἐξ
ἄλλου· καὶ εἰ ἐκ ταύτου γένους, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
γένους, οἷον ποιότητων ποιότητας. ἀρετὴ γὰρ καὶ
κακία ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἕξις τοιάδε, ἢ δὲ τοιάδε· ὥστε
25 ποιότητων οὐσῶν τῶν ἕξεων αἱ διαφοραὶ ποιότητες· εἰ
μή τις φαίη τὴν μὲν ἕξιν ἄνευ τῆς διαφορᾶς μὴ ποιότητα
εἶναι, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν τὴν ποιότητα ποιεῖν. ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ
γλυκὺ ὠφέλιμον, βλαβερὸν δὲ τὸ πικρὸν, σχέσει, οὐ
ποιότητι, διαιρεῖ. τί δ' εἰ τὸ γλυκὺ παχύ, τὸ δὲ
30 αὐστηρὸν λεπτόν; οὐ τί ἦν γλυκὺ ἴσως λέγει παχύ, ἀλλ'

¹ Müller, Cilento, Theiler.

¹ This sentence is one of the clearest statements in Plotinus of the close resemblance between αἰσθήσις and νοήσις: cp. VI. 7. 7. 29-31; he seems here to be developing the

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

perception or intellect which says that they are different, and they will not give a reason, sense-perception because the reason does not belong to it, but only giving different indications, but the intellect everywhere uses its own simple acts of attention, not reasons, so that it says of each thing "this is this and that is that"; and there is an otherness in its movements which distinguishes one thing from another and does not itself need an otherness.¹ Then will all qualities be differentiations or not? Whiteness, indeed, and colours in general and touch- and taste-qualities would be differentiations of other things even if they are species, but how could literature and music be? By the fact that one soul is literary and another musical, especially when they are so by nature, so that these become species-forming differentiations. And if quality, then, was a differentiation, it would be either from this genus or also from another; and if from the same genus, it would be a differentiation of what is from the same genus, qualities of qualities for instance. For virtue and vice are states, one of this kind and one of that; so that since states are qualities the differentiations are qualities; unless one were to say that the state without the differentiation was not a quality, but the differentiation made the quality. But if [one says] that the sweet is beneficial but the bitter harmful, one is distinguishing them by relation, not quality. But suppose [one says] that the sweet is dense and the sour rare? One does not perhaps mean that what the sweet is is dense, but that in which the sweetness

thought of Aristotle: cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI 11. 1143a35-b5.

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ὦ ἡ γλυκύτης· καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐστηροῦ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.
ὥστε εἰ πανταχοῦ μὴ ποιότητος ποιότης διαφορά
σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οὐσίας οὐσία, οὐδὲ ποσοῦ
ποσότης. ἢ τὰ πέντε τῶν τριῶν διαφέρει δυσίν. ἢ
ὑπερέχει δυσί, “διαφέρει” δ’ οὐ λέγεται· πῶς γὰρ ἂν
35 καὶ διαφέρει δυσίν ἐν τοῖς τρισίν; ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ κίνησις
κινήσεως κινήσει διαφέρει ἂν, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἂν
τις εὔροι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ
ὅλον ληπτέον, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοῖς διοίσει. τὸ δὲ ἐκ ταυτοῦ
γένους, τοῦ ποιοῦ, καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἄλλου, εἴ τις διαιροῖ τῷ τὴν
40 μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς, τὴν δὲ περὶ ὀργάς, καὶ τὴν μὲν περὶ
καρποῦ κομιδὴν, καὶ οὕτω παραδέξαιτο καλῶς
ᾠρίσθαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι διαφορὰς εἶναι καὶ μὴ
ποιότητας.

19. Τῇ δὲ ποιότητι συντακτέον, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει, καὶ
τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὰς ποιούς, καθόσον ποιότης περὶ αὐτούς,
οὐ προσποιουμένους αὐτούς, ἵνα μὴ κατηγορίαι δύο,
ἀλλ’ εἰς τοῦτο ἀνιόντας ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, ἀφ’ οὗ λέγονται. τὸ
5 δὲ οὐ λευκόν, εἰ μὲν σημαίνει ἄλλο χρῶμα, ποιότης· εἰ
δὲ ἀπόφασις μόνον εἴη, [πραγμάτων ἢ ἐξαρίθμησις]¹
οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὴ φωνὴ ἢ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος γινομένου
κατ’² αὐτοῦ πράγματος· καὶ εἰ μὲν φωνή, κίνησίς τις, εἰ
δ’ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος, πρὸς τι, καθὸ σημαντικά. εἰ δὲ μὴ
10 μόνον πραγμάτων ἢ ἐξαρίθμησις κατὰ γένος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ σημαίνοντα, τίνος ἕκαστον

¹ del. Theiler.

² coniecimus: καὶ Enn.

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is; and the same applies to the sour. So one must investigate whether everywhere quality is a differentiation of what is not quality, as substance is not a differentiation of substance or quantity of quantity. Now five differs from three by two. No, it exceeds by two and "difference" is not the word used: for how could it differ by "two" which is in the "three"? But neither would movement differ by movement from movement, nor would one find this in the other genera. But with vice and virtue one must compare the whole with the whole, and so one will distinguish the wholes by themselves. But as for the differentiations being derived from the same genus, the qualitative, and not from another, if one distinguished by one [virtue or vice] being concerned with pleasures, and one with tempers, and one with the acquisition of produce, and accepted that this was a good distinction, it is clear that it is possible for non-qualities also to be differentiations.

19. We should rank with quality, as it appeared, the differentiated qualia, in so far as there is quality in them, not bringing them themselves into consideration, to avoid having two categories, but going up from them, to that after which they are called qualia. But the "not-white", if it indicates another colour, is a quality; but if it was only a negation it would be nothing but a sound or a name or a definition of the thing to which it is applicable; and if it is a sound, it is a movement, but if it is a name or definition, it is relative in that these are significant. But if there is not only a counting-out of things according to their genus, but one must also count out the words and the significations, saying what genus each of them signifies, we shall say that

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γένους σημαντικόν, ἐροῦμεν τὰ μὲν τίθεσθαι αὐτὰ μόνον
 δηλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ ἀναιρεῖν αὐτά. καίτοι βέλτιον ἴσως τὰς
 ἀποφάσεις αὐτῶν μὴ συναριθμεῖν τὰς γε καταφάσεις
 15 διὰ τὸ σύνθετον μὴ συναριθμοῦντας. τὰς δὲ στερήσεις
 πῶς; [τὰς δὲ στερήσεις]¹ εἰ ὧν αἱ στερήσεις ποιότητες,
 καὶ αὐταὶ ποιότητες, οἶον νωδὸς ἢ τυφλός. ὁ δὲ γυμνὸς
 καὶ ἡμφιεσμένος οὐδέτερος ποιός, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πως
 ἔχων· ἐν σχέσει οὖν τῇ πρὸς ἄλλο. πάθος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ
 πάσχειν ἔτι οὐ ποιότης, ἀλλὰ τις κίνησις· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ
 20 πεπονθέναι καὶ ἔχειν μένόν ἤδη τὸ πάθος ποιότης· εἰ δὲ
 μὴ ἔχοι ἔτι τὸ πάθος, λέγοιτο δὲ πεπονθέναι,
 κεκινήσθαι· τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτὸν τῷ “ἦν ἐν κινήσει”. δεῖ δὲ
 μόνον κίνησιν νοεῖν ἀφαιροῦντα τὸν χρόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 οὐδὲ τὸ “νῦν” προσλαμβάνειν προσήκει. τὸ δὲ “καλῶς”
 25 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς μίαν νόησιν τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀνακτέον.
 εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐρυθριᾶν εἰς τὸ ποιὸν ἀνακτέον, τὸν δὲ
 ἐρυθρὸν μηκέτι, ἐπισκεπτέον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρυθραίνεσθαι
 ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀνακτέον· πάσχει γὰρ ἢ ὅλως κινεῖται· εἰ δὲ
 μηκέτι ἐρυθραίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἤδη ἔστι, διὰ τί οὐ ποιός; οὐ
 30 γὰρ χρόνῳ ὁ ποιός—ἢ τίνι ὀριστέον;—ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιῷδε,
 καὶ ἐρυθρὸν λέγοντες ποιὸν λέγομεν· ἢ οὕτως τὰς ἑξῆς

¹ del. Creuzer.

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positive terms posit things by simply indicating them, but negative terms take them away. Yet perhaps it is better not to count in the negations, at any rate if we do not count in the positive terms because they are composite. But what about privations? If what they are privations of are qualities, they themselves are qualities, "toothless" or "blind" for instance. But the "naked" and the "clothed" are neither of them qualified, but rather in a particular state: in a relation, therefore, to something else. An affection, as long as being affected continues, is not a quality but a kind of movement; but when affection means having been affected and having the affection still remaining, it is a quality, but if something does not still have the affection but is said to have been affected, this means to have been moved; and this is the same as "was in movement". But one must only think of the movement, taking away the time: for it is not even proper to bring in the "now". The "well done" and such-like are to be referred to the single notion of the genus. But we must enquire whether being of a red complexion is to be referred to the qualitative, but not as well the [temporarily] red-faced man. Now turning red in the face is correctly not so referred; for there is affection or in general movement; but if someone is not any more turning red, but is red in the face already, why is he not qualified? For being qualified does not depend on time—or by what interval of time would it be defined?—but by being of such a kind, and when we say "red-faced" we say "qualified"; or otherwise we shall only call [settled] states, and not any more

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

μόνας ποιότητος ἐροῦμεν, τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκέτι. καὶ θερμὸς τοίνυν οὐχ ὁ θερμαινόμενος, καὶ νοσῶν οὐχ ὁ ἀγόμενος εἰς νόσον.

20. Ὅρᾶν δὲ δεῖ, εἰ μὴ πάση ποιότητί ἐστί τις ἄλλη ἐναντία· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ μέσον τοῖς ἄκροις δοκεῖ ἐπ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἐναντίον εἶναι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν χρωμάτων τὰ μεταξὺ οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι μίξεις τῶν ἄκρων τὰ
5 μεταξὺ, ἔδει μὴ ἀντιδιαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ λευκῶ καὶ μέλανι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συνθέσεις. ἢ τῷ μίαν τινὰ ἄλλην ἐπὶ τῶν μεταξὺ, καὶ ἐκ συνθέσεως ἢ, θεωρεῖσθαι ἀντιτίθεμεν. ἢ ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐ μόνον διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείστον. ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει τὸ πλείστον διαφέρειν λαμβάνεσθαι ἐν
10 τῷ θέσθαι ἤδη ταῦτα τὰ μεταξὺ· ἐπεὶ, εἴ τις ταύτην τὴν διάταξιν ἀφέλοι, τίνοι τὸ πλείστον ὀριεῖ; ἢ ὅτι τὸ φαιὸν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ λευκοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ μέλαν· καὶ τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς ὀψεως μὴνύεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν χυμῶν ὡσαύτως <καὶ τῶν ἀπτῶν πικρὸν γλυκύ>,¹ θερμὸν ψυχρόν, τὸ μῆδέτερον μεταξὺ· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν
15 εἰθίσμεθα, δῆλον, τάχα δ' ἂν τις ἡμῖν οὐ συγχωροί ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν πρὸς ὁτιοῦν ὁμοίως πάντα ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι καὶ ἕτερα

¹ H-S².

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

[temporary] dispositions, qualities. And then a warm man would not be a man who is getting warm, and a sick man not a man on the way to sickness.

20. But one must see if there is not to every quality another contrary one; since in the case of virtue and vice even the mean appears to be contrary to the extremes. But in the case of colours [he¹ says that] the intermediates are not so. Perhaps therefore, because the intermediate colours are mixtures of the extremes, we ought not to make a division of them by opposition, but [only] by white and black, [regarding] the others as compositions [of white and black]. Or else we divide them by opposition because one particular colour among the intermediates is different [from the others] even if they can be seen as resulting from composition. Or because the contraries do not only differ, but differ as much as possible. But it is likely that "differing as much as possible" is only apprehended in already positing these intermediates: since if one takes away this arrangement of intermediates, by what will one define "as much as possible"? Or because grey is nearer to white than black is; and we are informed of this by sight, and it is the same with tastes and touch-sensations, bitter, sweet, hot, cold, and what is neither in between; but that this is how we are accustomed to apprehend things is clear, but perhaps someone would not concede us this, that white and yellow and any colour in relation to any other are altogether different from each other, and since

¹ Aristotle. Plotinus is contrasting *Nicomachean Ethics* II 5. 1106b24–28 (on virtue and vice as mean and extremes) with e.g. *Categories* 8. 10b12–18 (on colours).

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ὄντα ποιά ἐναντία εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι μεταξὺ
 αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἢ ἐναντιότης. ὑγιεία γοῦν καὶ νόσῳ
 20 οὐδὲν παρεμπέπτωκε μεταξὺ, καὶ ἐναντία· ἢ ὅτι τὰ
 γινόμενα ἐξ ἐκατέρου πλείστην παραλλαγὴν ἔχει. καὶ
 πῶς πλείστην ἔστιν εἰπεῖν μὴ οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς μέσοις
 ἐλαττόνων; οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἐπὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου
 πλείστον εἰπεῖν. ἄλλω τοίνυν τὸ ἐναντίον, οὐ τῷ
 πλείστον, ὀριστέον. εἰ δὲ τῷ πολλῷ, εἰ μὲν τὸ πολὺ ἀντὶ
 25 τοῦ πλέον πρὸς ἔλαττον, πάλιν τὰ ἅμεσα ἐκφεύξεται·
 εἰ δ' ἀπλῶς πολὺ, ἐκάστη φύσει πολὺ ἀφεστάναι
 συγχωρηθέντος, μὴ τῷ πλείονι μετρεῖν τὴν ἀπόστασιν.
 ἀλλ' ἐπισκεπτέον, πῶς τὸ ἐναντίον. ἄρ' οὖν τὰ μὲν
 ἔχοντά τινα ὁμοιότητα—λέγω δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ γένος οὐδὲ
 30 πάντως τῷ μεμίχθαι ἄλλαις οἶον μορφαῖς αὐτῶν—ἢ
 πλείονα ἢ ἐλάττονα οὐκ ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οἷς μηδὲν ταῦτόν
 κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἐναντία; καὶ προσθετέον δέ· ἐν γένει τῷ
 ποιῷ. ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἅμεσα τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷς
 μηδὲν εἰς ὁμοίωσιν, οὐκ ὄντων ἄλλων τῶν οἶον
 ἐπαμφοτεριζόντων καὶ ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλληλα
 35 ἔχόντων, τῶν δέ τινων μόνων μὴ ἔχόντων. εἰ τοῦτο, οἷς
 μὲν ἔστι κοινότης ἐν τοῖς χρώμασιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐναντία.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

they are different qualia are contrary. For their contrariety is not due to the fact that there are intermediates, but to this being different. At any rate, no intermediate intervenes between health and sickness, and they are contraries: perhaps because the results of each have the greatest possible difference. And how is it possible to say "the greatest possible" if there are not lesser differences in the intermediates? One cannot therefore say "the greatest possible" in the case of health and sickness. So contrariety is to be determined by something else, not by the "as much as possible". But if it is determined by the "much", if "much" is said instead of "more" compared with "less", again the contraries without intermediates will get away; but if it means simply "much", when it is agreed that there is much distance between each and every thing, one cannot measure the distance by the "more". But we must investigate how there is contrariety. Is it, then, that things which have some likeness—I do not mean likeness according to genus, nor at all that which results from the mixture of something like other forms of them—either greater or lesser, are not contraries, but those are contraries which have nothing the same in their specific form? And one must add: in the genus of quality. For then also the contraries which have no intermediates [will be contrary], those which have nothing tending to likeness, as there are no others which so to speak face both ways and have a likeness to each other—but of some of them only some intermediates do not have a likeness. If this is so those among colours which have something in common will not be contraries. But there will be nothing to prevent, not

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύσει μὴ πᾶν μὲν παντί, ἄλλο δὲ ἄλλω
 οὕτως εἶναι ἐναντίον, καὶ ἐπὶ χυμῶν ὡσαύτως. ταῦτα
 μὲν οὕτω διηπορήσθω. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐν μὲν τοῖς
 40 μετέχουσιν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἐδόκει, ὑγίεια δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ
 δικαιοσύνη ἠπορεῖτο. εἰ δὴ πλάτος ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστη
 αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς ἑξεῖς αὐτὰς δοτέον· ἐκεῖ δ' ἕκαστον τὸ
 ὅλον καὶ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μᾶλλον.

21. Περὶ δὲ κινήσεως, εἰ δεῖ γένος θέσθαι, ὥδ' ἂν τις
 θεωρήσειε· πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ μὴ εἰς ἄλλο γένος ἀνάγειν
 προσήκεν, ἔπειτα, εἰ μηδὲν ἄνωθεν αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι
 κατηγοροῖτο, εἴτα, εἰ πολλὰς διαφορὰς λαβούσα εἶδη
 5 ποιήσει. εἰς ποῖόν τις γένος αὐτὴν ἀνάξει; οὔτε γὰρ
 οὐσία οὔτε ποιότης τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτὴν· οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰς
 τὸ ποιεῖν—καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν πολλαὶ κινήσεις—
 οὐδ' αὖ εἰς τὸ πάσχειν, ὅτι πολλαὶ κινήσεις ποιήσεις·
 ποιήσεις δὲ καὶ πείσεις εἰς ταύτην. οὐδ' αὖ εἰς τὸ πρὸς
 10 τι ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τινὸς ἢ κίνησις καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' αὐτῆς· οὕτω
 γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι· τινὸς γὰρ ἢ ποιότης
 καὶ ἔν τινι· καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ὡσαύτως. εἰ δ' ὅτι ὄντα ἐκείνᾳ
 τινα, καὶ τινος ἢ καθό ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ποιότης, τὸ δὲ
 ποσότης εἴρηται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἐπειδὴ, καὶ τινος ἢ
 κίνησις ἢ, ἔστι τι πρὸ τοῦ τινος εἶναι, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐφ' αὐτοῦ

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every colour being contrary to every colour, but one colour to another. And the same will apply to tastes. And let that be the end of this discussion. But as for the "more" it appeared that it is in the participants, but there was a difficulty about health and justice. Certainly if each of these has the breadth for it, the permanent states themselves must be granted to have it. But there in the intelligible each is the whole and does not have a "more".

21. About movement, whether one should posit it as a genus, one might look at it in this way: first, whether it would not be appropriate to refer it to another genus, and then whether nothing higher than it could be predicated of it in its essence, and then whether by receiving many differentiations it will make species. To what genus will one refer it? For it is neither substance or quality of the things which have it; one will certainly not refer it to active doing and making—for there are certainly many movements in passivity—nor to passivity because many movements are active doings and makings; but one should rather refer activities and passivities to this [genus of movement]. Nor again could it be correctly referred to relation, because movement is movement of something and not on its own; for in this way the qualitative would be in the category of relation; for quality is quality of something and in something; and the same will apply to the quantitative. But if it is because these are something particular, even if in so far as they exist they are of something else, that one is called quality and the other quantity, in the same way, since, even if movement is movement of something, it is something before it is of something, we should grasp what it is

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

15 ληπτέον ἂν εἶη. ὅλως γὰρ πρὸς τι δεῖ τίθεσθαι οὐχ ὅ
ἐστιν, εἴτ' ἄλλου ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἡ σχέσις ἀπογεννᾷ
οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἄλλου παρὰ τὴν σχέσιν καθὸ λέγεται, οἷον
τὸ διπλάσιον καθὸ λέγεται διπλάσιον ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ
πηχναῖον παραβολῇ τὴν γένεσιν λαβὼν καὶ τὴν
20 ὑπόστασιν οὐδὲν νοούμενον πρὸ τούτου ἐν τῷ πρὸς
ἕτερον παραβεβλήσθαι ἔσχε τοῦτο λέγεσθαι τε καὶ
εἶναι. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐτέρου ὃν ἐστὶ τι, ἵνα καὶ
ἐτέρου ᾗ, ὥς τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ ἡ οὐσία; ἢ
πρότερον, ὅτι μηδὲν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὥς γένος κατηγορεῖται,
25 ληπτέον. ἀλλ' εἰ τὴν μεταβολὴν τις λέγοι πρὸ κινήσεως
εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ταῦτόν λέγει ἢ γένος λέγων ἐκείνο
ποιήσει ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ πρόσθεν εἰρημένα· εἴτα δῆλον,
ὅτι ἐν εἵδει τὴν κίνησιν θήσεται καὶ τι ἕτερον ἀντιθήσει
τῇ κινήσει, τὴν γένεσιν ἴσως, μεταβολὴν τινα κακεῖνην
30 λέγων, κίνησιν δὲ οὐ. διὰ τί οὖν οὐ κινήσις ἢ γένεσις; εἰ
μὲν γάρ, ὅτι μήπω ἐστὶ τὸ γινόμενον, κινήσις δὲ οὐ περὶ
τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν μεταβολὴ δηλονότι ἂν εἶη ἢ γένεσις.
εἰ δ' ὅτι ἡ γένεσις ἐστίν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀλλοιώσις τις
καὶ αὐξή τῷ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν καὶ αὐξομένων τὴν
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on its own. In general, one should posit as relative not what first is, and then is of something else, but what the relationship generates without there being anything else beside the relationship in virtue of which it gets its name, for instance the double, in so far as it is called double, has its origin and its existence in the comparison with the single cubits-length, and, without anything before this entering the mind, is called and is double in being compared with something else. What then [in the case of movement] is this, which, though it is of something, is something in order to be of something, like the qualitative and the quantitative and substance? Now first we must understand that nothing prior to it is predicated of it as its genus. But if someone were to say¹ that change is prior to motion, first of all he is either speaking of the same thing, or, if he is calling change a genus, he will be making another genus besides those previously mentioned; then it is clear that he will set movement among the species [of change] and set some other kind [of change] against movement, perhaps coming-to-be, saying that it also is a change, but not a movement. Why then is not coming-to-be a movement? If it is because what is coming into being does not yet exist, but movement has nothing to do with the non-existent, coming-to-be obviously could not be change either. But if it is because coming-to-be is nothing but a change of quality and an increase of quantity, because coming-to-be takes place when certain things are changed and increased, he is thinking

¹ Aristotle, *Physics* E 1. 225a34–b3; the discussion of Aristotle continues through the rest of the chapter.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

γένεσιν εἶναι, τὰ πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως λαμβάνει. δεῖ δὲ τὴν
 35 γένεσιν ἐν τούτοις ἑτερόν τι εἶδος λαβεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ
 ἀλλοιοῦσθαι παθητικῶς τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἡ γένεσις,
 οἷον θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ λευκαίνεσθαι—ἔστι γὰρ τούτων
 γενομένων μήπω τὴν ἀπλῶς γένεσιν γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 τι γίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ἡλλοιωῖσθαι—ἀλλ' ὅταν
 40 <εἶδος τι λαμβάνη>¹ ζῶον ἢ φυτόν [ὅταν εἶδος τι
 λαμβάνη].¹ εἴποι δ' ἂν τις τὴν μεταβολὴν μᾶλλον
 ἀρμόττειν ἐν εἶδει τίθεσθαι ἢ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῆς
 μεταβολῆς ἄλλο ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἐθέλει σημαίνειν, τὸ δὲ τῆς
 κινήσεως ἔχει καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οἰκείου μετάστασιν,
 ὥσπερ ἡ τοπικὴ κίνησις. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο βούλεται τις,
 45 ἀλλ' ἡ μάθησις καὶ ἡ κιθάρισις, ἢ ὅλως ἡ ἀφ' ἑξέως
 κίνησις. ὥστε εἶδος τι ἂν εἴη κινήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ
 ἀλλοιώσεως ἐκστατικὴ τις οὔσα κίνησις.

22. Ἄλλ' ἔστω ταῦτόν νοούμενον τὸ τῆς
 ἀλλοιώσεως κατὰ τὸ παρακολουθεῖν τῇ κινήσει τὸ
 ἄλλο. τί οὖν δεῖ λέγειν τὴν κίνησιν; ἔστω δὴ ἡ κίνησις,
 ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἐκ δυνάμεως ὁδὸς εἰς ἐκείνο, ὃ
 5 λέγεται δύνασθαι. ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ <μὲν>² δυνάμει [τοῦ
 μὲν],² ὅτι ἦκοι ἂν εἰς εἶδος τι, οἷον δυνάμει ἀνδριάς, τοῦ
 δέ, ὅτι ἦκοι ἂν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, οἷον τὸ βαδιστικόν, ὅταν
 τὸ μὲν προῆ³ εἰς ἀνδριάντα, ἢ πρόοδος κίνησις, τὸ δ' ἐν
 τῷ βαδίζειν ἦ, τὸ βαδίζειν αὐτὸ κίνησις· καὶ ὄρχησις
 ἐπὶ τοῦ δυναμένου ὀρχεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀρχῇται. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν

¹ Theiler.

² H-S².

³ Kirchhoff (*procedit* Ficinus): προσίη Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

about what is prior to coming-to-be. But one must consider coming-to-be in these things here to be a different species. For having come to be and becoming do not consist in being passively changed, like being heated or whitened—for it is possible when these changes occur that coming-to-be in the absolute sense has not yet occurred, but only coming to be something, that is, this very change we are talking about—but when an animal or a plant acquires a specific form. But someone might say that it is more appropriate to make change a species than movement, because change intends to signify one thing instead of another, but the range of meaning of movement includes transition which does not take a thing out of its proper nature, such as local movement. But if this is not what one intends, it must be learning and playing the lyre, or in general movement which comes from a state. So change would be rather a species of movement, being a movement which takes a thing out of itself.

22. But let us grant that the idea of change is the same [as that of movement] in that "different" is a consequence of movement. What, then, are we to say that movement is? Let us grant that movement, to describe it sketchily, is the passage from potentiality to that which it is said to be the potentiality of. For one thing is potential because it can arrive at a particular form, potentially a statue for instance, and another because it can arrive at an activity, the activity of walking for instance, and when one progresses to a statue, its progress is movement, and when the other is engaged in walking, the walking itself is movement; and, with someone who is a potential dancer, his dancing whenever he dances is

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

- 10 τινι κινήσει τῇ εἰς ἀνδριάντα εἶδος ἄλλο ἐπιγίγνεται, ὃ εἰργάσατο ἢ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀπλοῦν εἶδος ὃν τῆς δυνάμεως, ἢ ὀρχησις, οὐδὲν ἔχει μετ' αὐτὴν παυσαμένης τῆς κινήσεως. ὥστε, εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν εἶδος ἐγρηγορὸς ἀντίθετον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶδεσι τοῖς ἐστηκόσιν,
- 15 ἢ τὰ μὲν μένει, τὸ¹ δὲ οὐ, καὶ αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶδεσιν, ὅταν μετ' αὐτὴν τι γίνηται, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἴη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ζωὴν τις λέγοι σωμάτων ταύτην, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος νῦν, τὴν γε κίνησιν ταύτην ὁμώνυμον δεῖ λέγειν ταῖς νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς κινήσεσιν. ὅτι δὲ γένος ἐστίν, οὐχ ἦττον ἂν τις
- 20 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι ὀρισμῶ ἢ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἶναι λαβεῖν πιστώσαιοτο. ἀλλὰ πῶς εἰδός τι, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἢ κίνησις ἢ ὅλως παθητικὴ ἢ κίνησις; ἢ ὁμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν ἡ θέρμανσις τὰ μὲν αὖξῃ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὰ δ' εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄγῃ, καὶ ἢ κοινόν τι ἢ κίνησις καὶ ἢ
- 25 αὐτὴ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, τοῖς δὲ ὑποκειμένοις τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν δοκοῦσαν ἔχῃ. ὑγίανσις οὖν καὶ νόσανσις ταυτόν; ἢ καθόσον μὲν κίνησις ταυτόν· τίνι δὲ διοίσει; πότερα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἢ καὶ ἄλλω; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ὕστερον, ὅταν περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ἐπισκοπῶμεν. νῦν δὲ τί ταυτόν ἐν πάσῃ κινήσει σκεπτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ γένος εἴη. ἢ
- 30 πολλαχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ οὕτως ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ὄν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι ἴσως δεῖ, ὅσαι μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄγουσιν ἢ ἐνεργοῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, ταύτας μὲν οἶον εἶδη εἶναι, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀγωγὰς ἀνάλογον τίθεσθαι τοῖς ἐφ' ᾧ

¹ Harder, Theiler: τὰ Enn.

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

movement. And in one kind of movement, that to the statue, another form is acquired which the movement has made, but the other kind, dancing, as being a simple form of the potentiality, has nothing after it when the movement has stopped. So that it would not be inappropriate if one were to say that movement is a form awake, opposed to the other forms which are static, in that they abide but it does not, and is a cause to other forms, when something comes to be after it. But if someone were to say that this movement which we are now discussing is the life of bodies, one must give it the same name as the movements of Intellect and Soul. But one could be confident that movement is a genus no less because it is difficult, or even impossible, to comprehend it in a definition. But how can it be a form, in cases when the movement is to the worse, or in general passive? It is like when heating, the heating from the sun, makes some things grow and takes others the opposite way, and it is the same for both, but the apparent difference is in the subjects. Is it the same as becoming healthy or sick? Yes, in so far as they are movements it is the same; but in what will the difference lie? Will it be in the subjects, or in something else? But we will discuss this later, when we consider change. But now we must investigate what is the same in all movement: for in this way it could be a genus. Or perhaps it might be used in many senses, and be a genus in the way that being is. And [we must investigate] as well the difficulty that perhaps all the movements which lead to what is according to nature or are active in what is according to nature must be like species-forms, as has been said, but those which lead to what is against nature

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

- 35 ἄγουσιν. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ τε ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ
 αὐξήσεως καὶ γενέσεως καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ἐπὶ¹
 τε τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς, καθὼς κινήσεις αὗται
 πᾶσαι; ἢ τὸ μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἕκαστον, ἐν ᾧ πρότερον ἦν,
 εἶναι μὴδ' ἡρεμεῖν μὴδ' ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ παντελεῖ, ἀλλὰ,
 40 καθόσον κινήσεις πάρεστιν, αἰεὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τὴν ἀγωγὴν
 ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν· ἀπόλλυσθαι
 γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν, ὅταν μὴ ἄλλο· διὸ καὶ ἑτερότης οὐκ ἐν
 τῷ γεγονέναι καὶ μέναι ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἑτερότης.
 ὅθεν καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἕτερον αἰεὶ, διότι κινήσεις αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.
 45 μεμετρημένη γὰρ κινήσεις οὐ μένουσα· συνθεῖ οὖν αὕτῃ
 ὡς ἐπὶ φερομένης ὀχούμενος. κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκ
 δυνάμεως καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν πρόοδον καὶ
 ἀγωγὴν εἶναι· πᾶν γὰρ τὰ κινούμενον καθ' ὅποιον οὖν
 κίνησιν, προϋπάρχον δυνάμενον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
 ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι γίγνεται.

23. Καὶ ἔστιν ἡ κινήσεις ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ παρ'
 ἄλλου ἐνιεμένη σείουσα καὶ ἐλαύνουσα καὶ ἐγείρουσα
 καὶ ὠθοῦσα τὰ μεταλαβόντα αὐτῆς, ὥστε μὴ εὔδειν
 μὴδ' ἐν ταυτότητι εἶναι, ἵνα δὴ τῇ μὴ ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ οἶον
 5 πολυπραγμονήσει ταύτῃ εἰδῶλῳ συνέχεται ζωῆς. δεῖ
 δὲ οὐ τὰ κινούμενα τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι νομίζειν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ
 πόδες ἢ βάδισις, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τοὺς πόδας ἐνέργεια ἐκ
 δυνάμεως. ἀοράτου δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης τοὺς

¹ Igal, H-S²: ἔτι Enn.

¹ In spite of the sharp contrast implied between the sense-world and the intelligible world, the function of κινήσεις here below is described here in terms remarkably like those in which the functions of ἑτερότης and κίνησις in the intelligible world are described in VI. 7. 13. 11–16. And for Plotinus the function of movement and time in this world here below is positive. Such substantial existence

ON THE KINDS OF BEING III

must be considered in the same way as what they lead to. But what is the common element in change of quality and quantity and coming-to-be and the opposites of these, and in change of place, in so far as these are all movements? It is that each thing is not in the same in which it formerly was, and is not at rest or in total quiet, but, in so far as movement is present, is always being led away to something else and its being other is not abiding in the same; for movement perishes when there is no other; for this reason otherness is not in the having come to be in and remaining in another [state], but perpetual otherness. So time is always another, because motion makes time; for it is measured movement which does not stay still; for it runs along with movement, as if riding on it as it goes. But common to all is being a progress and a leading from potentiality and the possible to active actuality; for everything that is moved according to any kind of movement has the pre-existing potentiality to do this when it comes into motion.

23. And the movement which is in sense-objects comes in from another and shakes and drives and wakes and pushes the things which have a share in it, so that they do not sleep and are not in sameness, in order that they may be held together by this inquietude and this sort of fussiness which is an image of life.¹ But one must not think that the things which are being moved are movement: for walking is not the feet but the activity in the feet which comes from their potentiality. But since the potentiality is and coherence as the things here below have depend here on their being in motion and in III. 7.4. 19-29 on their being in time.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD VI. 3.

ἐνεργούντας πόδας ὁρᾶν μόνον ἀνάγκη, οὐ πόδας ἀπλῶς,
 10 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἡσύχαζον, ἀλλ' ἤδη μετ' ἄλλου, ἀοράτου
 μὲν τούτου, ὅτι δὲ μετ' ἄλλου, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
 ὁρωμένου τῷ τοὺς πόδας ὁρᾶν ἄλλον τόπον ἔχοντας καὶ
 ἄλλον καὶ μὴ ἡρεμεῖν· τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούσθαι¹ παρὰ τοῦ
 ἀλλοιουμένου, ὅτι μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ποιότης. ἐν τίνι οὖν ἡ
 κίνησις, ὅταν ἄλλο κινῇ, καὶ ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης
 15 δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἴη; ἄρα ἐν τῷ κινούντι; καὶ πῶς
 τὸ κινούμενον καὶ πάσχον μεταλήφεται; ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
 κινουμένῳ; διὰ τί οὖν ἐλθοῦσα οὐ μένει; ἢ δεῖ μήτε τοῦ
 ποιούντος ἀπηλλάχθαι μήτε ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἀπο-
 20 τετμημένην εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου εἰς ἐκεῖνο, οἶον
 πνοὴν εἰς ἄλλο. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ κινεῖν
 βαδιστικὴ ᾖ, οἶον ὥσε καὶ πεποίηκεν ἄλλον ἀλλάττειν
 αἰεὶ τόπον, ὅταν δὲ θερμαντικὴ, ἐθέρμανε· καὶ ὅταν ἡ
 δύναμις ὕλην λαβοῦσα εἰς φύσιν οἰκοδομῇ, αὔξεις,
 25 ὅταν δ' ἄλλη δύναμις ἀφαιρῇ, μείωσις τοῦ δυναμένου
 ἀφαίρεσιν παθεῖν μειουμένου· καὶ ὅταν ἡ γεννώσα φύσις
 ἐνεργῇ, γένεσις, ὅταν δὲ αὕτη ἀδυνατῇ, ἡ δὲ φθείρειν
 δυναμένη ἐπικρατῇ, φθορά, οὐχ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἤδη γεγονότι,
 ἀλλ' ἡ ἐν τῷ πορευομένῳ· καὶ ὑγίανσις δὲ κατὰ τὰ
 αὐτά, τῆς ποιεῖν δυναμένης ὑγίειαν ἐνεργούσης καὶ
 30 κρατούσης [ὑγίανσις],² τῆς δ' ἐναντίας δυνάμεως

¹ Theiler: ἀλλοιούμενον Enn.

² del. H-S¹.

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invisible, it is necessary to look only at the active feet, not simply the feet, as if they were at rest, but the feet already with something else; this is invisible, but because it is with something else, it is seen incidentally by looking at the feet occupying one place and then another and not staying still; but one sees the alteration from that which is altered, because its quality is not the same. In what, then, is the movement, when it moves something else, and indeed when it passes to actuality from an immanent potentiality? Is it in the mover? Then how will that which is moved and affected participate in it? But is it in that which is moved? Why then does it not stay when it has come? Now, it must not be separated from its producer nor in it, but from it and to that which is moved, and not be in that as cut off, but it comes from that and goes to that other, as a breath of wind goes to another. When, therefore, the potentiality of moving is a walking potentiality, it pushes, so to speak, and produces a continual change of place, but when it is a heating potentiality, it heats; and when the potentiality takes matter and builds it into a nature, it is growth, but when another potentiality takes away, it is diminution when that which has the potentiality of experiencing taking away is diminished; and when the generative nature is active, there is coming-to-be, but when this is impotent and that which has the potentiality of making things pass away is dominant, there is passing-away, not that which occurs in what has already come to be, but in that which is on the way; and becoming healthy works the same way, when that which has the potentiality of producing health is active (but the opposite potentiality produces the opposite re-

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τάναντία ποιούσης. ὥστε συμβαίνειν μὴ παρὰ τὰ ἐν οἷς
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐξ ὧν καὶ δι' ὧν [καὶ τὴν τῆς
κινήσεως ιδιότητα]¹ ποιὰν τὴν κίνησιν καὶ <τὴν τῆς
κινήσεως ιδιότητα>¹ τοιάνδε εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις.

24. Περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, εἰ τὸ ἄνω
φέρεσθαι τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον, καὶ τὸ κύκλῳ τοῦ ἐπ'
εὐθείας διοίσει, πῶς ἢ διαφορά, οἷον τὸ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς
καὶ ὑπὸ πόδας ῥίπτειν; καὶ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ὠστική μία·
5 εἰ μὴ τις ἄλλην τὴν ἄνω ὠθοῦσαν, καὶ ἄλλην λέγοι καὶ
ἄλλως τὴν κάτω πρὸς τὴν ἄνω φοράν, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ
φυσικῶς κινοῖτο, εἰ ἡ μὲν κουφότης εἴη, ἡ δὲ βαρύτης.
ἀλλὰ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς τὸν οἰκείον τόπον
φέρεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνταῦθα κινδυνεύειν παρὰ τὰ ἔξω τὴν
10 διαφορὰν γίνεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κύκλῳ καὶ ἐπ' εὐθείας, εἰ
οἷόν περ ἐπ' εὐθείας καὶ κύκλῳ περιθρέξαιεν, πῶς ἄλλη;
ἢ παρὰ τὸ τῆς πορείας σχῆμα, εἰ μὴ τις μικτὴν λέγοι
τὴν κύκλῳ, ὥς οὐ παντελῶς οὔσαν κίνησιν οὐδὲ πάντῃ
ἐξισταμένην. ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὅλως μία τις εἶναι ἡ τοπικὴ
τοῖς ἔξωθεν τὰς διαφορὰς λαμβάνουσα.

25. Σύγκρισις δὲ καὶ διάκρισις ἐπισκεπτέα πῶς. ἄρ'
ἕτεροι κινήσεις τῶν εἰρημένων, γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς,
αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως, τοπικῆς μεταβολῆς, ἀλλοιώσεως, ἢ
εἰς ταύτας αὐτὰς ἀνακτέον, ἢ τούτων τινὰς συγκρίσεις

¹ Igal, H-S².

